


Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY ■ JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2003

Officership



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From the Editor

Since 1922, *Military Review* has had several formats and designs. The current layout took form in the mid-1980s. Since then, the world has undergone many changes: the Soviet Union's demise, the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf war, operations in the Balkans, and most recently, operations against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. To meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment, the Army is developing the Objective Force. Similarly, *Military Review* will be redesigning its format to become a better forum for discussing the art and science of operational and tactical warfighting. To that end, we are soliciting suggestions to improve the U.S. Army's professional journal. Send recommendations to the managing editor at <milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil>.

In this issue, *Military Review* presents two sections: officership and effects-based operations. Officership—the office, duties, and obligations of a commissioned officer—is a subject of growing interest. In “Officership,” Colonel (Retired) Don Snider provides a framework for discussing officership and explains why its study is important. In “The Officer as Warfighter,” Majors Paul Yingling and John Nagl consider officers' warfighting dimension and officers' obligation to serve as ethical role models. In “The Officer as Servant,” Major Suzanne Nielson examines officers as servants to the Nation and as members of a profession.

Effects-based operations is another topic of increasing interest. To achieve a desired effect against an enemy force, commanders have used the doctrinal construct of task, purpose, and intent to provide subordinate commanders direction and guidance in ambiguous or problematic situations. Some commanders argue that current doctrine does not incorporate commander's intent sufficiently into the tasks assigned to subordinate commanders to allow them to act with confidence and decision. Major General James Dubik argues in “Effects-Based Decisions and Actions” that desired effects against the enemy should be the cornerstone of a subordinate commander's decisionmaking process rather than the current collection of task, purpose, and commander's intent. In “The New DOCC,” General Burwell B. Bell leads a group of authors in relating how III Corps is transforming its deep operations coordination cell to plan and attack enemy targets more effectively.

In other articles, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Lester W. Grau and Major James H. Adams III consider the feasibility of helicopter aerial combat in “Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat.” In “Strategy Revisited,” Major Isaiah Wilson III cautions against what appears to be the current practice of using actual or proposed military capabilities to formulate national security strategy. In “The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer,” Lieutenant General (Retired) G. A. Crocker reflects on what makes a successful executive officer. Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy, reviews Egypt's successful deception operations that preceded the Yom Kippur War in “The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warning.” As always, *Military Review* remains committed to publishing the best in contemporary military thinking. Let us know how we can do better.

MRR



Officership



Officership—the quality of being a commissioned officer—is a topic of growing interest among senior Army leaders. What does it mean to be a U.S. Army commissioned officer? In his introductory article “Officership,” Don Snider explains that the commissioned officer corps needs to develop a self-identity to which commissioned officers subscribe. He identifies four dimensions that provide a framework for discussing officership: the officer as warfighter; the officer as servant to the Nation; the officer as member of a profession; and the officer as leader of character. In “The Officer as Warfighter,” Majors Paul Yingling and John Nagl examine more deeply the commissioned officer’s roles as warfighter and as leader of character. Major Suzanne Nielson, in “The Officer as Servant,” considers the commissioned officer in the roles of servant to the Nation and as practitioner of a well-defined set of skills and specialized knowledge.

Officership: The Professional Practice

Colonel Don M. Snider, U. S. Army, Retired

GIVEN THE INCREASED operations tempo of the past decade, many in the Army family have lost comrades-in-arms, friends, or loved ones. How are we to remember these people's lives, services, and sacrifices? Did these young people, who had lived so little, died so young, and left so much behind, die in vain? How are members of the Army profession and the larger Army family to make meaning of such tragedies and to go on with their lives?

Army officers must have a clear understanding of who they are that goes far deeper than the work they do on a daily basis. Yet, a dominate self-concept as individuals is not held in common and often does not approximate the true meaning of being a commissioned Army officer, with all that a shared professional identity entails.¹

Army Officers are shorting themselves of an immense potential of inspiration and satisfaction because of their poorly conceived self-concept, which contributes directly to the dissatisfaction among junior officers and to the shortage of captains and the misutilization of lieutenants. Even if there were no other costs to the Army's effectiveness, having a poorly conceived self-concept is too high a price for the profession to bear.

In fairness, the lack of a commonly held self-identity is not the fault of younger officers. Since the end of the Persian Gulf war, the Army has focused little on junior officers' professional education and development. The Army's decade-long build-down, increasing operational deployments, and doing more with less has diverted attention elsewhere. The 11 September 2001 attack on America has exacerbated this condition. Not surprisingly, during the past decade, study after study, including the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study, has documented the erosion of morale and esteem

Two of the ATLDP's more disturbing conclusions are that "the Army's Service Ethic and concepts of Officership are neither well-understood nor clearly defined [and] that Army Culture is not 'healthy' due to the existence of 'a gap between beliefs and practices' that 'is outside the band of tolerance.'"

among junior officers and the widening gap of distrust between them and their officer leaders.²

How to Think About Professions

More so than occupations or organizations, professions focus on developing expert knowledge in individual members so they can apply specific expertise in a professional practice. Doctors perfect medical treatments; lawyers apply legal expertise to new cases; and the military develops new technologies and tactics to provide for the common defense. In most cases, professional expertise and practice is essential to the functioning of society and is beyond the average citizen's capabilities. Often, becoming a professional takes years of study and preparation.

Professional success is measured primarily by effectiveness—how well the practitioner succeeds—rather than by efficiency. Was the patient cured? Was justice served? Was the battle won and the homeland defended? Because of their expert knowledge and the moral obligations inherent in professional practices, professions focus heavily on developing individual members' expertise. A significant part of professional development is learning the ethics of the profession and individual and collective standards of practice. These are the attributes that create and help maintain the necessary trust between the profession and its clients. Western societies gen-

When the bureaucratic dominates the professional, as is arguably the case now, there is cause for immense tensions for individual professionals and for the institution as a whole. Militaries that do not resolve this tension in favor of their professional side can “die” in the professional sense. . . . and soon become little more than obedient military bureaucracies exhibiting little of the effectiveness of a vocational profession.

erally grant professions a large degree of autonomy to set standards, to police their ranks, and to develop their future members.

Some professions have a less visible, darker side. They compete fiercely for control over arenas or jurisdictions in which they seek to apply their expertise.³ A well-publicized example of such a competition is currently being waged between physicians and HMOs as they battle over the right to make patient-care decisions. Other professions face similar challenges as they seek to gain legitimacy in new fields while retaining decision rights in traditional jurisdictions.

The Army is embroiled in many such competitions today across a variety of jurisdictions, including the non-war jurisdiction (counterdrug operations, peace-keeping operations, and so on) in which the Army has often resisted, unsuccessfully, to compete; the jurisdiction of unconventional war, in which the Army is currently competing quite well; and the Army's traditional jurisdiction of conventional land warfare where its ability to compete has been compromised by a force structure considered to be too strategically immobile. The Army's competitors within these jurisdictions include the other two U.S. military professions (aerospace and maritime); foreign militaries; private companies and contractors (many started and led by former Army officers); and international organizations.⁴ These rivalries are not trivial, and competitive failure might well result in the Army's demise or integration into one of the other services, much as would happen with a noncompetitive business.

The three U.S. military professions are also government bureaucracies. Unlike professions, bureaucracies focus on routine applications of nonexpert knowledge, usually through standing operating procedures or policies and regulations, more than through the professional expertise of their employees, in whom often little is invested. Therefore, the Army is, on one hand, a vocational profession fo-

cused on developing expert knowledge of land warfare and its application by human experts, and on the other hand, it is a hierarchical bureaucracy focused on applying routine knowledge through operating routines, procedures, and checklists. The Army's current, highly centralized approach to unit training “by template,” which leaves little to the discretion of junior commanders, is an example of the latter.

This dual nature is unavoidable, though when the bureaucratic dominates the professional, as is arguably the case now, there is cause for immense tensions for individual professionals and for the institution as a whole.⁵ Militaries that do not resolve this tension in favor of their professional side can “die” in the professional sense. As their bureaucratic nature dominates, they increasingly squeeze professional practices into bureaucratic molds, tend increasingly to treat professionals as bureaucrats or mere employees, and soon become little more than obedient military bureaucracies exhibiting little of the effectiveness of a vocational profession. One need only look at western European militaries in the post-Cold War era to see such phenomena.

Given this unresolved tension in the Army today, it is paramount that officers—junior or senior—develop professional self-concepts drawn from a right understanding of their roles within the Army profession. Not only will this provide rich personal satisfaction, it will also help reduce unhealthy tensions within the officer corps.

Expert Knowledge and Professional Practice

If the Army is to remain a successful, competitive profession, it must have a clear concept of the expert knowledge it alone can provide. What expertise does it provide that the American people need and want and that can be applied to future situations?

Like other professionals, an infantry company commander has acquired an immense catalogue of expert knowledge—tactics; weapons capabilities; use of available fires; logistics; leadership and care of soldiers; how to work with other professionals (non-commissioned officers [NCOs]); the laws of land warfare; and so on. Once he receives an operational mission, his “practice” is similar to that of other professionals. He analyzes the situation (diagnosis), applies his expert knowledge to it (inference), then develops a plan and leads its execution (treatment).⁶ The essence of his professional practice is no different even if the task is to train his unit to standard on certain operational tasks.

Stryker infantry carrier vehicles are offloaded from a C-17 Globemaster III during a demonstration for senior Department of Defense and Congressional leaders, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, 16 October 2002.

US Army



The Army is embroiled in many . . . competitions today across a variety of jurisdictions, including the non-war jurisdiction (counterdrug operations, peacekeeping operations, and so on) in which the Army has often resisted, unsuccessfully, to compete; the jurisdiction of unconventional war, in which the Army is currently competing quite well; and the Army's traditional jurisdiction of conventional land warfare where its ability to compete has been compromised by a force structure considered to be too strategically immobile.

Army professionals' basic tasks are four-fold: prepare to kill, kill, prepare to die and, if necessary, die.⁷ A society needs soldiers to be well-schooled, effective in the arts of warfighting as a democratic Army and to use their expertise when and where directed. This fact alone points to why the Army needs dedicated commissioned officers. Under commission from the American people and the U.S. Government, and acting as their moral agent, officers provide overall direction to and leadership of the military institution by exercising legal command responsibilities over Army units at all echelons.

Samuel P. Huntington referred to this expertise generally as the "management of violence."⁸ Others use similar phrases. Recently, theorists of the social organization of expert work, as well as some military professionals, have made the same point. That is, commissioned officers, particularly senior leaders, direct and lead the Army profession by performing the following critical tasks:

- Bounding, prioritizing, and adapting expert knowledge of the profession for current and future needs of the client.

- Developing such knowledge into the human expertise of Army professionals for application to new situations (professional practice).

- Managing the profession's jurisdictional competitions to ensure the execution of assigned tasks, to remain legitimate, and to survive, serving the client as needed.⁹

Expert knowledge of the profession is the foundation of the officer's expertise and professional practice, and it enables the daily exercise of discretionary judgment to make decisions and to take actions that fulfill moral and legal responsibilities. An Army professional's broad field of expert knowledge contributes to forming the officer's unique self-concept.

The analytical framework in figure 1 allows visualization of several things vital to understanding the Army profession. Across the top are the four broad clusters of expert knowledge. These clusters are groupings of abstract knowledge that form the source of the officer's expertise.

The first cluster is military-technical knowledge of warfighting in land combat (leadership; combat and support doctrines; tactics, techniques, and

procedures; and so on). The second cluster, knowledge of military ethics, enables Army commanders, units, and individual soldiers to fight America's wars according to the legal and moral content of the

A society needs soldiers to be well-schooled, effective in the arts of warfighting as a democratic Army and to use their expertise when and where directed. . . . Under commission from the American people and the U.S. Government, and acting as their moral agent, officers provide overall direction to and leadership of the military institution by exercising legal command responsibilities over Army units.

profession's ethic. The third cluster is knowledge of human development (education, training, moral and character development, and so on) that enables the Army, like other true professions, to develop individual practitioners capable of applying the expertise of the profession when and where directed. Primarily the Army's strategic leaders use the last cluster, political-social knowledge, as they fulfill their responsibilities to resource the profession; to represent it in the councils of the Government and to the client (the American people); and to manage successfully its jurisdictional competitions.

In actuality, boundaries between areas of abstract knowledge are not as precise as the solid vertical lines in figure 1 suggest. For example, is the issue of force protection and how best to provide it an aspect of military-technical knowledge or of the profession's moral-ethical expertise? Or, does force protection rely more on the Army's expertise in political and social arenas (a matter of adapting successfully to political guidance to avoid casualties)?¹⁰

Obviously, addressing such issues involves expertise drawn from multiple areas of knowledge where boundaries are not clearly delineated. The point is clear, however. All officers must be experts to some degree (depending on rank and position) in every area of knowledge. Such is the necessary foundation for personal expertise and for continuing to develop as Army professionals.

As the framework in figure 1 indicates, each cluster of the profession's expertise encompasses multiple perspectives. The three perspectives come from the profession's client (American society); from the professional institution itself (the Army, collectively); and, from individual professionals (officers, NCOs, soldiers, or Army civilians). The horizontal boundaries between the groups and their perspectives denote interfaces of potential disagreement and tension between the Army and the society it serves (civil-military relations) and the profession and its individual members (Army-soldier relations).

The four clusters of expert knowledge, which ultimately become areas of expertise for all Army professionals, are what depict Army officers' shared identity. In figure 2, each area of expert knowledge corresponds logically to one identity. Thus, the four identities of the Army officer are warfighter, leader of character, member of the profession, and servant of the Nation.

Clearly, not all officers blend these identities into their dominant self-concept in the same manner or proportion. Infantry company commanders likely view themselves far more as warfighters than as members of a profession or as servants of the Nation. The opposite might be true of a major or lieutenant colonel assigned to the Army general staff at the Pentagon, who would more likely see themselves as resourcers of Army needs fighting jurisdictional battles with other military professions and private contractors.

The point is that all Army officers, regardless of branch or grade, should hold in some proportion all four identities. They must share a common profes-




Figure 1. Analytical framework for understanding the hierarchy of the Army profession's expert knowledge.

sional self-concept—a perspective of who they are that would provide meaning and, thus, motivation to their daily lives. Their unique warfighting expertise, the ethics under which they employ it, the Nation’s expectations for them, and service hardships inform military professionals of their calling’s nobility.

Walking the Talk

Two of the ATLDP’s more disturbing conclusions are that “the Army’s Service Ethic and concepts of Officership are neither well-understood nor clearly defined [and] that Army Culture is not ‘healthy’ due to the existence of ‘a gap between beliefs and practices’ that ‘is outside the band of tolerance.’”¹¹ Such findings are disturbing when one recalls the Army’s superb professionalism during the Persian Gulf war. On the other hand, such findings show what is well known but seldom acknowledged because of the profession’s often dysfunctional “can do” attitude; that is, living the life of an officer day after day, deployment after deployment, is a daunting task. Living such a life has become even more daunting during the past decade in which the Army profession has been overcommitted and under-resourced.

One of the quickest and most effective ways to restore trust within the Army officer corps and to address the gap in beliefs and practices is for officers to better “walk the talk” in every position of responsibility and authority in which they serve. Changing how Army officers see themselves and how each is motivated to perform will improve the climate and practices within every unit in every command in every region of the world where U.S. Armed Forces are deployed.

This is not to say that if all officers change their self-concept and motivation, all will be well within the Army. But self-concept is a source of individual motivation. Attitude and motivation influence behavior, and they can be used to great effect if they are placed in the correct professional context. If each officer better walks the talk to reflect congruence between Army beliefs and an officer’s personal practice, the problems noted within the profession’s training and leader development systems would be quickly and forthrightly leveraged toward ultimate resolution. To do so, officers must live principled lives both on and off duty. Doing so reflects a consistent set of time-tested principles that have proven best able to inform decisions of discretion and judgment. When deeply internalized from the contents of the Army’s professional ethic (Army’s values, warrior ethos, Ranger creed, commissioning oath, the Declaration of Independence, the preamble to the U.S. Constitution, and so on), such principles provide consistent, professional, and virtuous individual and collective behavior in officers’ daily lives. The officer corps’ time-tested principles include the following.¹²

Duty. Professional officers always do their duty, subordinating their personal interests to the requirements of the professional function. They are prepared, if necessary, to lay down their own lives and the lives of their soldiers in the Nation’s interest. When assigned a mission or task, its successful execution is first priority, above all else, with officers accepting full responsibility for their actions and orders in accomplishing it—and accomplishing it in the right way. The officer’s duty is not confined, however, to explicit orders or tasks; it extends to any circumstance involving allegiance to the commissioning oath.

Honor. An officer’s honor, derived through history from demonstrated courage in combat is of paramount importance. Honor includes the virtues of integrity and honesty. Integrity is the personal honor of the individual officer, manifested in all roles. In peace, the officer’s honor is reflected in consistent acts of moral courage. An officer’s word is an officer’s bond.

Loyalty. Military officers serve in a public vocation and their loyalty extends upward through the chain of command to the President as




Figure 2. Analytical framework showing that each area of expert knowledge corresponds logically to one identity.

The four clusters of expert knowledge, which ultimately become areas of expertise for all Army professionals, are what depict Army officers' shared identity. Each area of expert knowledge corresponds logically to one identity. Thus, the four identities of the Army officer are warfighter, leader of character, member of the profession, and servant of the Nation.

Commander in Chief and downward to all subordinates. Officers take care of their soldiers and their families. This loyalty is a central ingredient of the trust that binds the military profession to its public servant role.

Service. An officer's motivations are noble and intrinsic: a love for the technical and human aspects of providing the Nation's security and an awareness of the moral obligation to use that expertise for the benefit of society. The officer has no legacy except for the quality of his or her years of service.

Competence. The serious obligations of officership—and the enormous consequences of professional failure—establish professional competence as a moral imperative. More than knowing one's job or proficiency in the skills and abilities of the military art, professional competence in this sense includes worldly wisdom, creativity, and confidence. Called to their profession and motivated to master their practice of it, officers are committed to a career of study and learning.

Teamwork. Officers model civility and respect for others. They understand that soldiers of a democracy value an individual's worth and abilities,

both at home and abroad. But because of the moral obligation accepted and the mortal means employed to carry out an officer's duty, the officer also emphasizes the importance of the group as against the individual. Success in war requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the task of the group. The military ethic is cooperative and cohesive in spirit, meritocratic, and fundamentally anti-individualistic and anti-careerist.

Subordination. Officers strictly observe the principle that the military is subject to civilian authority and do not involve themselves or their subordinates in domestic politics or policy beyond the exercise of the basic rights of citizenship. Military officers render candid and forthright professional judgments and advice and eschew the public advocate's role.

Leadership. Officers lead by example, always maintaining the personal attributes of spiritual, physical, and intellectual fitness requisite to the demands of their chosen profession and that serve as examples to be emulated.

Developmental Goals

Developmental goals of all commissioned officers should be to better understand the four identities of the Army officer and how they most appropriately are integrated into individual professional practice—a life lived daily in a principled manner. Understanding that they are simultaneously warfighters, leaders of character, members of a profession, and servants of the Nation can provide a powerful self-concept with which to confront challenges with inspiration and motivation. A common, shared self-concept can greatly help officers fulfill the extensive, unremitting responsibilities of leading the Army profession. **MR**

NOTES

1. Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C. Cohen, "In Their Own Words: Army Officers Discuss Their Profession," in Don M. Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds. *The Future of the Army Profession* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 77-100.
2. See The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study online at <www.army.mil/features/ATLDP/ATLDP.htm>, accessed on March 2002. See also, Joseph J. Collins and T.O. Jacobs, "Trust in the Army Profession," in Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 39-58.
3. The competitive nature of modern professions is described in Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions* (University of Chicago Press, 1988).
4. For more on the Army's competitors, see Deborah Avant, "Privatizing Military Training: A Challenge to U.S. Army Professionalism," in Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 179-96; "America's Secret Armies," *US News and World Report* (4 November 2002): 38-43.
5. Extensive support for this statement is contained in "Project Conclusions," in Snider, Watkins, and Matthews.
6. For a detailed discussion of professional practice, see Abbott, chap. 25.
7. James Toner, *The Burden of Military Ethics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1995), 22-24.
8. For a comparison between earlier theorists of military professions, such as Samuel

P. Huntington, and the newer school of competitive, turf-war professions, see James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy in Military Professions," in Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 19-38.

9. Gregg F. Martin and Jeffery D. McCausland, "The Role of Strategic Leaders for the Future Army Profession," in Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 425-38.

10. This vexing problem is analyzed in considerable detail in Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, *Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 1999).

11. ATLDP Officer Study, Executive Summary, OS-8.

12. These principles were first published in this form in *USMA Strategic Vision, 2010* (West Point, NY: Office of the Superintendent, 1999), 8. Some might wonder why we suggest a set of principles for commissioned officers to live by when the Army already has a set of values. The answer is straightforward: they are different constructs created for different developmental purposes for professional cohorts with different responsibilities. Of course Army officers must value the institution's values as must all soldiers, but because of the moral responsibilities of their commissions, their daily "walk" must also reflect principles not now addressed in the current version of Army values, for example, in the principles of subordination and the moral imperative of professional competence, and so on.

Colonel Don M. Snider, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D., is Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Military Academy. He joined the civilian faculty in 1998 following three years in the Olin Chair as Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies. A career Army officer, he served three tours in Vietnam as an infantryman. Later, after battalion command in the 7th Infantry Division, he specialized in strategy and defense policy, serving consecutively as Chief of Plans, USAREUR; Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Army General Staff; and, as Director of Defense Policy on the National Security Council Staff, The White House.

The Army Officer as Warfighter

Major Paul Yingling, U.S. Army, and
Major John Nagl, U.S. Army

Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He may live to the age of retirement without seeing a battle; still, he must always be getting ready for it as if he knew the hour of the day it is to break upon him. And then, whether it comes late or early, he must be willing to fight—he must fight.

—Brigadier General C.F. Smith¹

THE MILITARY OFFICER must fill a number of roles, often simultaneously. He has responsibilities as a warfighter, as the Nation's servant, as a member of the profession of arms, and as a leader of character. These four roles are interrelated almost to the point of inseparability, but examining each separately allows a better understanding of their inherent complexities.

The central premise of this article is that preparing for battle is a lifelong developmental process and a worthy life's work. While fighting America's wars is not the professional soldier's only task, it is the task that only the professional soldier can do. Warfighting's complex arrangement of activities includes generating, applying, and sustaining combat power from the fort to the port to the fighting position to achieve the aims of policy. Most of the examples cited come from the realms of direct and indirect fire, but that fact stems more from our inability to discuss the other critical aspects of warfighting than it does from any contention that the point of the spear is somehow more important than the shaft.

Developing the set of skills necessary to manage violence in the Nation's service is a lifelong developmental process that begins when an officer receives his commission and continues throughout a career. Professionalism is a combination of competence and devotion to service that grows over time,

and growth occurs differently in each individual. There is no rank or position or level of education that clearly delineates the professional from the mere jobholder. Furthermore, the relationship between professionals at differing stages of career development is symbiotic. The younger professional benefits from the older one's wisdom and dignity, while the older benefits from the younger one's idealism and energy.

Mastering the art and science of warfighting encompasses every aspect of the human experience—physical, intellectual, and moral.² To understand fully the officer's responsibilities as a warfighter, we must explore in detail each of these aspects.

The Physical Dimension

The Army inspires soldiers to have the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, anytime.

—The Army Vision, 2002³

This statement from Army Vision, 2002, is as applicable to General George Washington's crossing of the Delaware in 1776 as it is to Task Force Eagle's crossing of the Sava in 1995. Warfighting always has been and always will be a struggle, not only against hostile forces but also against hostile environments. The officer as warfighter has a duty to prepare himself and his subordinates to cope with such physical rigors. This duty begins at the earliest stages of an officer's service.

After arriving at his first duty station, a second lieutenant is expected to set the standard for his platoon in physical toughness. Toughness, not mere fitness, is the standard by which soldiers measure leaders. That the lieutenant be in excellent physical condition is necessary, but not sufficient. More important is his willingness to share his soldiers' physical hardships. Sergeant Major John Stepanek, addressing a group of officer candidates, stated succinctly what they could expect from noncommissioned officers

(NCOs): “You can expect loyalty to your position, devotion to our cause, admiration for your honest effort, courage to match your courage, guts to match your guts, endurance to match your endurance, motivation to match your motivation, esprit to match your esprit, a desire for achievement to match your desire for achievement. . . . We won’t mind the heat if you sweat with us. We won’t mind the cold if you shiver with us. . . . And if the mission requires, we will storm the very gates of Hell, right behind you.”⁴

The importance of leader presence in the worst possible conditions—in the mud and rain during training or at the point of maximum danger during combat—cannot be overestimated. When the officer endures such hardships alongside his soldiers, the hardships become the glue that binds the unit into a cohesive fighting force. If the officer uses his rank or position to exempt himself from such hardship, the effect is exactly the opposite. The same hardships, endured only by lower ranking unit members, become the acid that dissolves the unit into a mob of sullen, angry individuals, each emulating his leader by looking first to his own safety and comfort.

As an officer grows in seniority, the obligation to endure hardships alongside his soldiers becomes

The officer as warfighter is duty bound to educate himself and his subordinates on the theory and practice of war. Such an education trains an officer not what to think but how to think. In this way, officers develop in themselves and in their subordinates what Fuller describes as “creative intelligence.” Applying creative intelligence allows officers to know when to adhere to time-honored wisdom and when to disregard convention and attempt the unconventional.

ever more important. Senior officers exposing themselves to the dangers of combat has an energizing effect on soldiers that defies rational calculation. Great commanders are aware of this effect and make every effort to bring their leadership to bear on the decisive point in the same way they bring to bear firepower, maneuver, or information. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz prescribed the commander’s presence as an anecdote for the soldier’s exhaustion: “As each man’s strength gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the whole comes to rest on the commander’s will alone. The ardor of his spirit must rekindle

the flame of purpose in others; his inward fire must revive their hopes.”⁵

General Matthew Ridgeway, famous for his presence at the front, put the matter this way: “I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and the sleet and the mud, sharing the same cold, miserable existence they had to endure.”⁶ Ridgeway’s ability to inspire his soldiers to face danger and hardship rested solely on his credibility. Ridgeway did not order his soldiers into battle from a comfortable headquarters. He led them into battle and shared their dangers and hardships in the process.

The Intellectual Dimension

The Nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to have its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.

—Sir William Francis Butler⁷

Courage is a necessary attribute in every soldier, but courage alone can never be sufficient for the officer to exercise his duties as a warfighter. A comprehensive knowledge of the theory and practice of warfare must govern his courage. Such knowledge enables him to win the Nation’s wars at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure. In the absence of such knowledge, warfare becomes (to use the Confederates’ painfully accurate critique of Union tactics at Fredericksburg) “simply murder.”

The officer as warfighter is duty bound to educate himself and his subordinates on the theory and practice of war. Such an education trains an officer not what to think but how to think. In this way, officers develop in themselves and in their subordinates what J.F.C. Fuller describes as “creative intelligence.”⁸ Applying creative intelligence allows officers to know when to adhere to time-honored wisdom and when to disregard convention and attempt the unconventional. In such an education, theory and practice remain tightly linked, with each informing the other. The officer who studies theory at the expense of practice degenerates into what Fuller calls “military scholasticism.” Such an officer becomes blind to the life-and-death struggle of combat, seeing his soldiers as so many pawns to be cleverly maneuvered and, ultimately, sacrificed. The officer who clings only to time-honored practice, uninformed by theory and blind to innovation, risks becoming “Prince Eugene’s mule.” Frederick the Great remarked that the unfortunate animal, after having experienced some 40 campaigns, was still a mule.



Matthew B. Ridgway inspecting the 25th Infantry Division front in west central Korea, March 1951.

General Matthew Ridgway, famous for his presence at the front, put the matter this way: “I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and the sleet and the mud, sharing the same cold, miserable existence they had to endure.” Ridgway’s ability to inspire his soldiers to face danger and hardship rested solely on his credibility.

The officer’s duty to develop intellectually begins at the earliest stages of his service. Every officer basic course graduate is expected to demonstrate an elementary understanding of the theory and practice of small unit combat operations. The theoretical aspects of such operations are expressed in Army doctrine. Doctrine is essentially a distillation of theory on how best to employ combat power to ensure mission accomplishment. Even the most basic battle drill on reacting to contact is grounded in a theory on the relationship between fire and maneuver. The practical aspects of such operations include the technical knowledge required to employ available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

The new officer immediately puts this knowledge into practice on arriving at his first assignment. Commanders expect second lieutenants to accomplish missions by applying Army doctrine and resources to real-world problems. Noncommissioned officers, with their wealth of experience, help young officers put doctrine and resources into practice. Every commander worth his salt advises the new lieutenant to

“listen to your NCOs.” However, that advice does not mean, “do what your sergeants say.” Rather, it means, “understand what your sergeants know.” As the young officer acquires more experience, his appreciation for the applications and limitations of doctrine grows as well.

As officers advance in seniority, their responsibilities increase and their education must keep pace. The lieutenant leads a platoon and conducts battle drills on a small objective. The lieutenant colonel commands a task force and employs combined arms tactics throughout an area of operations. The lieutenant general commands a joint task force and applies operational art to achieve the aims of national policy.

As an officer’s challenges become more unique and complex, doctrine recedes into the background, drawing into sharp relief the senior commander’s creative intelligence—Robert E. Lee at Chancellorsville—or lack thereof—George A. Custer at Little Bighorn. Lee and Custer violated the principle of mass by dividing their forces in the presence of a numerically superior enemy. Lee is rightly



Hamid Karzi and Frank L. "Buster" Hagenbeck talk to 10th Mountain Division soldiers at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, 30 March 2002.

The Army not only wins wars, it also maintains postwar peace almost everywhere it places its boots. In Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and perhaps soon in Iraq, U.S. Army officers serve the Nation's interests by maintaining stability and acting as a check on potential aggressors. Peacekeeping goes hand in hand with warfighting as a critical role of military officership, and it is likely to increase in importance in the post-Cold War world.

celebrated for his audacity; Custer is rightly condemned for his stupidity. A commander's intellect might well mark the difference between success and failure, and the Army must continue to recognize and encourage its warfighters' intellectual development so they know when to follow doctrine, when to violate it, and when to write it by their actions on future battlefields.

The Moral Dimension

We are completely devoted; we are members of a priesthood really, the sole purpose of which is to defend the Republic.

—General George C. Marshall⁹

While every aspect of warfighting is demanding, only the moral aspect of warfighting is paradoxical. To protect the State from the dangers of anarchy, the warfighter must be fierce enough to kill the State's enemies, but to protect the State from the dangers of tyranny, he must be gentle enough to re-

spect the freedoms of its citizens. Faced with this paradox, Socrates despaired of founding a republic that was both secure and just.

America's Republic has proven Socrates wrong. Our country is, in President Abraham Lincoln's eternal words, "a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal."¹⁰ This idea, that U.S. officers swear to defend against all enemies foreign and domestic, is enshrined in the world's oldest living constitution, the U.S. Constitution.

An officer derives legal and moral authority to employ force from his subordination to America's ideals. Legally, the President and Congress confer the officer's authority in the form of a commission, which gives the officer broad authority to act within the law to protect the Constitution. Morally, the officer's authority is derived from his role as a servant of society. The officer who subordinates his personal safety and comfort to the security of soci-

ety inspires subordinates to do likewise. America's Army of free citizens, inspired by examples of selfless service, has been and will remain the most potent military force on the planet. The graveyard of history is filled with petty tyrants and gangsters who underestimated the power of U.S. arms and ideals.

The young officer learns early to wield his legal authority lightly and to assert his moral authority boldly. The unit held together by an officer who only threatens punishment will soon dissolve in the face of the enemy. However, the unit bound by a shared belief in what is true, right, and just is actually made stronger in the crucible of combat. Sergeants teach young officers to speak to soldiers not by threatening punishment for doing wrong, but by explaining the necessity of doing right. In 1879, Major General John Schofield advised West Point cadets that "the discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment."¹¹ A Nation founded to affirm the dignity of every citizen can only be defended by affording that same dignity to every soldier.

As officers advance in seniority, the necessity of wielding arms in accordance with America's ideals becomes ever more important. In America's short history, the world has grown smaller and more dangerous, and the U.S. Army has necessarily grown larger and more powerful. So powerful a force can be an instrument of good or evil, depending on the character of those who command it. The officer is duty bound to achieve the aims of policy through the application of violence. However, that violence must be applied in a manner consistent with America's laws and treaty obligations as well as her sense of decency. The officer must remember that he carries into battle not only America's arms, but also her honor.

The Army is raised by a free society to preserve the freedom of the American people and their allies; it must never be employed as an instrument of repression either abroad or at home. The singular challenge for the officer is to wield the enormous power of America's arms in such a way as to inspire awe and fear in its enemies while retaining the respect and affection of its citizens.

The Changing Challenges of Leadership

And through all this welter of change and development, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars.

—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur¹²

The world has changed dramatically in only a few years' time, which has caused profound implications for the military profession. The events of 11 Sep-

tember 2001 are not only what have provoked changes in officership challenges; the end of the Cold War is also forcing us to rethink our responsibilities. The demise of a nation-state and political system with the will and the ability to eradicate the United States is a fundamental sea-change in the international system that created corresponding

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changes in officers' responsibilities. We are guardians of our Nation's place in the world order; when that order changes, so too must our understanding of our responsibilities change.

The Soviet Union's demise does not lessen the challenge of officership; on the contrary, when the threat to the Nation is evident and symmetrical, the physical, moral, and especially the intellectual challenges of officership are comparatively simple to understand, if not always easy to achieve. Generations of Army officers came of age eating, sleeping, and breathing the tactics and organization of the Group Soviet Forces Germany. To this day, they can rattle off the number of Soviet amphibious infantry combat vehicles from divisional and regimental reconnaissance they expect to see in a brigade sector before the combat reconnaissance patrol shows its much-loved face. However, when we can no longer be certain of our enemy's order of battle, or even who our enemy is likely to be, the officer's task becomes correspondingly more difficult.

Officers of the 21st century have shed none of their responsibilities to be competent warfighters. The current prospect of a conventional invasion of Iraq constantly reminds us that competence in heavy armored operations remains essential to the Nation's survival. Yet even as we sharpen our tank gunnery skills, and as our light infantry and Special Forces soldiers continue the search for Osama bin-Laden in other countries in the Middle East, we are reminded that war and peace are profoundly political activities.

MacArthur is remembered in history as much for writing the Japanese constitution and establishing a

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peaceful, stable postwar Japanese nation as he is for his island-hopping campaign across the Pacific. The Army not only wins wars, it also maintains postwar peace almost everywhere it places its boots. In Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and perhaps soon in Iraq, U.S. Army officers serve the Nation's interests by maintaining stability and acting as a check on potential aggressors. Peacekeeping goes hand in hand with warfighting as a critical role of military officership, and it is likely to increase in importance in the post-Cold War world.

As Saint Augustine reminds us, the only purpose for war is to create a better peace. As the officer applies his expertise in warfighting, he must constantly keep that better peace in mind. The 21st-century officer must be able to transition rapidly across the spectrum of operations. To create a better peace, he must have the ability to lead troops in the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. These operations might oc-

cur simultaneously, and the transition from one to the other will often be made at the discretion of junior leaders. The officer who wins the war and loses the peace is no more professional than the physician who saves a patient's leg at the expense of his spinal cord.

The physical demands of peacekeeping do not differ appreciably from those of warfighting. That the peacekeeper on his beat in Kosovo remains alert and physically ready is just as essential as it is for the tank commander in Kuwait. However, the moral—and especially the intellectual—requirements of officership are much more difficult in a world in which officers serve to deter and prevent war as much as to win it. Officers must understand and appreciate the languages and cultures of a number of states and nations that might or might not pose a threat to the Nation. How well officers perform their duties might be decisive in determining whether those states become friend or foe.

On 11 September 2001, we learned again that military security in and of itself is insufficient. The most powerful military the world has ever seen was powerless against a cowardly attack on unarmed civilians. In his 1961 inaugural address, President John F. Kennedy issued "a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, 're-joining in hope, patient in tribulation'—a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself."¹³ Today's Army officers must recognize the fundamental truth of Kennedy's call. Succeeding in the long twilight struggle that has been thrust on us demands all of the physical, moral, and intellectual energies we can bring to bear to prepare for the responsibilities we must bear as warfighters and as officers of the world's most vital and powerful Army. **MR**

NOTES

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Major John Nagl is Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, Fort Riley, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), an M.Phil. and a D.Phil. from Oxford University and an MMAS from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS), Southwest Asia, and Germany. He taught international relations and national security studies at USMA. He is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

Major Paul Yingling is Chief of Plans, 2d Infantry Division, Korea. He received a B.A. from Duquesne University, an M.A. from the University of Chicago, and he is a graduate of CGSC and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He has served in a variety of troop leading and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Korea.

The Army Officer as Servant

Major Suzanne Nielsen, U.S. Army

The Army exists for one purpose—to serve the Nation. For over 225 years, American Soldiers have answered the Nation's call to duty, faithfully and selflessly performing any mission that the American people have asked of them.

—The Honorable Thomas E. White
and General Eric K. Shinseki¹

MEN AND WOMEN who become officers in the U.S. Army take an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. After this shared beginning, however, officers' views on what it means to serve as commissioned leaders diverge. Researchers Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C. Cohen, who looked at how officers view themselves, discovered that Army officers do not have a shared conception of the nature of their special expertise or their roles.² Two such roles are the officer as a servant of the Nation and the officer as a member of a profession.

A Servant of the Nation

In January 2000, while serving on the faculty at West Point, I had the opportunity to teach to second-year cadets a military science class called "Perspectives on Officership." The course was organized around four perspectives on officership: the officer as warfighter, the officer as leader of character, the officer as servant of the Nation, and the officer as a member of a time-honored profession. During the readings and discussions on the officer as servant, several cadets surprised me with their negative reactions. One cadet in particular did not want to see himself in this role. To him, being a servant was uninspiring and even demeaning; it took us a while to get past the term "servant" to be sure we were talking about the same thing.

What does it mean for an Army officer to be a servant of the Nation? Fundamentally, this perspective is tied to the manner of appointment of officers and the oath they take upon commissioning. With the advice and the consent of the Senate, the President appoints commissioned officers. Therefore, officers' authority derives from the executive authority of the President. However, as with many powers of the Government, the President and Congress share authority over military affairs. While the U.S. Constitution says that the President shall serve as the Commander in Chief, it also gives Congress the authority to declare war; to raise and support armies; to regulate the Armed Forces; and to provide for "organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia."³ Therefore, being a servant of the Nation as an Army officer means serving the American people in the way that elected executive branch and Congressional officials interpret the Nation's interests and values.

This latter point is important to remember. Army officers do serve the Nation, but not based on directly expressed popular preferences. In our representative system of government, elected leaders, not Army officers, are responsible for deciding how the U.S. Army can best serve the American people. If political leaders are wrong or make mistakes, they are accountable only to the other branches of government and ultimately the citizenry. Therefore, being a servant of the Nation requires that Army officers have respect for the democratic institutions of American society and have faith in the democratic process.

For officers to recognize the positive contribution that America's free press makes to democracy is also important. Although relations between the military and the media in the United States have not always been harmonious, Army officers should appreciate that a free press plays a vital role in preserving

the open, democratic political process that officers swear to protect.

So what does being a servant of society *not* mean for an Army officer? It does not mean that Army officers are responsible for interpreting the will of

Carl von Clausewitz said political aims "are the business of the government alone." Military officers have the responsibility to preserve their status as apolitical but loyal junior partners to the Nation's political leadership. Leaders who fulfill their duties in this manner are best situated to serve as constructive contributors to the difficult decisions political leaders must make.

the American people or serving as policy entrepreneurs. Military expertise has a role to play in the formulation of national security policy, but such expertise also has its limits. Important policy choices, both foreign and domestic, are only partially affected by technical considerations and almost always involve tradeoffs in values. Take the example of health-care policy. One relevant question might be whether a particular plan would provide more and better care to those who need it. In other words, will it work? Technical experts should participate in answering this question. A second issue is whether it is of greater value to devote the resources to that plan rather than to some other worthwhile purpose. In other words, does the plan actually respond to the American people's interests and values? This is a question for the Nation's elected leaders.

Similar issues surround U.S. military intervention abroad. Important questions here relate to whether a particular use of military power will achieve stated objectives, at what level of risk, and at what cost. In sorting through these issues, Army officers have a role to play. However, an equally important question is whether a particular use of military power reflects the American people's interests and values. Only the President and elected leaders in Congress have the responsibility and legitimate authority necessary to make this choice. As military theorist Carl von Clausewitz said, political aims "are the business of the government alone."¹⁴ Military officers have the responsibility to preserve their status as apolitical but loyal junior partners to the Nation's political leadership. Leaders who fulfill their duties in this manner are best situated to serve as constructive contributors to the difficult decisions political leaders must make.

Historically, the Army has been seen as a servant of society, fulfilling the country's needs at different stages in its development. In *The Masks of War*, Carl Builder discusses this reputation and examines the personalities of the U.S. military services and their possible effect on U.S. defense policymaking.⁵ Builder argues that of "all the military services, the Army is the most loyal servant and progeny of this nation, of its institutions and people. If the Army worships at an altar, the object worshiped is the country, and the means of worship are service."⁶ He points out that when the Army writes about itself, the themes are "the depth of roots in the citizenry, its long and intimate history of service to the nation, and its utter devotion to country."⁷ In Builder's assessment, these themes represent deeply held beliefs about what "the Army thinks it is and what it believes in."⁸

In 1989, Builder noted a threat to this longstanding self-identity: "[S]omething happened to the Army in its passage through World War II that it liked," and the Army developed a split personality.⁹ Some officers had come to see the Army as the "defender of Europe," with a focus on the high-intensity conflict which that self-image entails. Others in the Army sought to return to the Army's traditional, historical role as the Nation's handyman.¹⁰ Although Builder wrote his book during the last years of the Cold War, his arguments still resonate. Surely it would not be difficult to find in the Army today an officer who would argue that the Army's responsibility to "fight and win the Nation's wars"—with the high-intensity focus that phrase usually implies—is both the beginning and the end of the story.

We begin to see some of the challenges officers face as servants of the Nation. First, what if Army officers do not like the missions the Army receives? If World War II showed some in the Army the kind of war they would like to fight, the Vietnam war showed them the kind of war they wanted to avoid.¹¹ In November 1984, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger set out certain criteria for the use of force, criteria that were attractive to many in uniform. His speech became a touchstone in this debate.¹² Weinberger's requirements included the following:

- That vital interests be at stake.
- That forces be committed wholeheartedly with the intent to win.
- That objectives be clear.
- That public support be present.

The Weinberger doctrine suggested to military leaders that force would only be used under condi-



Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger at Fort Lewis, Washington, 1984.

The Weinberger doctrine suggested to military leaders that force would only be used under conditions more favorable than conditions present during the Vietnam conflict. . . . Colin Powell supplemented the Weinberger doctrine with his own perspective on the use of force [which emphasized] “quick, decisive actions and prompt exits.”

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In the 1990s, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell supplemented the Weinberger doctrine with his own perspective on the use of force. Although Powell disavowed a rigid checklist, his views on the benefits of overwhelming force were perceived by at least one observer to constitute a doctrine of their own, with an emphasis on “quick, decisive actions and prompt exits.”¹³

A danger associated with simplistically embracing the Weinberger and Powell doctrines is that their premises undermine the status of officers as servants of the Nation. In effect, the doctrines suggest that the Army (as well as the other services) respond to the direction of political leaders only if certain preconditions are met. Undoubtedly, senior military officers need to give political leaders assessments of feasibility, costs, and risks associated with planned military operations. However, the ultimate decision to employ the services belongs to political rather than military figures. This perspective, of course, is perfectly in accordance with the Army’s current capstone doctrinal Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Opera-*

tions, which highlights the Army’s “Proud History of Full Spectrum Operations.”¹⁴

A second potential challenge to the Army officer’s identity as a servant of the Nation arises when policy decisions act against the interests of the Army as an institution. Examples of such choices include budget reductions, canceling weapons programs, and changes in force structure. How should Army officers respond? As with the use of force, officers would be negligent if they did not provide civilian leaders with assessments of the costs and risks associated with various policy choices. In addition, officers at the most senior level face the challenge of remaining loyal to their executive branch superiors while also responding to Congress’ constitutionally mandated right to exercise oversight. However, this communication should take place behind closed doors as much as possible. When officers attempt to serve as shapers of public opinion, they step out of the role of servants of society and into some other capacity.¹⁵

General Creighton W. Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army from 1972 to 1974, was a strong combat leader who set a good example as a servant of the

Nation. Abrams was a key architect of major reforms in the Army that helped the institution recover from Vietnam and win decisively in the Persian Gulf war. He was known also for avoiding the limelight

A second potential challenge to the Army officer's identity as a servant of the Nation arises when policy decisions act against the interests of the Army as an institution. Examples of such choices include budget reductions, canceling weapons programs, and changes in force structure. How should Army officers respond?

and for the highest standards of loyalty to military and civilian superiors. Perhaps the highest praise Abrams received came from Lieutenant General Ralph Foster, Abrams' Secretary of the General Staff, who said, "He had a deep loyalty. . . . He put the Army first in his life because it was the thing that he had to do, but what he [actually] put first was the country."¹⁶

A Professional

In addition to being a servant of the Nation, an Army officer is also the practitioner of a profession. What does this mean? Certainly the word "professional" has different meanings in different contexts. When discussing athletes, for example, the term "professional" is contrasted with the term "amateur" and means little more than that the athlete is paid for his or her performances. In the Army we might describe someone's behavior as "professional" or "unprofessional" according to whether or not an individual controls his temper or his vocabulary. A third use of the term "professional" is associated with variations in social status. For example, one can contrast a profession with a mere craft or mere occupation. In other words, claims to professional status might be nothing more than claims to greater prestige.

None of these uses of the term really illuminates what it means to an individual Army officer to be a practitioner of a profession. Fortunately, a recent project on the future of the Army profession has suggested a useful way of thinking about the issue.¹⁷ The authors of the project took sociologist Andrew Abbott's *The System of Professions*, as a starting point.¹⁸ Abbott defines professions as "exclusive occupational groups" that apply "somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases."¹⁹ The tasks that professions perform are "human problems amenable to expert service."²⁰ The relatively exclusive group we are discussing is the Army's officer corps, and the


human problem Army officers address with expert service is military security, particularly as it pertains to land-based warfare. Abbott's definition is helpful because it clarifies just what it is about being an Army officer that makes one a professional while leaving behind much of the baggage that can be associated with that term. However, to be fully useful, Abbott's formulation requires further development.

One important question that we must answer relates to the nature of the Army officer's special expertise. In a 1957 discussion of the officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, Samuel P. Huntington cited Harold Lasswell's phrase "the management of violence" and argued that it summed up the special expertise of professional military officers.²¹ Huntington argued that "the direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer."²² This is helpful, but it needs further refinement. The Army's leadership doctrine is a useful place to begin.

Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, argues that the "Know" component of the Army's "Be, Know, Do" leadership framework tells the members of the Army that they must develop four skills: "You must develop **interpersonal skills**, knowledge of your people and how to work with them. You must have **conceptual skills**, the ability to understand and apply the doctrine and other ideas required to do your job. You must learn **technical skills**, how to use your equipment. Finally, warrior leaders must develop **tactical skills**, the ability to make the right decisions concerning employment of units in combat" [emphasis in original].²³

Army leadership doctrine also recognizes that mastery of these skills requires different specific competencies at different levels of responsibility. These requirements are cumulative. As military officers become more senior and develop the competencies they will need at the organizational and strategic levels of leadership, they must retain the skills of direct leaders.

Despite the usefulness of the Army's leadership doctrine, difficult questions remain. FM 22-100 is written for all members of the Army—officer and enlisted, civilian and military. Because it does not distinguish between the roles of these different Army members, FM 22-100 leaves several questions unanswered. For example, is there required of the Army's commissioned officers a unique professional expertise that is distinct from that required of the Army's noncommissioned officers or civilians? Answering "yes" is easier than drawing the boundary lines. What are the implications for the content of the Army officer's expertise that stem from increased



Soldiers pass out comic books designed to warn Bosnian children about land mines, 2001.

Clausewitz is famous for recognizing that war is a subordinate phenomenon whose logic is provided by political ends. . . . The changing nature of warfare makes it useful to reconsider the level at which this understanding is important. In today's stability and support operations where small unit actions can have strategic impact, even officers operating at the small unit level need to appreciate the subordination of the use of force to political purposes.

specialization under the current officer personnel management system? Is there still a core expertise common to all officer specialties? These are difficult issues that the Army's officer corps will probably wrestle with for years to come.

Even after the content of Army officers' expertise is fully articulated, it should be recognized that for Army officers to remain effective the borders of this expertise will have to change over time. Gaining additional perspective on this issue is possible by looking at the work of others who have thought deeply about ground combat. For example, some of what Clausewitz says about military expertise is still relevant today. However, a fully adequate formulation for officers operating in the current en-

vironment would need to include requirements that did not exist in Clausewitz's time.

One issue on which Clausewitz's insights are enduring is the relationship between the use of force and politics. Clausewitz is famous for recognizing that war is a subordinate phenomenon whose logic is provided by political ends. Part of the particular expertise of Army officers is an understanding of this relationship and an ability to support the achievement of political aims with military means. The Army has recognized this principle in its leadership and operational manuals, requiring strategic leaders and commanders to appreciate the relationship between political ends and military means.²⁴ Even on this issue, however, the changing nature of warfare makes it

useful to reconsider the level at which this understanding is important. In today's stability and support operations where small unit actions can have strategic impact, even officers operating at the small unit level need to appreciate the subordination of the use of force to political purposes.

Another area of continuity relates to the skills that officers bring to bear in combat. While Clausewitz holds that the logic of war comes from politics, he also argues that war has its own unique grammar.²⁵ The military officer must understand the grammar

Abbott defines professions as "exclusive occupational groups" that apply "somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases." The tasks that professions perform are "human problems amenable to expert service." Huntington argues that "the direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer."

of war, including the nature of military forces, tactics, and strategy, with a focus on the central task of combat.²⁶ Clausewitz also recognizes the special nature of the conditions under which officers apply their knowledge. He portrays war as an environment ruled by physical exertion, uncertainty, and fear, in which friction and a determined enemy work to thwart success. According to Clausewitz, an expert operating in this realm must have both theoretical knowledge and experience, and these attributes must be underpinned by strong character.²⁷ Clausewitz's argument reaffirms the Army's current emphasis on conceptual, technical, and tactical skills and the need to be able to bring them to bear under the most challenging conditions.

While Clausewitz's insights provide useful perspective, his conception of military expertise is in many ways now incomplete. Current Army doctrine is much stronger than Clausewitz's work on the topic of interpersonal skills and their worth in enabling effective leadership. Clausewitz discusses the importance of effective leadership to success in war, but he emphasizes the leader's individual knowledge and ability rather than the leader's ability to effectively interact with others. In addition, today's Army officer must be prepared to go to war with the Army's sister services as part of a joint team. This is an aspect of needed expertise Clausewitz does not address. These points illustrate that the special expertise of the Army officer will be dynamic, and the profession will have to adapt along with changes

in technology, society, national security strategy, and the international environment. Officers need to draw on operational experiences, the professional education system, and self-directed efforts to enhance their expertise and keep themselves up to date.

In addition to Abbott's mention of special expertise, another important aspect of his definition is the argument that a profession engages in the reasoned application of abstract knowledge to particular cases. Some observers have argued that the Army's professionalism has been threatened recently by greater bureaucratization, with one indicator being the increasingly rote application of formulaic solutions to particular problems.²⁸ One challenge to today's Army officers is not only to know the "approved" doctrinal solution, but to understand why that solution does or does not make sense and the conditions under which it might change. In 1984, Colonel Huba Wass de Czege wrote that *"the fundamental key to controlling and integrating change effectively is to raise the level of the knowledge and practice of the science and art of war in our Army"* [emphasis in original].²⁹ The challenge implied in this remark is a call to Army officers to act as professional custodians of a particular and dynamic body of expert knowledge and to take part in knowledge development as well as knowledge application.

The nature of the expert knowledge of the professional Army officer has an additional implication. As stated in FM 22-100, the Army is and must continue to be a values-based institution. The seven core values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.³⁰ At the institutional level, these values constitute a professional ethic. Of course values also operate at an individual level; officers bring to their service their own sets of values.

The Army's professional ethic is strongest when two conditions are present: first, when the actual environment in the Army reflects the Army's professed values and, second, when individual values and the Army's values are compatible. When these two conditions are not present, the professional ethic is weakened.³¹ Because of the importance of the Army's professional military ethic to effectiveness, the Army's officer corps must work to maintain its strength.

The Army's professional ethic is related to the officer's expert knowledge in at least three ways. First, armies can be dangerous to the societies they are created to serve. Therefore, the Army officer's expertise must be accompanied by values so the officer's military skills are only used in the service of legitimate authority. Second, and this has been more obvious at some times during the Nation's his-

tory than at other times, Army officers perform a vital service to the country by participating with the other armed services in the Nation's defense. This function requires dedication, because failure is not an option, and selflessness, because service members might have to put their lives at risk. The determinants of behavior when it matters most are values and trust in the Army's leaders. Finally, the Army officer's expertise must be governed by the Army's values because Army leaders are responsible for the lives and welfare of their soldiers.

In all these areas, the officer's role as a servant of the Nation and the officer's role as a practitioner of a profession merge. Army officers apply their expert knowledge only when called to do so by legitimate authorities, in protection of the country's interests and values, and with a heavy sense of responsibility for the sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.

Because of the nature of the military function, the values that are necessary in a military context do not exactly mirror the values of the society from which the Army stems. One aspect of the greatness of American society is the room it provides for individual expression, achievement, and growth. In contrast, while the individual is still valued in a military context, military-effectiveness requires greater emphasis on the welfare of the group and the sub-

ordination of self. Army officers must articulate these differences and defend them if necessary. The Army officer corps must also serve as the custodian of the Army's professional ethic and police its own ranks accordingly.

In sum, the Army officer is a professional able to apply a body of expert knowledge about warfare to particular scenarios. The necessary knowledge is gained through both theoretical study and practical experience and evolves over time. In addition, the officer's profession is intrinsically values-based. The professional uses his or her expert knowledge to protect the values and interests of the American people as defined by their political representatives. In so doing, the officer accepts the weighty responsibility for the welfare of the soldiers under his or her command.

When the officer takes the oath of commissioning, he or she accepts the obligation to be a servant to the Nation and to become an expert member of a challenging profession. Along with the two other perspectives on officership—the officer as a leader of character and the officer as a warfighter—these roles define what it means to serve as a commissioned leader in the U.S. Army. An officer corps that embraces the challenges of each of these roles will be able to lead the Army effectively and confidently through the 21st Century. **MR**

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20. *Ibid.*, 35.
21. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 11.
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*Major Suzanne Nielsen, U.S. Army, currently attends the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. She holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and a M.A. from Harvard University, where she is a Ph.D. candidate. She served previously in military intelligence units in the continental United States and Germany. She has also served as an assistant professor of international relations at USMA. Her publications include "Rules of the Game? The Weinberger Doctrine and the American Use of Force," in *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston, McGraw-Hill, 2002), and the U.S. Army War College monograph, "Political Control Over the Use of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective" (2001).*

Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat



Ka-50 HOKUM illustration by John E. Richards

**Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired,
and Major James H. Adams III, U.S. Marine Corps**

Helicopters are proliferating among the world's armies. This growing inventory includes armed helicopters equipped with weapons systems suitable for engaging other helicopters in aerial combat. In a major regional conflict, armed helicopters might pose a threat that neither the U.S. Air Force nor U.S. Army is prepared to counter.

IN THE 1990s, the coalition air forces enjoyed unquestioned air superiority during Operation Desert Storm over the skies of the Persian Gulf, during the NATO air operation over Bosnia, and during the NATO operation against Kosovo. Despite this overarching air superiority, some Iraqi and Serbian military aircraft continued to fly practically unhindered. Such aircraft included helicopters and prop-driven, fixed-wing aircraft that flew low and slow for short hops.

Although Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) airborne radar can detect practically any moving object, aircraft radar operators routinely screen out objects moving slower than 85 miles per hour to avoid tracking motor vehicles. Doing this also screens out most slow-flying aircraft. Even when slow-flying aircraft were detected, fast-moving jets were uninterested or were too stressed to be able to engage the slower aircraft before they had landed and moved under shelter. Even in ideal circumstances, fast-moving jets are hard pressed to engage slow-moving aircraft because they fly low, employ elementary electronic countermeasures, or take evasive action.

In future conflicts, U.S. ground forces might face a new air threat for which U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Army air defenses are not fully prepared. Helicopter gunships or utility helicopters (UHs) armed with antitank guided missiles and chain guns can pop up to engage U.S. ground forces, then disappear. Accompanying ground-based air defense (AD) forces usually require line-of-sight (LOS) to engage aircraft. The best LOS is normally found on open ground or at the top of commanding heights, but it is often difficult to get AD elements to these positions, particularly when the unit is moving. Ground-based AD assets are challenged to provide adequate coverage in difficult terrain.

The ideal air defense against enemy rotary-wing and slow-moving, fixed-wing aircraft is an AD system situated in the same environment as the attacking helicopters. The system would then enjoy rapid target acquisition, identification, and unimpeded fields of fire. An armed helicopter or slow-moving close air support (CAS) aircraft (such as the A-10) is the ideal counter to a low-altitude, low-air-speed threat. Such aircraft can readily engage threat systems with rockets, guided missiles, and automatic cannon, and

can quickly offset the threat to the ground force since the opposing aircraft must contend with the ground force and the attacking aircraft simultaneously. The A-10's future is uncertain, so in the next decade, the Army might need to train and equip heliborne assets to assume the anti-helicopter mission.

A major problem with the Army's assuming the rotary-wing air-superiority role is that Army aviation and Air Force assets will have to be synchronized. Army aviation must integrate into the USAF's planning process and configure its command and control (C2) systems to receive reports and warnings from USAF systems such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Army aviation and the Air Force have a history of not talking to each other—a bad habit that has resulted in such unfortunate incidents as the fatal USAF attack on Army helicopters during Operation Provide Comfort in 1994. During the Kosovo crisis, Army aviation and the Air Force again proved they were not “talking” to each other during the ponderous deployment of Task Force Hawk. The door swings both ways, but the fact remains that Army aviation has derived few lessons about working with the Air Force and vice versa.¹

Currently, Army helicopters are not specially equipped for aerial combat. The Army had mounted short-range Stingers on some observation helicopters (OH-58s) to protect Apaches while in battle positions, but the OH-58s were phased out of the inventory because they were too slow to keep up with the Apaches and because they lacked the optics for aerial combat.² The on-again-off-again Comanche, which is an impressive aircraft that might be able to conduct aerial combat, is supposed to take the OH-58's reconnaissance role. Some provisions and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to mount short-range Stinger missiles on Army Apaches have been made, but there is no developed Army doctrine, partly because the Army has no current peer competitor and does not expect to meet quantities of opposing helicopter gunships in future conflicts. However, as the Army's mission changes from forward deployment to force projection, the probability of this happening increases. Helicopter gunships and armed utility helicopters are increasingly common worldwide. In undeveloped theaters where there are no nearby hard-surfaced airfields, USAF assets will be hard pressed to provide continual close-air and air-defense support. The rapid deployment forces the Army is developing are limited in AD weapons. There might well be a need for Army helicopter aviation to develop an aerial combat capability

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against enemy helicopters and CAS aircraft.

Helicopter v. helicopter combat began in much the same fashion as fixed-wing aerial combat began in World War I—in chance encounters between opposing aircraft. These encounters led to individual aerial duels using individual sidearms, then on-board ordnance, or whatever else was available. In the late 1960s, a U.S. utility helicopter (a UH1-C) shot down a North Vietnamese AN-2 Colt biplane. During the Falkland Islands war, British helicopters dueled with Argentinean fixed-wing aircraft, and Argentinean helicopters fired at British Harrier jets. According to Russian sources, at least 53 helicopter v. helicopter fights were recorded during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The bulk of the helicopters shot down during these fights were unarmed combat support helicopters downed by helicopter gunships. Also Iranian AH-1 Cobra helicopters successfully attacked fixed-wing jet aircraft.³

New helicopter gunship designs include specific aerial combat capabilities, and European and South African aviation firms are developing such aircraft. Russia, despite economic and social problems, is actively involved in developing helicopters optimized for aerial combat.

Enter the Black Shark and the Alligator

The Russians developed the Mi-28 (NATO designation HAVOC) during the 1970s; it made its first appearance in the early 1980s. The Mi-28, which is a conventional two-rotor attack helicopter with a maximum flying speed of 300 kilometers per hour (kmph), can fly rearward and sideways at speeds up to 100 kmph, hover turn at 45 degrees per second, and perform aerial stunts such as loops and snap-rolls.⁴ The Mi-29 carries 16 Vikhr [Whirlwind] laser-guided antitank missiles, which can fly 420 meters per second (mps) to a maximum guided range of 8 kilometers (km). The Vikhr has an impact fuze and a proximity fuze; the pilot chooses one or the

Ambush or abeam attacks should work particularly well against helicopter forces whose antiarmor attack doctrine calls for on-line-abreast attack formations, which individual helicopters have little maneuver room to escape the ambush.



The optimal time to attack is when antiarmor attack gunships have missiles in the air (either on-the-wire or squirting lasers). Most crews lose situational awareness at this point because they are concentrating solely on their target. Diminished situational awareness allows the ambush force to turn the flank, engage, then egress, all the time remaining at maximum missile range. Aerial ambushes cause a great deal of confusion and further loss of situational awareness as wingmen suddenly explode for no apparent reason.

other before firing. The impact fuze is used against armored vehicles; the proximity fuze is used against airborne targets. The Mi-28 also carries a stabilized 2A42 30-millimeter (mm) cannon attached to the right side of the fuselage that provides a fast point-and-shoot capability. The 30-mm cannon has an initial projectile velocity of 980 mps for its 1,000-grain bullet, and it has a selective fire rate of 300 or 900 rounds per minute.⁵ The nose turret allows a vertical cannon displacement of +13 degrees to -40 degrees and a horizontal displacement of ± 110 degrees. The cannon has an effective range out to 4,000 meters (m) depending on the ammunition used. The ammunition types include an armor-piercing round and an exploding fragmentary round with a

proximity fuze, both of which are carried in the Mi-28's chin-pods.⁶

On 27 July 1982, the Ka-50 Black Shark (NATO designation HOKUM) made its first flight. The Ka-50, a dual-coaxial, main-rotor attack helicopter with a one-man crew, has a maximum flying speed of 350 kmph and a hover ceiling of 4,000 m. Since the Ka-50 has no tail rotor, it is extremely maneuverable and can make abrupt 180-degree changes in course and sharp lateral moves at speeds of over 100 kmph.⁷ Like the Mi-28, the Ka-50 carries the Vikhr and the stabilized 2A42 30-mm cannon in a nose turret.

During the early 1980s, the Soviet Ministry of Defense conducted a competition to determine which




An armed helicopter or slow-moving close air support aircraft (such as a Warthog) is the ideal counter to a low-altitude, low-air-speed threat.

A major problem with the Army's assuming the rotary-wing air-superiority role is that Army aviation and Air Force assets will have to be synchronized. Army aviation must integrate into the USAF's planning process and configure its C2 systems to receive reports and warnings from USAF systems such as the Joint Surveillance and JSTARS.

design bureau would manufacture the new ground forces gunship. Specifications required that the helicopter be capable of ground and air attack. The Kamov design bureau won the competition because its dual-coaxial, main-rotor design was so much more maneuverable than the Mi-28 with the conventional tail rotor. Also, the Kamov is structurally impervious to 23-mm rounds. During the fly-off, a ZSU 23-4 AD gun shot off the Kamov's tail, and the Kamov was still able to complete its mission. In a 1998 Swedish Army fly-off, the Kamov outscored the U.S. Apache and the French/German Tiger gunships.⁸

The Ka-52 Alligator (NATO designation HO-KUM B), a modification of the Ka-50, was introduced in November 1996. It seats two and can also serve as a C2 craft, a training craft, or as a plat-

form for additional equipment that requires a dedicated operator. Although some Ka-52 specifications differ from Ka-50 specifications, the Ka-52 carries the same ordnance of 12 Vikhr laser-guided missiles; 480 30-mm rounds; and 80 80-mm free-flight rockets. The Vikhr can also carry 20 122-mm free-flight rockets in place of the 80-mm rockets. These Russian attack helicopters have been shown with weapon loads that include AA-8 APHID and AA-11 ARCHER air-to-air missiles. The APHID has a 10-km range, while the ARCHER has a 40-km range.⁹ Because the Russian military is experiencing severe budgetary problems and an ongoing conflict in the Caucasus, it has bought little new equipment. Instead, the cash-strapped Russian defense industry is trying to sell its own equipment. Turkey, India, China, and Poland are seriously considering



Close-up views of Mi-28 Havoc systems at a Paris International Air and Space Show, Le Bourget Airfield. (Left) Rockets and missiles include the laser-guided Vikhr with a proximity fuse for use against helicopters. (Below left) The Havoc's laser target indicator allows for rapid engagement and disengagement.



(Above) The Mi-28's stabilized 2A42 cannon can effectively fire an exploding 30-mm fragmentary round with proximity fuse out to 4,000 meters. The 30-mm cannon and Vikhr missile system are well suited to helicopter v. helicopter operations.

Because the Russian military is experiencing severe budgetary problems and an ongoing conflict in the Caucasus, it has bought little new equipment [including the Mi-28, the Ka-50 and Ka-52]. Instead, the cash-strapped Russian defense industry is trying to sell its own equipment.

buying the Ka-50 or KA-52 along with SA-16 and AA-11 air-to-air missiles.¹⁰

Russian military theorists look to future war and continue to develop the theory and tactics for helicopter aerial combat. Other countries are also studying the issue, but so far, unclassified discussion in their professional journals is not as developed as the Russians'.

Not the Only Threat

While advanced systems such as the Black Shark and the Alligator pose a significant threat on the future battlefield, a more significant threat already exists—the armed utility helicopter. In an age of decreasing defense budgets, the cost of replacing existing inventories of heliborne assets with dedicated attack helicopters is beyond most nations' financial capacities. Equipping utility helicopters with offensive anti-air weapons is a less costly route that many nations are taking to create forces to be reckoned with.

Helicopter-mounted machineguns and chain guns are universally common and are quite effective in air-to-ground and air-to-air missions. China originally mounted the old Soviet SA-7 Grail air-to-air missile

on helicopters for tail engagements and is upgrading those with the Chinese QW-1 Vanguard air-to-air missile with a 5-km range. Pakistan is building a similar air-to-air helicopter missile—the ANZA MK2.¹¹

In 1986, France mounted the Mistral air-to-air missile on the Gazelle helicopter. Since then, this 5-km-range air-superiority weapon has also been mounted on the Dauphin Panther, the A129 Mangusta, the Ecureuil Fennec, the AH-64, the CSH-2 Rooivalk, and the Eurocopter Tiger. France has exported the Mistral to at least 17 countries. Of these, South Korea is known to be mounting the Mistral on its helicopters. South Africa has built 5- and 8-km-range Darter V3C and U-Darter air-to-air missiles and mounted them on Puma and Rooivalk helicopters. South Africa also has built the longer range (20-km) Kukri V3A/B and mounted it on the Rooivalk.

The old air-to-air SA-7, which is built by Russia, Egypt, China, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Yugoslavia, has been mounted on helicopters belonging to Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Georgia, India, North Korea, Libya, Mongolia, Poland, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. Russia has replaced the



An Mi-28 Havoc being towed on a flight line.

The [Russian] Mi-28, which is a conventional two-rotor attack helicopter with a maximum flying speed of 300 kilometers per hour (kmph), can fly rearward and sideways at speeds up to 100 kmph, hover turn at 45 degrees per second, and perform aerial stunts such as loops and snap-rolls.

SA-7 with SA-16 and SA-18 air-to-air missiles on the Mi-24 Hind E, Mi-28 Havoc, and KA-50 Hokum.¹² That future battles will be fought against utility helicopters armed for air-to-air battle is highly likely.

Helicopter Aerial Combat

Army aviation has limited aerial combat doctrine and limited pilot training for air-to-air combat. Preparing pilots for air-to-air combat takes time to develop the required skills. Furthermore, Army aviation plans to fight future engagements mostly at night. U.S. helicopters are far better equipped than those of most countries for night flying. Will future helicopter v. helicopter combat be primarily a daytime action, or will it be conducted around the clock?¹³

Helicopter AD combat air patrols (CAPs) would stress maintenance capabilities and should be mounted only when the threat is high or the ground force is especially vulnerable to hostile helicopter attack. The ground force is most vulnerable when it is moving through difficult terrain or when it is deployed in the attack. Helicopter aerial combat will seldom be a one-on-one duel. Rather it will most often involve groups of helicopters attacking other helicopters and might include attacks on groups of at-

tack helicopters, air assault formations, electronic warfare (EW) helicopters, radio relay helicopters, or transport helicopters. Helicopter aerial combat might also include attacks on other low-flying, slow-moving, fixed-wing aircraft used for liaison, reconnaissance, CAS, or artillery fire adjustment, or for attacks on unmanned aerial vehicles and, according to the Russians, cruise missiles. Helicopter aerial combat might be used to defeat enemy reconnaissance and penetration attempts or to screen friendly forces.¹⁴

While the helicopter lacks the jet fighter's ability to climb and turn rapidly, helicopter aerial combat has much in common with jet fighter aerial combat. Like jet fighter crews, helicopter crews attempt to be the first to detect and identify enemy aircraft, gain the altitude and speed advantage, and open fire. Figure 1 is an example of a Russian defending helicopter force fighting an enemy air assault. The air assault force is flying in three groups: a support group of EW, C2, and scout helicopters; an attack group of helicopter gunships; and a transportation group of transportation helicopters. The defending screening force provides early warning to helicopters on strip alert. The helicopter force commander




Figure 1. Russian defending helicopter force fighting an enemy air assault.

Command and control of a helicopter aerial attack force is probably a question of national style. The Russian military prefers centralized C2... [while] the U.S. Army would probably control from the air. In the Russian examples, it would not be hard to control the merge of the number of helicopters involved in the engagement with the enemy. It would be difficult, however, to affect the success of tactical engagements directly in an air-to-air battle using a centralized command structure.

uses strip-alert helicopters to reinforce the screening force to the extent he believes is needed during the time it takes to alert the rest of his force. The commander will covertly deploy his main force to the flanks and rear of the attacking force using terrain folds, forests, and masking terrain to get close to the air assault force. He will try to hit the air assault group from the rear with long-range air-to-air missiles. Should he lose surprise or exhaust his supply of missiles, the commander will quickly press forward for the close battle with automatic cannon. The air assault force will try to shake off the attacker and leave the area. High tempo and movement, G-force turns approaching 3.5, and limited time characterize close aerial combat. Therefore, it is always best to gain time and position by hitting the other force while it is hovering to attack a ground target or inserting an air assault force.

During the approach and battle, it is essential that helicopter pilots receive accurate, up-to-date information on enemy actions or the approach of other helicopters.¹⁵ This information can come from visual spotting, acoustical signatures, infrared characteristics, ground-force reconnaissance, or radar.

Radar is particularly important in determining the presence and activity of aircraft. During the Persian Gulf war and the war over Kosovo, the United States used cruise missiles, helicopter strikes, and other systems to take out stationary AD radar early. Aircraft-mounted radar, whether on helicopters or AWACS aircraft, are often more survivable than ground-based radar, but they are key targets. The Russian KA-31 radar helicopter can detect low-flying objects out to 120 km at a height from 5 to 3,500 m off the ground, and its radar can accurately determine a target's speed, identity, and location.¹⁶




Figure 2. Russian use of heliborne and ground radar to defeat approaching helicopters.

MAWTS-1 currently conducts two weapons and tactics instructor courses per year, during which USMC aircrews learn the additional skill of aerial combat. The 6-week course stresses aerial combat terminology that saves time and avoids ambiguous orders. The course also spends considerable time teaching aircraft identification, range estimation, and battle drills. Most training scenarios are run in the context of a meeting engagement as part of a two-helicopter team.

Figure 2 is an example of the Russian use of heliborne and ground radar to defeat approaching helicopters. A combined arms army has established a low-altitude radar field using three orbiting radar helicopters. To remain protected from enemy air activity, they orbit over the major concentration of the army's air defenses. They can detect low-flying objects 50 to 60 km from the front-line trace. This is a much greater detection distance than mobile ground-based radar can achieve. Radar reports are passed to the army's intelligence information center, which retransmits the information to forward combat control groups and helicopter landing fields. Helicopters sortie to meet and defeat the enemy.

Command and control of a helicopter aerial attack force is probably a question of national style. The Russian military prefers centralized C2, which limits the flexibility of airborne assets because of the

requirement to receive guidance from ground commanders. The U.S. Army would probably control from the air. In the Russian examples, it would not be hard to control the merge of the number of helicopters involved in the engagement with the enemy. It would be difficult, however, to affect the success of tactical engagements directly in an air-to-air battle using a centralized command structure.

To facilitate successful engagements, tactics for aerial combat must be simple and decentralized. A frontal attack, where a friendly helicopter engages an adversary from the forward quarter, has some advantages over ambush or abeam attacks. The increased closing velocity (V_c) reduces the adversary's firing time for either guns or missiles; masks the heat signature of the attacking aircraft from first-generation heat-seeking missiles; and presents a smaller target to the enemy. Also, most

Although the Army does not currently train for helicopter aerial combat, one sister service does. The U.S. Marine Corps, which has its own organic fixed-wing CAS, is not content with leaving the destruction of opposing helicopters to fixed-wing fliers. It realizes that the best counter to an attack helicopter is another attack helicopter. Using fixed-wing aerial combat tactics as a start point, the USMC has developed doctrine, armaments, and TTP, and procedures for helicopter aerial combat.

helicopter-launched weapons are forward-firing and can be used more readily from this position.

While the frontal attack has some definite advantages, the preferred tactic is the unobserved attack. The optimal time to attack is when antiarmor attack gunships have missiles in the air (either on-the-wire or squirting lasers). Most crews lose situational awareness at this point because they are concentrating solely on their target. Diminished situational awareness allows the ambush force to turn the flank, engage, then egress, all the time remaining at maximum missile range. Aerial ambushes cause a great deal of confusion and further loss of situational awareness as wingmen suddenly explode for no apparent reason. This technique should work particularly well against helicopter forces whose antiarmor attack doctrine calls for on-line-abreast attack formations, in which individual helicopters have little maneuver room to escape the ambush. Many of the world's helicopters look alike at longer ranges (the AH-64 Apache and the Mi-28 Havoc, for example), which could also add to the confusion and leave helicopters' flanks and rears exposed to additional long-range missile shots.

Limited radio coordination can control simple tactics and battle drills. Once an attack begins, coordination becomes a matter of protecting friendly flanks and countering any counterattacks.¹⁷

Training for Helicopter Combat

Although the Army does not currently train for helicopter aerial combat, one sister service does. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), which has its own organic fixed-wing CAS, is not content with leaving the destruction of opposing helicopters to fixed-wing fliers. It realizes that the best counter to an attack

helicopter is another attack helicopter. Using fixed-wing aerial combat tactics as a start point, the USMC has developed doctrine, armaments, and TTP for helicopter aerial combat. USMC Cobra helicopters rise to the challenge over the desert floor at the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One (MAWTS-1) near Yuma, Arizona. The USMC AH-1W Bell Super Cobra, which is the primary aerial combat helicopter, can carry two AIM-9 missiles or use Hellfire and TOW missiles for aerial combat along with the Cobra's 20-mm cannon and flechette-tipped 2.75-inch rockets.

MAWTS-1 currently conducts two weapons and tactics instructor courses per year, during which USMC aircrews learn the additional skill of aerial combat. The 6-week course stresses aerial combat terminology that saves time and avoids ambiguous orders. The course also spends considerable time teaching aircraft identification, range estimation, and battle drills. Most training scenarios are run in the context of a meeting engagement as part of a two-helicopter team. The course teaches helicopter v. helicopter and helicopter v. fixed-wing battle and survival.

An intimate knowledge of aerodynamics is essential for the survivor in an aerial duel. The thinking, well-armed opponent can counter every move. The aircrew must understand intimately its own aircraft and armament capabilities as well as those of the enemy. Head-on attacks are dangerous, but maybe less so if the opponent's helicopter has less power, weapons range, tactical training, or maneuverability. During aerial combat training, the aircrew plans initially against a specific threat, then it does a hanger-floor walkthrough of the plan using 1:72-scale, stick-mounted aircraft models. The walkthrough tests the plan against the three-dimensional geometry of the engagement. The aircrew rehearses the tactical radio calls necessary to coordinate the fight. The walkthrough also helps identify and solve problems in the plan. The aircrew then flies the rehearsed plan against an MAWTS-1 aggressor force. After the exercise, the stick walkthrough is repeated to identify what worked and what did not.

Aircrew search techniques are an important part of the course. Since the Super Cobra lacks on-board radar, the aircrew must actually see the threat. The aircrew has to learn how to do a 360-degree search, looking for exhaust smoke, canopy glint, shadows, contrasting shapes, and so on. Avoiding detection is another imperative. Route selection, varying airspeeds, limiting electronic signals, shadow reduction, avoiding wing flash, and applying camouflage help hide the helicopter.

Once the helicopter meets the air threat, the pilot must decide to engage or avoid it. USMC training

presents the aircrew a variety of scenarios (rear hemisphere attack, forward hemisphere attack, abeam attack) and allows it to practice various standard battle drills. Each sortie also has a portion devoted to a mission-oriented attack, which tests the aircrew's ability to conduct aerial combat in conjunction with its assigned mission.

The USMC does not see the helicopter as a dedicated anti-air platform; rather, the aerial combat capability is an implied or embedded mission that might arise while performing or conducting a primary mission and should be part of an experienced pilot's capabilities. Therefore, the USMC provides doctrine, training, and weapons systems that allow Super Cobras to meet and match hostile aviation.

So What?

The world is not static, and the United States might not always hold the preeminent position in military affairs. The Army certainly will not always fight in prepared theaters, so it must anticipate changes. At the end of World War I, fixed-wing aerial combat was in its infancy, but it developed rapidly. Now, rotary-wing combat is in its infancy, but the impetus for it to develop is close at hand. Force projection over vast distances will mean traditional relationships between the Army and Air Force might change. The Army might have to do more to keep enemy aviation off its own neck. One way to do this is to prepare to defeat enemy helicopters with our own.

The Army will not take over the air superiority battle from the Air Force, but it can supplement the effort through conventional ground-based and heli-

The cost of replacing existing inventories of heliborne assets with dedicated attack helicopters is beyond most nations' financial capacities. Equipping utility helicopters with offensive anti-air weapons is a less costly route that many nations are taking to create forces to be reckoned with. . . . Future battles will be fought against utility helicopters armed for air-to-air battle is highly likely.

copter air defense. Army helicopters could protect themselves and the ground force. Experienced helicopter pilots would fly AD missions as a supplemental mission to their normal missions. Helicopter air defense CAPS might be necessary during an advance or during close combat, but doing so would not be a full-time effort that would require dedicated AD helicopters.

Developing the Army's capability for aerial combat will take time and effort. Doctrine should lead the effort followed by adapting and acquiring necessary hardware. Future helicopter design should consider the demands of aerial combat, cockpit ergonomics and armor, special maintenance needs, and perhaps, G suits. A good place to start would be Yuma, where the Marine Corps has been working on the capability for years. **MR**

NOTES

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5. Yevgeniy Vasilevich Sudarev, *Vooruzheniye, politika, konversiya* [Arms, politics, conversion], 2(9), (30 July 1995): 26-29.
6. A. Shirokorad, "Sto pyat' desyat vistrelov v sekundu" [150 rounds per second], *Voenniy znaniya* [Military banner] (January 1995): 19-21; Conversations with CW3 Scott "Buddha" Barnes, U.S. Army, Retired, who is one of the few Army pilots who has actually conducted helicopter v. helicopter engagements in Red Flag training exercises over California and Nevada.
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8. Barnes.

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10. Paul Jackson, ed., *Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1999-2000* (Surrey: Jane's Information Group Limited, 1999), 375.
11. Duncan Lennox, ed., *Jane's Air-Launched Weapons* (Surrey: Jane's Information Group Limited, July 1998).
12. Lennox (November 1998), 31.
13. Calhoun.
14. Krasnov and Mel'nichuk, 36-37.
15. Ibid., 37-38.
16. Ibid., 38-39.
17. These three paragraphs are courtesy of Barnes and Adams.

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired, is a military analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute, and the U.S. Air Force War College. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in the continental United States, Europe, and Vietnam.

Major James H. Adams, U.S. Marine Corps, is an AH-1W pilot at the Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy. He has held various operational assignments, including three overseas deployments, and he was recently an instructor pilot at the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) where he was responsible for rotary-wing air-to-air tactics.

Effects-Based Operations

The combination of task, purpose, and commander's intent (purpose, method/key tasks, and end state) has been the doctrinal engine that has driven friendly action on the battlefield; however, among operators and planners, a clear description of the effects a commander wants to achieve seems to be gaining favor over the current doctrinal formula as a guide to unit operations. In "Effects-Based Decisions and Actions," Major General James M. Dubik argues that an effects-based commander's intent embeds the commander's intent throughout the order in ways current doctrine does not. In "The New DOCC," General Burwell B. Bell and his co-authors describe how III Corps transformed its deep operations coordination cell to better plan and coordinate deep operations.

Effects-Based Decisions and Actions

Major General James M. Dubik, U.S. Army

WHY SHOULD commanders and staff use effects-based decision and action? Staffs often spend precious time in process rather than in product. They devote many hours working through all the steps in the decisionmaking process rather than focusing on issuing an order. Often, units waste time executing a plan that does not affect the enemy as the plan was designed to do, but units follow the plan anyway because it is “the plan.” An effects-based decision and action system that focuses on product, not process, and on effect on the enemy, not adherence to the plan, addresses these issues. In addition, an effects-based decision and action system leads to decisions and allows actions to be performed faster than an enemy can do the same, thereby increasing the probability that units can take advantage of opportunities as they arise on the battlefield. Finally, an effects-based decision and action system fits the operational concepts of the Army’s Objective Force.

Effects-based decisions and actions begin with commanders at every level, and they describe how commanders want to bring effects to bear on the enemy. “Effects” describes what commanders and units are trying to do to the enemy. Effects are the “end” or goal of the operation, battle, or activity a unit is undertaking. All else is “means”; that is, operations, battles, or other activities are the means through which a unit intends to achieve the effect the commander describes. Effects are fixed; means are variable.

Effects must be nested. A description of desired effects on the enemy begins with the senior commander and works its way down through an organization. Each subordinate commander must ensure that the effects described are consistent with those

Doing things that will not have the commander’s desired effect on the enemy is wasted effort. Worse, such efforts are counter-productive and impede achieving the organization’s goal. . . . Most of the time, if a subordinate commander reports, seeks guidance, and only then acts, an opportunity can slip away. Task-based intent is of little help. . . . Effects-based intent provides the subordinate commander with an explicit decision tool to use when presented with fleeting opportunities.

of the commander two levels above. Furthermore, effects must be described clearly and concisely enough to be useful two levels down.

Effects influence an enemy, by which we mean the conventional definition—uniformed soldiers of a nation-state or group of nation-states with which the United States is in armed conflict. The second, nontraditional definition is more difficult to define; it includes any person, place, group, action, or situation that inhibits an organization from accomplishing its mission.

An effects-based decision and action system changes the way in which units use commander’s intent, which current doctrine defines in terms of purpose, method/key tasks, and end state. Commander’s intent is a task-based, stand-alone component of the operations order. In contrast, an effects-based decision and action system integrates commander’s intent into other parts of the order; incorporates purpose into the mission; embeds key tasks as part of missions to subordinate units; and



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integrates the end state into the concept of the operation (see figure).


The difference between current doctrinal commander’s intent and an effects-based decision and action system is critical. In an effects-based decision and action system, the *mission* and the *concept of the operation* become the means (the variable element) the commander envisions to implement the action he wants to inflict on the enemy, that is, the end that he describes in the intent (the fixed element). The *why* of the mission statement states why, from a friendly commander’s perspective, he assigns a particular task. Examples of mission statements that current doctrine generates are “seize a hill to protect a flank”; “secure a bridge to facilitate a river crossing”; “defend a town to protect a key facility.”

Effects, on the other hand, are writ-

ten from the enemy’s perspective. A commander’s intent that an effects-based decision and action system generates might state, “prevent the enemy from interrupting friendly movement across the river”; “keep the enemy within a specific geographic area”; “destroy the enemy’s ability to perform a particular task.”

Intent—the effect a commander wants to have on the enemy—governs initiative. In fact, intent should govern all activity on the battlefield and on staffs at every level. Doing things that will not have the commander’s desired effect on the enemy is wasted effort. Worse, such efforts are counter-

productive and impede achieving the organization’s goal. An organization achieves real economy of effort when all of its parts contribute to a common goal. Wasted effort occurs when part of



the organization is busy with activities that are only tangentially related to the common goal.

The nature of any battlefield is such that opportunities arise quickly and fade just as quickly. How can a subordinate commander take advantage of such opportunities? Most of the time, if a subordinate commander reports, seeks guidance, and only then acts, an opportunity can slip away. Task-based intent is of little help, for when an unforeseen opportunity arises and a commander refers to task-based intent to consider how best to take advantage of that opportunity, the guidance that the task-based intent implies is "do these tasks," that is, follow the plan.

Effects-based intent provides the subordinate commander with an explicit decision tool to use when presented with fleeting opportunities. If taking advantage of an opportunity produces or helps produce the effect the senior commander desires, the subordinate commander should take it. The subordinate commander should inform adjacent commanders of what action he is going to take, inform higher commanders of his intent, then act so as not to miss the opportunity.


Intent, then, is sacrosanct, for it describes the desired end state. Mission and concept of the operation vary, for they describe means. Altering a mission or adjusting a concept of the operation to achieve intent is well-used initiative. Of course, subordinate commanders must use judgment as well as initiative. Each level of command is nested within others. Any action a commander takes at one level will affect other levels. So, a commander who alters the mission or adjusts a concept of the operation must first think through how doing so will affect those around and above him as well as how his actions will help achieve the senior commander's intent.

Pursuing a fleeting opportunity creates new and more opportunities. Pursuing an opportunity in such a way so as to negatively affect one's parent organization or adjacent units does not create more opportunities. Rather, it could ruin the entire operation. Using judgment is why commanders get paid the big bucks.

Decision Templates and Information Gathering

The current, doctrinal decision support template plays an important role in the effects-based decision and action system. Each decision on the template has several components:

- What is the decision?
- What are the minimal criteria?



An F-117 takes on fuel during a joint exercise testing effects-based operations, October 2002. While PIR are linked to information about the enemy, EEFI and FFIR are linked to information about friendly forces or other supporting agents, actions, or organizations.

CCIR are composed of three elements: priority information requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and friendly force information requirements (FFIR). . . . All or parts of CCIR are directly tied to criteria on the decision support template. The speed with which an organization receives a report, recognizes its relation to a pending decision, and forwards it to the correct person determines the speed with which that organization can make decisions and take action.

- Who is authorized to make the decision?
- When must the decision be made to achieve the desired end state?

There are two important points about decision criteria to remember. First, decision criteria must be the

minimal set. Battlefield realities dictate that commanders will always make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. Therefore, to describe a set of decision criteria that requires full knowledge—100 percent certainty—is to ensure that the commander will never make a decision. Second, to know when a particular set of decision criteria is met means that the staff must require specific information about the enemy; friendly troops; or other agents, actions, or organizations. That set of information becomes all or part of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), the collection plan, and the reconnaissance plan.

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information about the enemy. EEFI and FFIR are linked to information about friendly forces or other supporting agents, actions, or organizations. Both kinds of information are important in decisionmaking.

PIR, EEFI, and FFIR arrive at headquarters in the form of reports (voice, digital, face-to-face). All or parts of CCIR are directly tied to criteria on the decision support template. The speed with which an organization receives a report, recognizes its relation to a pending decision, and forwards it to the correct person determines the speed with which that organization can make decisions and take action. Speed (and accuracy) of information flow relate directly to the speed of decisionmaking and action.

Information flow has several important components. First, it has a technical component made up of a digital network, a voice network, connecting nodes, network management tools, and so forth. Second, it has a human component of soldiers and lead-

ers who understand what information is important; who can recognize important information; and who knows how, when, and where to send it. Third, it has an organizational component made up of a set of standing operating procedures that a unit has, knows, and follows and a culture of aggressive action, not mere reporting, that focuses on achieving the commander's intent. For information to flow and be useful, all three components must be present.

Collection Planning

An effects-based decision and action system continues the common understanding of collection planning as it applies to PIR, the collection plan, and the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS). Here, the leaders of the intelligence BOS ensure that all collection means focus on answering the commander's PIR and are positioned to react as PIR change. These PIR are directly related to either the effects the commander wants to have on the enemy or on criteria needed to make a decision as described on the decision support template.

Collection planning is equally important in almost every other BOS, even though doctrine does not currently discuss it this way. For example, bits of EEFI or FFIR might be key relative to one or more decisions on the decision support template. The bits of information that satisfy EEFI or FFIR might come from a report generated somewhere within the friendly unit or from an organization supporting it. Identifying information needed, then assigning someone the task of collecting and reporting it, is a de facto cross-BOS collection plan—and a critical one at that.

An effects-based decision and action system puts together a new form of intent, a new description of CCIR, and a cross-BOS collection plan. Incorporating an effects-based decisionmaking and action system into doctrine has implications. Effects-based systems will alter some of the leader development training, professional military education, and training and fighting doctrine. These changes, however, will result in a more agile army—something we all want to achieve. More important, decisions and actions based on effects fit current battlefield realities and accords with Objective Force operational concepts. Therefore, the Army should consider incorporating effects-based decisions and actions systems into its doctrine. **MR**

Major General James M. Dubik, U.S. Army, is the J9 at Joint Forces Command. He received a B.A. from Gannon University, and M.A. from Johns Hopkins University, and an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's School of Advanced Studies. He is also a graduate of the National War College. He has served in various command and staff assignments throughout the world.

The New DOCC

**General Burwell B. Bell, U.S. Army,
Major General Guy M. Bourn, U.S. Army,
Colonel Nathan K. Slate, U.S. Army, and
Lieutenant Colonel David D. Haught, U.S. Army**

THE U.S. ARMY Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) White Paper "Capturing the Operational Environment" states, "In assessing the changing world around us, it is clear that the Army must continue to evolve its training strategy and programs to adequately prepare leaders and units for today's complex battlefield conditions. Today, and into the foreseeable future, military organizations face a dynamic, multidimensional, and increasingly interconnected global operational environment. Warfare's characteristics also continue to change as the nature of conflict adapts itself to the new operational environment. The overall readiness of our forces and leaders depends on our ability to analyze and incorporate current and future realities into our training programs."¹


Scenarios that Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercises present now address the needs the White Paper describes. These exercises incorporate the contemporary operating environment (COE), which allows us to train against an enemy we are more likely to face in future conflicts. During the 2002 III Corps BCTP warfighter exercise, the COE enemy presented III Corps with many unique challenges. Lessons learned from Ulchi Focus Lens 01, Digital Capstone Exercise II, and the introduction of the COE enemy led us to conclude that the current approach to shaping operations lacks efficiency and needs change. We decided to test a concept where shaping operations could be planned and executed simultaneously 24 hours a day. These changes proved to be quite effective against the COE enemy.

A premise in the TRADOC White Paper is that the Army will always have to win the close fight: "We must never lose our focus at the tactical level on winning the close fight. We must realize however, that the conditions and nature of the close fight continue to change. Future adversaries study every aspect of our doctrine, training, and technological capabilities with a view toward defeating us tactically, operationally, and strategically."² This said, how can

All preparations and executions were conducted in the LSS and involved rotating personnel in and out, setting up and taking down chairs, and so on. [A]gainst a conventional enemy, this arrangement worked. However, the COE enemy presented a much more capable and fleeting enemy. . . .

we shape the close fight to ensure its success? Previously, we relied on the deep operations coordination cell (DOCC) to shape the battle and posture combatants in the close fight for success. Today, we still rely on this approach, but given the COE, we must do so in a more efficient and effective manner.

The DOCC is not on any modified table of equipment (MTOE); it is an ad hoc organization built primarily from III Corps and III Corps Artillery staffs. Previous deep or shaping operations executed from the DOCC were built around rotary-wing assets. Most planning and execution efforts focused on the III Corps' aviation brigade and deep attacks into the enemy's battlespace. In III Corps, the DOCC was located in a logistical support shelter (LSS) at the main command post (CP). Planning and executing shaping operations were conducted in this single van. Targeting meetings, decision briefings, and synchronization meetings were held during the day. At night, the Apaches went after the enemy. All preparations and executions were conducted in the LSS and involved rotating personnel in and out, setting up and taking down chairs, and so on. This was not efficient. We could not simultaneously plan and execute shaping operations. Nevertheless, against a conventional enemy, this arrangement worked. However, the COE enemy presented a much more capable and fleeting enemy, which forced us to reevaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The solution was to establish separate cells where planning and execution could occur simultaneously.



[W]e used existing personnel and tethered them and their functions to their organic cells within the main CP. This had the added benefit of our not having to chase down members of the DOCC team. A combination of tactical Internet, AFATDS, ADOCS, and DNVT provided the tether.

To facilitate the new concept, a tent became a dedicated location for the DOCC's planning component. Resourced with adequate room, manning, time, and technology, the planning component took on new life. The additional space allowed work areas for air interdiction (AI) planners and division liaison officers (LNOs). Collocating these functions enabled the DOCC chief to provide oversight of these important supporting functions. This arrangement also facilitated developing nominations to the integrated tasking order (ITO) and coordinating with the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD). Real-time coordination with the divisions also improved markedly. The 24-hour operations allowed valuable coordination with III Corps planners to take place, and planners could develop needed branches and sequels for each ITO. The introduction of a video-teleconference (VTC) suite enabled DOCC planners to conduct face-to-face decision briefs with the III Corps commander regardless of where he was on the

battlefield. The depth added by continuous operations was evident throughout and gave DOCC planners new flexibility and relevance. (Figure 1 is a diagram of the planning cell. A copy of the DOCC's battle rhythm and products [decision briefing, synchronization meeting, and GO/NO-GO briefings] are available on the III Corps Artillery home page.³)

The redesign of the execution component of DOCC operations was even more striking. A fusion cell (one location for the real-time management and integration of deep assets available to the III Corps commander, such as surface-to-surface fires, U.S. Air Force (USAF), counterfire, attack aviation, and collection) was created. Given that we had to live within current authorization and manning levels, we used existing personnel and tethered them and their functions to their organic cells within the main CP. This had the added benefit of our not having to chase down members of the DOCC team. A combination of tactical internet, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), and digital nonsecure voice telephone (DNVT) provided the tether (figure 2).

The fusion cell's composition provides powerful, timely options for attacking the mobile COE enemy. At the fire support element (FSE) station, the FSE representative manages kill boxes and fire support coordination measures (FSCM); clears air space; and processes Army Tactical Missile System




Figure 2. Deep operations fusion cell.

(ATACMS) calls for fire. The Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), the AFATDS Client, and the DNVN tether the fusion cell's FSE representative to the III Corps main FSE as well as to the rear and tactical FSE. Displayed on computer screens are FSCM, friendly graphics, and the common kill box reference system used in Korea.

Sitting next to the FSE is the air liaison officer (ALO), whose primary task is to manage all USAF assets and who is the subject matter expert on USAF capabilities to the fusion officer. In addition, the ALO provides liaison with the air support operations group (ASOG). A status board of aircraft and the ITO helps the ALO perform his duties. The tactical internet and DNVN tether the ALO to other USAF agencies.

Adjacent to the ALO is the AI planning team (officer and senior noncommissioned officer), who are the only members of the DOCC team to work on both the planning team and the execution team. The AI team has ownership of the ITO from inception through execution. Beginning 4 days prior to an ITO's execution, the team begins developing the ITO using AI and close air support (CAS) nominations generated from daily targeting meetings. ITO development continues until AI and CAS nominations are submitted. Once published in the ITO, AI planners review resourced AI and CAS targets and prepare to oversee execution from the fusion cell.

During the BCTP warfighter exercise, we used

four teams of AI planners—one team per ITO (in correlation with the 96-hour planning cycle.) Each team was responsible for its ITO from cradle to grave. We experienced great success orienting aircraft on the target. The AI planner, with help from the G2 representative, provided target-location updates to the BCD at 8, 4, and 2-hour intervals before time on target. The tactical internet, ADOCS, and DNVN tethered the AI planner.

Located behind the fusion officer is a III Corps G2 representative. He is the fusion officer's link to intelligence assets and is tethered to the collection manager, field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO), and the chief of the analysis and control element (ACE) with a direct-line DNVN. The G2 representative provides the fusion officer with an assessment of emerging targets and the "so what" of targets located from various collection assets. He also works with the collection manager to ensure collection assets remain focused on approved targets. The G2 representative also has Joint Surveillance Target Analysis Radar System (JSTARS), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and Army Missile Defense Warning System (AMDWS) monitors to help him in his duties. These displays also provide situational awareness to the fusion officer.

The indirect fires officer (IFO) is positioned to the right front of the fusion cell. The III Corps artillery's targeting warrant officers man this station and are tethered via AFATDS Client, ADOCS, and DNVN

Position	Rank	Speciality	Requirements			Full Manning		
			Plans	Fusion	Total	Corps Staff	Corps/Arty /FSE	IMA
Chief, Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC)	COL	FA	1		1		1(C)	
Fusion Officer	LTC	FA		2	2		1(C)	1
Deep Operations Planner	MAJ/LTC	FA	2		2	1	1(C)	
Air Interdiction Planner	CPT/MAJ	FA	8		8			8
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Planner	CPT/MAJ	FA	2	2	4			4
Battle Captain	CPT/MAJ	FA	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Fire Support Element Representative to DOCC	CPT/MAJ	MI		2	2		2(F)	
Corps Artillery G2 Representative to DOCC	MAJ/LTC	MI	2		2		2(C)	
Indirect Fires/Counterfires Officer	CW3/4	131A		2	2		2(C)	
Division Liaison Officer	CPT/MAJ	CA		10	10	10		
Special Operations Officer	MAJ/LTC	IN/SF	2		2	2		
Targeting Officer (Fusion Cell Link to ACE)	CPT/MAJ	MI		2	2			2
Analysis & Control Element (ACE) Targeting Officer	CPT/MAJ	MI		2	2	2		
Opposing Force (OPFOR) Artillery Analyst (Field Artillery)		FA	2		2			2
OPFOR Artillery Analyst (Military Intelligence)	CPT/MAJ	MI	2		2			2
Collection Manager	CPT/MAJ	MI	2		2	2		
Air Liaison Officer	MAJ/LTC	USAF		2	2	2		
Information Operations Officer	MAJ/LTC	IO	2		2	2		
Staff Weather Officer	IMM	USAF	2		2	2		
Army Aviation Officer	MAJ/LTC	AV	2		2	2		
Air Defense Liaison	CPT/MAJ	AD	2		2	2		
Engineer Liaison	CPT/MAJ	EN	2		2	2		
Staff Judge Advocate Liaison	CPT/MAJ	JA	2		2	1		1
Army Space Liaison	CPT/MAJ	Space	2		2	2		
Long Range Surveillance Company (LRSC) Liaison Officer	E7/E8	MI	2		2	2		
DOCC NCOIC	E7/E8	FA	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Clerk/Typist	E1/E4	71L	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Radio-Telephone Operator/Automation	E1/E4	31U	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS) Client Operator	E1/E4	13D/P		2	2		2(C)	
Maneuver Control System (MSC) Operator	E1/E4	13D/P		2	2		2(C)	
Totals			47	36	83	34	21	28

Figure 3. III Corps deep operations coordination cell manning requirements.

to the III Corps Artillery targeting van. Tasks include monitoring the counterfire fight across the corps and providing the fusion cell with targeting data on enemy long-range shooters (such as the 9A52) as well as a common operating picture (COP) of the counterfire fight.

The 9A52 was a challenge; it is capable of shooting 90 kilometers and displacing within 3 minutes, making it hard to defeat. Our most effective TTP for attacking the 9A52 was to establish a kill box over it, then fire ATACMS from a stay-hot, shoot-fast mode. Reports were that we destroyed only a few of the enemy's very long shooters this way because of the short window of enemy vulnerability and the missile's long time of flight. However, we did enjoy some success with this TTP by destroying enemy logistic assets supporting the long shooters and, thereby, reducing the enemy's ability to fire and resupply those systems. Sending USAF assets against enemy long shooters was more effective in terms of destroying the weapon itself.

At the center of the fusion cell is the fusion officer, who is responsible for the supervision of fusion cell members. He receives and assesses emerging targets and assesses the capabilities present at that moment to attack that target, quickly.

The efficacy of the new DOCC was tested and validated throughout the warfighter exercise. The best substantiation of the new concept occurred on day 4 (ITO D), during which the DOCC simultaneously planned and executed various shaping operations. This included engaging enemy air defense in support of a III Corps air assault; a 6th Cavalry Brigade (AH-64D) deep attack that included suppression of enemy air defense; engaging targets in protected areas that were affecting the deep attack; and conducting counterfire against the 9A52. The functional representation and tethers in the fusion cell allowed us to adjust the plan and execute these complex operations simultaneously, in real time, and with great efficiency and effect.

The most difficult part of the new DOCC was manning. Because of current manning levels, we

The 9A52 was a challenge; it is capable of shooting 90 kilometers and displacing within 3 minutes. . . . Our most effective TTP for attacking the 9A52 was to establish a kill box over it, then fire ATACMS from a stay-hot, shoot-fast mode. [We] destroyed only a few of the enemy's very long shooters this way because of the short window of enemy vulnerability.

borrowed manpower from the ARNG 75th Division to prove our concept. Because it is unlikely that the Army will be able to fill our authorizations in the near term, we designed a manning document that includes individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs). If deployed to combat, we would rely on these IMAs to fill out the DOCC (figure 3).

The new III Corps DOCC proved to be an efficient, effective organization in defeating the COE enemy. The 24-hour planning and execution capabilities were critical to the DOCC's success. The more robust and continuous planning cell was especially effective in anticipating and coordinating deep-strike capabilities, especially USAF assets, so that they were available at the critical times in the fight. The fusion cell's real-time synchronization of III Corps and theater assets available to strike deep and shape the fight was devastating to the enemy.

At the end of the warfighter exercise, a majority of enemy kills were attributed to the effects of lethal and nonlethal fires that had been planned and executed from the new DOCC. The new approach empowered the III Corps commander to shape the battlespace and achieve decisive results. In the end, we were able to decentralize assets and focus effects—the only way to succeed against the COE enemy and future adversaries. **MR**

NOTES

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) White Paper, "Capturing the Operational Environment" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2 February 2000), 2.
2. Ibid., 3.
3. Online at <<http://sill-www.army.mil/3ca>>.

General Burwell B. Bell is Commanding General, United States Army, Europe, and 7th Army. He commanded III Corps and Fort Hood from August 2001 to November 2002. He received an M.B.A. from the University of Tennessee, an M.S. from the University of Southern California, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the National War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS), Germany, Korea, and Hungary.

Major General Guy M. Bourn, Commanding General of III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from June 2000 to August 2002, is Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, Cairo. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), CGSC, U.S. Navy Post-Graduate School, and the National War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS and Germany, including Special Assistant to the Assistant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Colonel Nathan K. Slate is Commander, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill. He received a B.S. from Virginia Tech, an M.A. from Central Michigan University, and an M.A. from the U.S. Naval War College. He is also a graduate of CGSC. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS and Germany.

Lieutenant Colonel David D. Haught, formerly Chief of Staff, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, is a student at the U.S. Army War College. He received a B.A. from Widener University and an M.M.A.S. from CGSC. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, and Korea.

Strategy Revisited

Major Isaiah Wilson III, U.S. Army

U.S. strategymakers are allowing short-term concerns over constrained resources to shape U.S. national security strategy. A capabilities-based strategy is shortsighted and runs counter to traditional definitions of strategy. Basing national security strategy on military capabilities creates rifts with allies; encourages reliance on anticipated but unfielded technology; leads to technological incompatibility with coalition partners; and most unsettling, departs from traditional U.S. strategic policies, values, goals, and interests.

THE U.S. ARMY Command and General Staff College's annual Grierson Award competition honors the Master Strategist of each school year. To be considered for the 2002 award, candidates wrote papers addressing the following questions: "In contrast to the current NSS/NMS [National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy], how does a transformed capabilities-based force structure impact the development of a new National Military Strategy, and what would that then modify in the U.S. National Security Strategy/National Policy? What are the risks or advantages inherent to these changes?"

The essay question called for a discussion of the following:

- A shift from a threat-based force-structuring paradigm to a capabilities-based force-structuring paradigm.
- The effect of such a shift on the development of a new NMS.
- The changes or modifications that might result in the next NSS and national policy in general.
- The risks or advantages inherent in such changes.

The wording of the question belied a larger, systemic problem in what decisionmakers, defense planners, military strategists, and even instructors of strategic art and science conceive strategy and strategic planning to be. A means-determines-the-ends proposition embedded in the question misinterprets the long-established, theoretical definitions of strategy and the strategic planning process.

To me, the essay question introduced a second question that subsumed the first: "Has the United States abandoned the broader, traditional notion of strategy and the strategic security planning process out of short-

term, domestic concerns over scarce resources and/or shortsighted assessments of the threat environment facing the country?" That is, "Has the United States allowed capabilities (resources available) and technological innovation to drive the national security policy formulation process?"

I propose that, in fact, U.S. national security policy (values, goals, interests) tends to determine economic-technological factors that affect the NMS. Assessment of threat in the strategic environment at any given time, during any given administration, is derived from a vantage point of political-public will and material resources the polity is willing to expend, not from an unconstrained blue-sky analysis. In other words, the size and shape of the military force the country is willing to resource tends to determine national policy, not the goals, values, and responsibilities of a global hegemonic state.

This sort of NMS-led strategic and force-planning process is contrary to a better understanding of what strategy and force planning is and should be. By following a wrongheaded process out of near-term domestic necessities, U.S. defense planners—even strategists—have forgotten what strategy really is. The two-major theater war (MTW) and today's capabilities-based paradigm are examples of how not to develop NSS and the military forces needed to implement that strategy.

The essay question inspired the following propositions:

- That a capabilities-based approach to force planning will lead to a strategy-resources gap and a mismatch between capabilities and national policy intentions similar to its predecessor, the two-MTW construct.
- That such a paradigm wrongly privileges military strategy over security strategy, allowing capabilities and available resources to determine and define policy and strategy.
- That while there are advantages to be gained by politicians and decisionmakers from the strategic ambiguity on which a capabilities-based model centers, the tasks that strategists and the military face in formulating and implementing a coherent, effective national security policy and strategic posture that is more commensurate with the goals and responsibilities of a global power, such as the United States, will be all the more difficult to achieve.

I believe a comprehensive, policy-based, force-structuring paradigm, which incorporates the advantages of threat- and capabilities-based approaches and which models, shapes, and sizes military forces (as well as other instruments of power) in light of national values, goals, interests, and obligations, is a paradigm most befitting a global hegemonic power such as the United States.

The book *Strategy and Force Planning* says, "Making the best strategic and force choices in a free society is a difficult and lengthy process. The strategist and force planner must consider numerous international and domestic factors, including political, economic and military influences. [B]ecause planning involves preparing for the future, there is considerable uncertainty and **much room for disagreement about preferred strategy and how forces should be structured, organized, and equipped.** [E]qually valid arguments are often made for widely different choices, each depending on the objectives sought and the **assumptions made about threats, challenges, opportunities, technological advances, and future political and economic conditions.** This tendency is exacerbated by various advocates **who focus**

U.S. national security policy (values, goals, interests) tends to determine economic-technological factors that affect the NMS. . . . In other words, the size and shape of the military force the country is willing to resource tends to determine national policy, not the goals, values, and responsibilities of a global hegemonic state.

THREAT-BASED PLANNING	CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used when threats to U.S. interests are “easily recognized and identified.” • Scenario-based or contingency-based modeling to determine force needs. • Provides a quantifiable rationale for the recommended force structure. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used when threats to U.S. interests are multifaceted and uncertain. • Ambiguous threats do not lend themselves to single-point scenario-based analysis. • Planners apply a “liberal dose of military judgement to determine the appropriate mix of required military capabilities.” • Claim to focus on objectives rather than scenarios.

Figure 1. Threat-based planning compared with capabilities-based planning.

[The new paradigm] denies that most U.S. national interests are global and that preserving America’s global leadership is a vital national interest. . . .

The Bush administration’s failure might be in how the same national policy is narrowly defined in truly national or “America first” terms, leaving that impression with allies and adversaries alike—an impression reinforced in the types of capabilities the strategy prescribes. . . .

on the single factor most important to them, such as the threat or budget, without a balanced attempt to explore the full dimensions of the problems” [emphasis in original].¹

There will never be enough resources to satisfy the Nation’s wants. Thus, decisionmakers must make strategic choices, establish requirements, set priorities, make decisions, and allocate scarce resources to the most critical needs. However, such decisions should not be made based on any one factor. That sort of flawed approach negates the true definition of strategic choice and sets conditions for narrow strategic and policy determinism.

The approach the United States has taken during at least the two or three most recent rounds of security and military strategy development has centered on how the means might modify the ends.² This is the wrong way to think of strategy. Such an approach is indicative of a flawed strategic planning process, one that tends to privilege short-term concerns and considerations such as fiscal constraints and technological issues over longer term (seminal) issues of national interests, values, purposes, and responsibilities. This latter set of considerations is in line with the more traditional (and more correct) understanding of strategy itself.³

There are numerous problems inherent in the threat-based (two-MTW) strategic force planning approach of the past and the transformed capabilities-based approach introduced in the 2002 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*.⁴ The most significant of these problems (impacts) follow:

□ Both paradigms are or were overdeterministic, having been conceived from focusing on single factors deemed most critical at the time.

□ Both paradigms fail or failed to adequately and comprehensively consider all factors affecting national security policy and the security and military strategies that should derive from that set of values, interests, and responsibilities.

□ Both approaches to the force sizing/shaping question address immediate crises (in their own right) and short-term realities of the day. Consequently, both result in a means-available-driven process (an NMS-led process) that is overly deterministic of the threat environment; of relationships with allies, friends, and potential foes in the international environment; and U.S. national policy (purpose, goals, roles, and missions) in general.

Figure 1 summarizes the differences between what are commonly regarded as the two popular methodologies available for force planning (sizing/shaping).⁵ The two-MTW, threat-based construct of the 1990s clearly outlived its utility as an effective force-shaping model, hav-

ing led to a hollow force incapable of meeting the broad policy goals of former President Bill Clinton's engagement strategy.

The capabilities-based paradigm that will guide U.S. strategy and force planning into the 21st century, while not likely to become irrelevant because of rigid adherence to a particular threat, might eventually be condemned because a narrow-way national policy, purpose, and strategy has been conceived and articulated in what might be appropriately termed the "Bush deterrence strategy."

Both Clinton's and President George W. Bush's approaches fail to adhere to author John L. Gaddis's concept of strategy.⁶ Each contributes to its own peculiar strategy-resource gap (see figure 2). In the late 1990s, the two-MTW force-structuring approach focused too much on fiscal constraints, thereby truncating a more realistic assessment of the changing strategic (threat) environment.⁷ The result was the articulation of a broad, comprehensive, do-everything engagement policy, crippled and de-legitimized by a record of less-than-effective interventions. America was soon regarded as the reluctant hegemon that got involved in international crises with "too little, too late."⁸ This reputation was largely the result of a flawed strategic- and force-planning process that centered too much on warding off domestic demands for force downsizing rather than on national interests and global responsibilities and the resourcing of a force to meet national policy.

The new paradigm might herald a strategy resource gap of its own—this one defined more by its narrowly conceived strategy than by its resources (resourcing). A capabilities-focused approach to strategic planning, an approach the Bush administration has championed since the 2000 campaign, could tend to build "all" (military strategy, security strategy, national policy, and national interests) on the tenuous hopes of future

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	ENDS RELATED TO MEANS	INTENTIONS RELATED TO CAPABILITIES	OBJECTIVES RELATED TO RESOURCES
Clinton's Threat-Based Paradigm	Vital, important, and humanitarian categories of U.S. national interests (broad in conception).	Shape the international environment. Respond to threats and crises. Prepare for an uncertain future.	The 2-MTW force sizing approach is designed as a stop-gap measure to maintain the existing size and type of forces available in light of the post-CW drawdown.
	Insufficient and inappropriate forces available to conduct full-spectrum operations.	Intervene in international affairs in coalition with foreign partners. Capabilities limited largely to old heavy (legacy) force systems designed for conventional, force-on-force MTWs (specifically, in Korea and Iraq).	Resources limited to the 2-MTW scenario. Little resources remain for non-MTW contingencies. Little to no strategic reserve.
Bush's Capabilities-Based Paradigm	Limited in scope: focus is on ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action (priority), honoring international commitments, and contributing to economic well-being	Homeland Security (defense of the homeland) is the priority mission. Shift to an Asia-first focus (divert resources and focus from Europe).	This approach is born out of the desire for a "leap-ahead" approach to force modernization (part of the Bush campaign platform in Election 2000).
	Leap-ahead means (JV2020) seen by allies and foreign friends as "provocative." Risk of leaving allies behind in technology-led RMA.	Middle East access still deemed important. Focus of capabilities on defense of homeland and U.S. interests worldwide (anti-access, force projection, strike).	Attacks on the U.S. homeland (9/11) elevate "asymmetrical threats" to forefront of security planning agenda.
		A deterrence and response-oriented posture (defensive intent).	Purpose behind new capabilities loosely defined.

Figure 2. Comparison of Clinton and Bush paradigms.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell and former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin are attributed with creating the Base Force during President George H.W. Bush's administration. Theirs was one of the first efforts at demonstrating military responsiveness to changes in strategic and budgetary environments.

technological innovations and the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA).⁹ The result could be the NMS (what America has the resources and capabilities to do) defining the NSS or even national policy and interests themselves (what America "is" and what it ought to do as a global superpower). This is not strategy. This approach denies that most U.S. national interests are global and that preserving America's global leadership is a vital national interest. Clinton's engagement strategy recognized these facts. However, his administration failed because of its inability to derive the correct military strategy to meet that broad set of policy goals and responsibilities and to properly resource that strategy.

The Bush administration's failure might be in how the same national policy is narrowly defined in truly national or "America first" terms, leaving that impression with allies and adversaries alike—an impression reinforced in the types of capabilities the strategy prescribes (leap-ahead; strike; forced-entry; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and so on).¹⁰

National Missile Defense (NMD) is a perfect example of—

- A U.S.-centric posture.
- A U.S. defense-oriented, force-development plan.
- How a purely capabilities-based force-shaping and sizing paradigm can signal U.S. unilateralism.
- A distanced, adversarial approach to the international environment.

The response the Pentagon's Joint Vision (JV)2020 received from U.S. transatlantic allies evidences this potential: "America leads but

A Historical Aside¹

Understanding the evolution toward what has become the two-MTW force-planning construct is important to understanding and appreciating the conditions from which the approach was derived, how it was originally conceived, and why it was eventually adopted as the force-sizing model that would underlie the NSS/NMS during the mid-to-late 1990s. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell and former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin are attributed with creating the Base Force during President George H.W. Bush's administration. Theirs was one of the first efforts at demonstrating military responsiveness to changes in strategic and budgetary environments.

The Base Force was considered a minimum force that would still allow U.S. Armed Forces to meet mission requirements with acceptable risks. The Base Force's original focus was on a capabilities-based approach to defense planning, driven largely by resource constraints.² In the early 1990s, threats to the United States were still largely amorphous. The 1992 NMS reflected a capabilities-based, force-planning approach that offered three conceptual conventional force packages. Operation Desert Storm distracted from a completion of this capabilities-based, analytical construct yet at the same time gave a more relevant yardstick with which to justify U.S. force structure and size.

In 1991-1992, Aspin, using U.S. experience in the Persian

Gulf as a backdrop, issued two national security papers that attack capabilities-based force planning and argue that such an approach led to the folly of determining in a vacuum what needed to be done.³ According to Aspin, "It is critical to identify threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them."⁴ What immediately came about was using the "Iraqi equivalent" as the generic threat measure for regional aggressors and the "Desert Storm equivalent" as the most robust building block for U.S. Armed Forces. The intent was to establish a "clear linkage between the force structure and the sorts of threats the forces could be expected to deal with."⁵

Aspin's threat-driven methodology was seen as being flexible enough to include aspects of a typical capabilities-based approach, with the building blocks for the methodology (basically, the Base Force) being generic capabilities. By 1992, Powell was touting the Base Force as a combined threat-based and capabilities-based methodology. Also in 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reported: "The ability to respond to regional and local crises is a key element of our new strategy."⁶

The 1992 NMS was geared toward fighting and deterring regional rather than global wars. At this stage, the Base Force was still centered on no more than a possible two-

no one is able (or desires) to follow.”¹¹ This is a backlash to what is perceived as U.S. unilateralism.

Revisiting Traditional Strategy and Concepts

Figure 3 shows the strategy and force planning framework that the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) prescribes. The NWC presents a systems approach to strategy and force planning.¹² A systems approach sees the policy process (any policy process) as an interaction of internal processes (point 1) and external influences (considerations) (point 2). Internal factors of the process must be identified and delineated from what is an external consideration affecting the process as an input but in no way defining the process itself.

Where the Clinton strategy focused on resource constraints, the Bush strategy focuses on, or appears to focus on, technology. The inherent risks are a potential failure to maintain a heavy force to contend with a possible conventional, MTW threat (more possible now than ever), and the potential for leaving friend and foe behind in technological innovation (the JV2010 and JV2020 dilemma)—a tendency to privilege go-it-alone strategies (unilateralism) at the expense of commitments to allies, foreign partners, and international organizations.¹³ The risks could be in a turning away from America’s national character (the values and principles that define the Nation) and its obligations to the international community as the self-elected (and consensus-based) global hegemony.

Where the two-MTW construct focused far too much on the fiscal bottom line, the fact that it was conceived of and formulated in a time of crisis and unconstrained resourcing and public support might flaw this

Aspin, using U.S. experience in the Persian Gulf as a backdrop, issued two national security papers that attack capabilities-based force planning and argue that such an approach led to the folly of determining in a vacuum what needed to be done.

MRC scenario set, still flexible enough to adequately meet all regional threat possibilities. The 1991-1992 Joint Warfighting Net Assessments (JMNAs) focused on warfighting analyses for an MRC-East, an MRC-Southwest Asia, and an MRC-Korea. The principal focus of these planning exercises was “regional crisis response, including the capability to respond to multiple concurrent major regional contingencies.”⁷ However, according to Powell’s autobiographical recollections, the 1992 NMS focused more on a two-MTW threat: “The Base Force strategy called for Armed Forces capable of fighting two major regional conflicts ‘nearly simultaneously.’”⁸

The Clinton administrations’ October 1993 *Bottom Up Review* followed the combined threat-based, capabilities-based methodology.⁹ However, the ultimate force-sizing criterion became the ability to maintain sufficient forces to be able to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The chief difference in this new defense policy was in the policy’s call for a smaller conventional force posture (10 to 15 percent smaller than the Base Force).¹⁰

The story goes farther, chronicling the evolution from a 2-MRC combined threat, capabilities-driven force-structuring model to the static two-MTW, threat-based, force-sizing construct. The difference is critical, a necessary and sufficient condition for understanding where the two-MTW approach leads to failure and to why and how the new capabilities-based approach might fail on similar grounds for similar reasons.

As originally conceived (a combined threat and a capabilities-focused approach), the Base Force idea provided the appropriate force-structuring paradigm that could further the formulation and implementation of a rational, comprehensive NSS and national policy appropriate for a global power of America’s size and stature. As the approach degraded and transformed into a purely threat-focused model—largely to accommodate domestic concerns with defense dollars and interests in a smaller force—the NSS and the national policy became hostage to a narrow interest in force size (a domestic, defense planning concern that largely ignored the strategic security interests behind the process).

NOTES

1. For more on this, see Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, eds., *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future* (Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project, 2000); Michele A. Flournoy, ed., *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001); Flournoy, *Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2000).

2. Steven Metz, ed., *Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, SSI, 2001).

3. Les Aspin, *National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces*, address before the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 January 1992, 5-6.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and to Congress* (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1992), 8.

7. “The Army Base Force—Not a Smaller Cold War Army” in *Joint Warfighting Net Assessments 1991-1992* (Washington, DC: February 1992).

8. Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

9. Bill Clinton, *Bottom Up Review* (Washington, DC: October 1993).

10. Richard L. Kugler, *Toward a Dangerous World* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 212-13.




Figure 3. Strategy and force planning framework.

new paradigm. The attacks on America on 11 September 2001 profoundly affected the QDR process. The crisis opened congressional coffers, and rightfully so. A \$40 billion boost to national defense is significant even in Pentagon terms.¹⁴

Caution is called for, however, when considering that while the crisis presented an opportunity to blue-sky force options, that is, to consider capabilities needed without significant consideration of resource constraints, no such blue-sky approach has occurred with regard to national policy, interests, and strategy in general. That process is even more constrained than before, as the United States seems to be adopting a defensive, adversarial, and some might say even paranoid, strategic posture.

There is little to no significant difference in forces required for a near-simultaneous win over two-MTWs and a win-hold-win approach to the MTW dilemma coupled with an ability to deal with multiple, smaller scale contingencies.¹⁵ An analysis of 1997-1998 and 2002 strategies and force-planning frameworks reveals the following:

- There is no significant difference in the array and types of threats assessed in the latest strategic assessments informing both series of strategy reviews (1997-1998 and 2002).

- There is no significant difference in the type of capabilities prescribed as needed to meet the new threats of the new security environment.

- There are differences in the paradigms (strategic reviews) found in the prioritization of objectives and interests. (Defense of the homeland is now explicitly the top priority; under Clinton it was number 3 or 4 on the list.)

- A difference was found in the manner of U.S. interaction in the international environment. Under Clinton, a proactive presence, enhanced and buttressed by allied support, defined the strategic posture. Under Bush, creation and preservation of a force capability that allows for a more reactive, defensive, and (if needed) unilateral posture is the modus operandi.

The NMS is what U.S. allies, foreign friends, and potential adversaries see and witness in terms of U.S. policy, interests, values, goals, wants, and desires. Official policy might say one thing, but what the United States does is what really matters. In *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*, Richard Neustadt says, "Policy is the art of the possible."¹⁶ And more often than not, what becomes possible is what is enforceable through the use of the military instrument of power. Therefore, how the military is shaped, sized, and implemented becomes the de facto U.S. national security policy. That the NMS reflects the Nation's true and full character and its long-term and lasting interests is vital.

In its technology-based approach to U.S. defense and security, the capabilities-based construct could have a damning effect on the Bush administration's NSS by distancing allies and potential friends in the in-

ternational community. This could justify the complaints of potential adversaries of the imperialistic, self-interested character of U.S. hegemony. The RMA and its leap-ahead technological baseline is not a substitute for a comprehensive security strategy.¹⁷

The RMA, capabilities-driven approach revealed in the 2002 QDR might create an enormous interoperability gap—a strategic deficit—between U.S. forces and those of allied nations. Many of the technological wonders this new paradigm bases its hopes on have not yet even reached the research and development stage. Those already in the acquisition process will not be fielded for at least another 7 years.¹⁸ Some might not be available until 2020.¹⁹

The current crisis and the open checkbook lead many to conclude that the United States can, in fact, eat its cake and have it too, that it can recapitalize legacy forces and simultaneously resource a leap-ahead to new technologies and capabilities. Caution is in order. Eventually and inevitably, the United States could find itself with plenty of cake, but it might be dining alone. **MR**

The inherent risks [of a predominant focus on technology] are a potential failure to maintain a heavy force to contend with a possible conventional, MTW threat, and the potential for leaving friend and foe behind in technological innovation (the JV2010 and JV2020 dilemma)—a tendency to privilege go-it-alone strategies at the expense of commitments to allies, foreign partners, and international organizations.

NOTES

1. Richmond M. Lloyd, ed., *Strategy and Force Planning* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997), 2.
2. Means refer to capabilities, resources available, and operational and organizational designs. As such, means are equivalent to what we expect to define in the NMS itself (the "how" in the national policy-strategy-implementation process). Regarding means, the question in this essay is referencing changes to the 2002 NMS expected to derive from the adoption of a new, capabilities-based force-sizing/shaping construct. See also U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 2002) and John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
3. Strategy, in its simplest definition, is a balance of national ends, ways, and means. See also Gaddis; Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982); Lloyd; Michele A. Flournoy, ed., *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001). The articulation of strategy that Gaddis offers accurately defines the issue and appropriately sets the stage for the argument this essay presents. For Gaddis, strategy is "the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources" (viii).
4. *QDR, 2002*.
5. Collected from Steven Metz, ed., *Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2001).
6. Gaddis.
7. For more on the two-MTW construct, see Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996); Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001). See also National Defense University, *Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999).
8. Isaiah Wilson, "Too Little, Too Late: The Dilemma of US Intervention Policy in the Balkan Crises of 1991 to 1995," *World Affairs* (Winter 1999).
9. Campaign 2000 witnessed Al Gore and the Democratic Party championing an incrementalist approach to military force modernization and force development, arguing for maintaining U.S. heavy forces while allocating defense dollars for the acquisition and production of new capabilities. Bush and the Republicans advocated a leap-ahead approach centered on a general abandonment of the legacy force for an investment in future forces, accepting risks during interim years.
10. For a fuller discussion of this array of capabilities, refer to the latest draft of the NMS [as of 27 March 2002].
11. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision (JV) 2010 and 2020*. I attended a workshop in February 2001 at Chatham House (London) that focused on a U.S.-European discussion of NATO and the European Security Defense Initiative/Policy (ESDI/P). Key decisionmakers from both sides of the Atlantic were present. The discussion of the Pentagon's JV2010 and the updated variant, JV2020, was visceral. The perception of the JV plan among America's strongest transatlantic allies is that the JV programmatic was conceived with little regard for European interests in a "full-spectrum dominance" force capability or in Europe's individual or collective capacity to keep pace with the United States in this sort of policy. The provocative sentiment in the ESDI/P was deemed to have been derived from and reflected European reaction to the provocative U.S. posture displayed in the JV idea and a main reason behind recent changes of the growth of a "Fortress Europe v. Fortress America" situation. This, at least, was the sentiment I observed in early 2001.
12. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2d ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1997), 3.
13. JV2010.
14. George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," Washington, D.C., 29 January 2002.
15. NMS 2002 (draft).
16. Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: The Free Press, 1990); David Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
17. Walter Neal Anderson, "Comprehensive Security and a Core Military Capability," in Metz, 165-83.
18. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki has accelerated the acquisition, testing, production, and fielding plan for the Army's Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), the Army's Transformation Force to the Objective Force from an originally planned and programmed 7- to 11-year cycle to a 5- to 7-year cycle. Recent journalistic accounts indicate that the Army plans to deploy the first IBCT to the European Theater in 2007 (Early-Bird reports, week of 1 March 2002).
19. U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force (USAF) systems acquisition cycles are significantly longer than those of the Army. Projections forecast the USAF's F-22 and JSF following acquisition cycles of 15 years.

Major Isaiah Wilson, U.S. Army, is a student at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.P.A., M.A., and a doctorate from Cornell University. He was the 2002 recipient of the George C. Marshall Award at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. His articles have appeared in World Affairs, Political Science Quarterly, and Joint Forces Quarterly.

The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer

Lieutenant General G. A. Crocker, U.S. Army, Retired

How best can you use your executive officer (XO)? Procedures vary with personalities, but the principles remain fixed. I learned the business of command and XO duties from some great leaders and dynamic XOs. These officers collectively made the unit and the Army a better place to soldier. These lessons reflect my experience as a battalion and brigade XO, as a division chief of staff, and as an XO for a four-star general.

Commander's Intent

The intent for the XO is to free the commander to command the unit. On the battlefield, this is slightly modified to read: "To free the commander to command and lead combat forces." This means to free the commander's time, focus, mind, and spirit so he can see and achieve his vision of greatness for the unit.

The commander must be allowed to lead and train; to be the visible symbol of the unit's resolve; and the ever-present human leadership factor that is at the decisive point at the decisive time. He must be free to inspire, instill confidence in subordinates, and accomplish the "paragraph 2" mission. His focus is the mission and the soldier, without distortion or distraction. The XO keeps the commander from becoming mired in detail. This is a simple notion, but as always, the devil is in the details.

The Staff

The XO is the staff's principal trainer. The staff serves units, not individuals. The XO must coordinate, train, coach, teach, mentor, and balance the staff. There should be no favorites. While the S3 might be viewed as first among equals, all staff members must have the same access to the XO's time. All the staff should have the same opportunities to function, and all staff members must carry a depth of doctrinally correct responsibilities. The staff should have a feeling of balance. Each staff member has an important

product for the unit. There should be no "stacked decks," hidden agendas, or haves and have-nots. Commanders and subordinate units should have direct access to the staff, but the XO is the entry point in the headquarters for staff issues.

The XO should train the staff as a team. Staff members should attend physical training together, socialize as a team, and foster a team attitude and spirit. The XO should never allow staff members to compete in dysfunctional ways. There should be no ego games, posturing, or showmanship. The XO must reward competence, candor, and commitment. Dignity and respect are always operative words within the staff.

The XO must also ensure that staff members speak and write in doctrinally correct language. Doing so is a priority task. The XO will have a collateral effect on higher, lower, and lateral staffs by how well the staff coordinates, communicates, visits, and works with others. Often, others' impressions of the unit are filtered through interactions with the staff. Staffs, like commanders, focus two levels down—and up!

Systems:

How the Unit Runs

The XO must learn and become an expert in the system of systems the Army and the command uses to make things work. To function properly, these complex systems require constant attention, maintenance, and training. The XO will have retained a wealth of knowledge from Army schooling and, therefore, will be familiar with the systems, which include personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and special staffs.

Personnel. The XO must learn the intricacies of assignments, promotions, disciplinary actions, morale and welfare, rewards and incentives, as well as keeping a focus toward unit strengths, balance, and talent. He should always know who is in

the rear and why the unit is in the field. He must keep an eye on any funds the unit might have and conduct an external audit if there are any discrepancies.

Intelligence. The XO should learn "the cycle" of intelligence and its relationship to priority intelligence requirements. Intelligence always structures any successful operation and is paramount at the outset of planning. The XO should know the systems the S2 can and should tap into, know what is routinely passed, and what can be obtained by request. Security clearances and physical security are normal collateral areas for the S2.

Operations. Training and operations are foremost and always most formidable. The 3-X series of field manuals (FM) are now operative, as are the older FMs. In addition to this core of knowledge, the XO must know ammunition, readiness reporting, and other local readiness requirements. S3s usually work non-mission essential task list (METL) support tasks as well as budgeting. The XO will find civil-military operations or S5 duties lurking about the environs of the operations arena. Civil operations and civilians on the battlefield are of such importance that the Army has added a C for civilian considerations to the time-tested mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available estimate of the situation. Even in peacetime, it is important to fit community relations and civilian partnering into the S5's rucksack.

Logistics. The XO must master the system of maintenance; learn how to fix or replace broken items; and get to know the organizational, direct support, general support, and higher systems and units. The XO should also master the supply system. This is critical, for the supply system has the capability to break or ground the unit. This is especially critical in heavy units where parts are expensive and numerous. One would not

allow his 18-year-old son or daughter to run the family finances, so the XO should not allow that in the unit. The XO needs to know who orders parts, period. Also important are supply, transportation, property book, and their subsystems, such as self-help. If the unit is on the ball, it will have cycles that focus on METL or individual training, gunnery, and so on, and cycles that focus on maintenance and self-help projects. A good unit is one that can do routine things, routinely. Continuity counts.

Special staff. The special staff must be integrated into the staff family. The signal officer has huge duties and mission responsibilities that expand with each advance in technology. Chaplains, maintenance officers, legal staff, and others also have roles, and there will be liaison officers (LNOs), who are formally attached as staff officers during operations. If the unit is a maneuver unit, and the artillery LNO is not in the unit's headquarters, the XO must rethink priorities. The headquarters commandant is a special case staff officer, and he is usually also the headquarters and headquarters company commander. The XO should also be involved in staff officers' evaluation reports. Finally, the XO should not invent his own systems, acronyms, doctrine, or methods that deviate from Army doctrine. The XO must use Army methods, doctrine, and systems, which are not subject to change. Standardization works; shortcuts fail.

Re-Fixing

A battalion or brigade commander in today's Army commands two battalions or brigades. Personnel turbulence is a sad reality of the personnel system, and the fact is that the commander and the command sergeant major (CSM) are the only tenured troopers for duty. The system's insatiable demand for branch-qualified majors and captains allows the XO few options. Company commanders and staffs turn over annually, or if fortunate, only every 18 months. The result is that the chain of command, staff, and unit leadership for a battalion or brigade commander's second year of command are all new. The XO will be commanding a "second" unit. All the things the commander fixed during his first year in command will have

to be fixed again. I include the XO as one of the transients, although the Army's goal is that his tour will be for 24 months. The XO must anticipate this and work ahead of the phenomenon, discuss this eventuality with the commander, and work to identify future difficulties.

Black Hat/White Hat

In the old days, the good guys wore white hats, and the bad guys wore black hats. It is said that on U.S. Navy ships, the XO is the whipcracker, the enforcer, the bad guy. The captain is the "Old Man," who is above such daily rants. He is the father figure, the good guy. This, of course, is myth, but it involves a practical principle. Someone in the command group must dispense verbal "fire and destruction" if other methods are not working. Nothing erodes a commander's authority faster than for him to issue an order only to have it blatantly ignored without consequences. Few peer dynamics erode unit officer cohesion more than does having a rogue in the ranks who is left to his own methods. If the commander does not act, it is up to the XO to do so. How XOs handle such situations varies with personalities. It is best, of course, for the XO to tell the commander his intentions. The commander's reaction will usually provide clues as to where he stands.

Leadership policy does not advocate harsh, tyrannical treatment. No great leaders were screamers or "flamers," but I have never met a successful commander who could not be tough at the right time. The key is for the XO to focus on the problem, not the individual. A dressing down that attacks the person is wrong. The XO must make the individual understand that he is not the problem; it is the situation that is the problem. If the XO strips a soldier of his personal dignity, the XO will lose that soldier's respect, but if the XO strips someone of stupid or hard-headed actions, the soldier will thank the XO for doing the right thing. Respect is the operative word.

The XO should set the example in counseling the staff. Even if there is no time to do it, the XO must make time. One technique for periodic (monthly) counseling is to have staff officers bring their completed forms to counseling sessions. They should prepare three positives and three

negatives for discussion (softer terms would be "sustains and improves"). Counseling sessions can be meaningful training and learning experiences instead of awkward confrontations. Counseling builds teams.

XO or 2IC?

The term "second in charge (2IC)" in its current use comes from the British Army and reflects the commander's prerogative and flexibility to use the XO as he sees fit. Most command applications for an XO will be tactical or operational and are even reflected in the task organization of an operation or fragmentary order. The XO derives command authority from these sources. The XO is never the commander. Thus, if the question arises, "Am I an XO or a 2IC," the answer is "XO." Units whose span of control warrant a "2IC" are given deputy commanders on the modified tables of organization and equipment.

Even so, a commander can use an XO as he sees fit. The XO must have a sense of what the commander needs as well as what he wants. The point is to tailor the unit's strengths and weaknesses to fit its mission. An XO will figure out quickly what the commander likes and does well and will be prepared to fill any gaps.

The XO, as the second senior member of the command group, is the commander's sounding board. The XO should understand better than others the commander's priorities, likes, and dislikes. That the commander can sound out an idea or unorthodox concept with the XO as a "free shot" should be understood. The XO should listen and give the best counsel and advice possible. The XO should never violate the commander's confidence. Likewise, the commander must honor the mentoring and sounding function.

I have known commanders who have put up signs over their office doors reading "No Surprises." The XO should have a set time or battle rhythm that allows for one-on-one time with the commander to bring him up to speed. The XO should present as much detail, or lack of it, as the commander wants. When in doubt as to what the commander wants, the XO should apply the magic technique: "Ask him." Trust and confidence begins with communication.

Despite dictums such as “maintenance is a command responsibility,” the commander might confide in the XO that he hates motor pools and wants the XO to take that lead with that task. The XO should do so, but he should structure things so the commander shows up at key times and is always set for success. The XO should never knowingly allow the commander to be embarrassed.

Command Sergeant Major

The XO should become the CSM’s partner. These two are the commanding officer’s closest allies and constant bearers of the torch. They should discuss issues daily and provide the commander with solutions, suggestions, and assistance. The two have unique perspectives, insight, and information that the commander might not have. The XO and the CSM should make a pact to

share information, be it good or bad, and to always be bound by a search for the best solution for the unit.

Values

Values are important. The statement, “When in doubt, do the right thing,” is perhaps trite, but it has enormous meaning. The values, ethics, and morality of the Army and the American people bind the right thing. The military bears special trust and confidence from American citizens in that it is given their most precious commodity—their children and family members—to care for and to nurture. All XOs must be true to their oaths and bear true allegiance to the U.S. Constitution. I have always been struck by, and used successfully, the moral hierarchy of American prisoners of war in the Hanoi Hilton. Their system of priorities asked, “What is best for my God (in the moral-ethical

sense), my country, my service, my unit, and (last) me?” This translates into the fact that what might be best for Company A might not be best for the battalion. This is not bad advice for an XO.

Time spent as an XO can be some of the most rewarding, fun, and valuable time of a career. The tips I offer here work, and, yes, I have tried or seen them all. Executive officers would do well to take them to heart.

Lieutenant General George A. Crocker, U.S. Army, Retired, is a Senior Mentor with CUBIC Applications, Inc. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.S. from Duke University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Panama.

MR Almanac

The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings

Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

The 1973 Yom Kippur War ranks high in the annals of intelligence failures. Although the Israelis scored a tactical victory against the Syrians and the Egyptians, the victory came at a high cost in men and materiel. Syrian forces penetrated the Golan Heights and came within 10 kilometers of securing a key bridge that would have left northern Israel vulnerable to attack. On the southern front, Egyptian forces broke through and overwhelmed the Bar-Lev Line. This surprise attack brought down the government of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and severely dented the reputation of Defense Minister General Moshé Dayan.

Israeli Security Doctrine

Despite winning three wars prior to 1973, the Israelis had to cope with how to address security needs with their small population. Compared to

Egypt and Syria, the Israelis could not economically field a huge standing army on its borders and could not sustain a protracted war on four fronts (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria). Thus, the Israeli concept of security was based on deterrence, early warning, and air supremacy. The rapid mobilization of its reserve forces depended on early warning, taking the battle to the enemy, and reaching a rapid decision on the political front.¹

Egyptian Security Doctrine

The Egyptians took great pains to study Israeli doctrine. Soon after the 1967 Six-Day War, they began to restructure their offensive and defensive techniques. Their objective was to fortify the western Suez and lay

out plans for capturing the Sinai. Unlike previous wars in which national objectives were not outlined and weapons systems did not match doctrine or the education of the troops, the Egyptians began to clearly define the ways, means, and ends for the eventual liberation of the Suez Canal and parts of the Sinai. They broke their objectives down into three phases: defiance, active defense, and war of attrition. A fourth phase resulted from the cease-fire brokered by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers.

The defiance phase (June 1967–August 1968) was to provide politically favorable conditions for the reconstruction of the armed forces and defense of the western side of the Suez Canal. The active defense phase (September 1968–February 1969) consisted of harassing Israeli forces and delaying their fortification of the east-

All Arabic sources were translated by the author and represent his translation. —Editor

ern side of the Suez. Egyptian troops began to probe the Sinai and to draw plans for crossing the Suez and penetrating Israeli fortifications. The war of attrition phase (March 1969-August 1970) projected day and night raids into the Sinai that would eventually reach company strength. This was augmented with constant exchanges of artillery fire across the canal and imbued the Egyptian fighting soldier with a sense of confidence. Harassment tactics also included Egyptian frogmen who were to sink transports at the port of Eilat. (This action occurred in November 1969 and again in February 1970 and was the catalyst for using high-pressure water to breach the Bar-Lev Line.) As the result of the cease-fire, a fourth phase was developed and labeled "No War, No Peace" (August 1970-October 1973).

In spite of the cease-fire, the Egyptians continued to collect information and plan for a massive campaign, should political negotiations fail to return the Sinai. In November 1972, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made the official decision to go to war.²

Egyptian Deception

The Egyptian deception plan can be divided into three components: economic, political, and military. A flood of communiqués and reports on Egypt's economic instability and its inability to afford another war were made public. The reports stressed the importance of a political solution to return the Sinai. Political deception stressed the status quo through the "No War, No Peace" slogan. The Egyptians highlighted their acceptance of the Rogers Plan and publicly expelled Soviet advisers. Many believed Sadat was working toward Western rapprochement. An element of the Rogers Plan stipulated that the United States would not look kindly at an Israeli first strike. This would cloud the Israeli decision to react in spite of growing intelligence indicating an attack. Military deception, the final component, involved a series of military exercises designed to act as fairs for the real attack.³

The concept of surprise occupied a large portion of the Egyptian general command's planning. Coordination with Syria occurred 6 months before D-Day (6 October). Militarily, the plan was to deceive Israel as to the intention of launching an offensive operation. The Egyptians also had to be concerned with concealing its main assault's timing, size, and direction. An emphasis on the defense was undertaken as part of the deception. After enduring four wars, the Israelis had become accustomed to the Egyptians and Syrians fortifying and conducting defensive operations. Thus, preparations for defensive operations continued as normal and were even heightened because the Arabs knew that Israel expected this. This defensive strategy was heavily emphasized in military radio traffic. False reports of negligent standards, faulty missile systems, and the difficulty of absorbing tons of Soviet equipment were exchanged on open radio to deceive Israeli signals intelligence operatives.

The Egyptian military staged exercises with different force structures and sizes along the Suez so as to hide the true order of battle for the Suez Canal crossing. They assembled troop concentrations for the actual attack over a 4-month period, with crack units being moved three weeks before D-Day under the pretense of massive engineering projects for defensive fortifications of the western side of the canal. Crossing equipment was brought from the rear to the front and back again, along with incidental moves of combat engineer units, to deceive the Israelis into believing this was simply movement training. They conducted well-practiced mobilization of reserves in a way in which the maximum number of forces would be ready for zero hour. Forty-eight hours before H-Hour, 20,000 reservists were demobilized as Israeli monitors watched.⁴

Perhaps the simplest, yet most effective, deception plan was the use of a company of the most undisciplined soldiers in the Egyptian Army one day before D-Day. They were to further reinforce Israeli contempt of

Egyptian forces by washing their clothes along the canal and loitering about in an undisciplined fashion. Israeli reports indicated that they were pitiful in their appearance. They were eating oranges, swimming, and sucking on sugar cane stalks. Other deceptions included a public announcement by the War Ministry accepting applications from armed forces personnel wishing to make a mini-pilgrimage (Umrâh) to Mecca during the holy month of Ramadan.⁵

An Egyptian destroyer squadron deployed in August 1973 under the pretense of an overhaul in India and Pakistan with port visits scheduled for Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. Their operations order, delivered on 1 October, directed the squadron to blockade the Bab-el-Mandab Straits that connect the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea.⁶ The squadron's objective was to deprive Israel of needed petroleum products being shipped from Iran.

Who knew and when? The Arabs practiced extraordinary operations security. In Egypt, only Sadat, War Minister Field Marshal Ismail Ali, and a dozen generals of the General Command knew the plan. In Syria, not more than 10 people were told of the plans. Egyptian and Syrian divisional commanders were told of the war on 1 October. Brigade and battalion commanders of both sides were told of the war on 5 October while most troops and officers were informed no more than 2 hours before H-Hour.⁷

What failed and why? The seeds of Israeli intelligence failure were sown in the tactical success of the Six-Day War. Israeli military intelligence developed a concept (the

Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein is a student at the Joint Military Intelligence College. He received a BBA from the University of Mississippi, and an MBA and MHSA from the University of Arkansas, Little Rock. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and the U.S. Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School. He is a prolific writer and has a regular column about the Middle East in the Foreign Area Officer Journal. He is a frequent contributor to Military Review.

The following two review essays are also by Lieutenant Aboul-Enein.

“Conceptzia”), which stipulated that an Arab-Israeli war would occur only if certain conditions were met. A combined Arab attack would not occur unless Arab forces possessed the means to simultaneously attack all Israeli airfields. Hence, 1975 was deemed the year of attack. Egypt was acquiring long-range Soviet fighter-bombers and would have adequate pilots and aircraft for the attack by 1975. Here, the Israelis practiced mirror imaging, a cardinal intelligence sin.

Another aspect of the concept was that the Suez Canal, with the formidable Bar-Lev Line, would be a sufficient barrier to give the Israelis enough time (48-hours) to mobilize. They did not expect an attack during Yom Kippur, the Jewish High Holiday, when only a skeletal force was deployed and mobilization was difficult. Finally, it was believed that the Arabs would not attack unless they possessed enormous stockpiles of weapons and equipment and that they were only capable of guerrilla warfare, not conventional attacks, as evidenced by their performance in three wars. This concept was adopted fully by Israel’s chief of military intelligence, and he squashed any indicators that violated these “rules.”⁸

Israeli intelligence is divided into five branches, with a focus on Aman, which according to the Agranat Commission that looked into the Israeli military’s failures, was responsible for the national intelligence estimate and bore responsibility for the intelligence failure. Israeli intelligence was vulnerable to the Conceptzia.

Since 1963, reorganization led to Aman being arranged along strict military lines. Officers were assigned at Aman for 6 to 7 years. By the early 1970s, no outside thinking took place, and no contradiction of analysis was made within this strict military hierarchy.⁹ A searing example of this is the story of Lieutenant Benjamin Simon-Tov, who 5 days before the war argued that Egyptian exercises and deployments were a camouflage for a real assault. His report sat on the desk of his commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gedaliah.¹⁰

What did not help was Sadat’s declaration that 1971 would be the Year of Decision. The year came and went with Sadat being seen as crying wolf. His threats in 1972 and 1973 were not taken seriously.

Indicators and Distractions

Israeli and U.S. estimates analyzed Egyptian and Syrian exercises over the course of several years, and each year the exercises grew larger, finally involving division-size maneuvers. Landlines were installed between Cairo and the Suez, which negated the need for radio traffic. There were civil defense exercises and the stockpiling of war materiel. In addition, elite Egyptian commando units were detected along the front. Even with such indicators, Aman was still distracted.

From 1969 on, Israeli intelligence distracters included a new emphasis—terrorism. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was active in 1972. The Lod Airport was attacked, the Munich Olympics was disrupted, an Israeli diplomat was killed in London with a letter bomb, the Israeli Naval attaché was gunned down in front of his home in Maryland, and a train carrying Soviet Jews on their way to Israel through Austria was hijacked. Many intelligence specialists were drained from other sources to form a new antiterrorism cell, which affected Israel’s ability to concentrate on Syrian and Egyptian maneuvers.¹¹

In May 1973, at a cost of \$10 million, the constant deployment of Egyptian and Syrian forces caused a mass mobilization of Israeli reserves. The attack never came, and there was criticism within the government regarding frivolous deployments. The most intriguing warning came from King Hussein of Jordan, who personally warned Meir that a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack was imminent.¹² Hussein had an interest in keeping Damascus weak through Israeli clashes. His message went unheeded.

The results of the war that Israel failed to imagine was 2,700 Israelis dead, the majority of whom died in

the first two days of combat. Israeli losses in tanks and armor were so enormous that Israel beseeched the United States for an immediate airlift. The Egyptians, used to advancing under a timetable, stopped and did not advance toward the Giddi and Mitla Passes. This allowed the Israelis to mobilize an effective counter-attack and surround the Egyptian Third Army.

Aman is guilty of several violations of intelligence analysis, including building an impregnable psychological barrier through adherence to strict concepts. Instead of influencing policymakers, Aman was influenced by disinformation.

The Israeli military establishment lacked private strategic think tanks to provide checks and balances on intelligence appraisals. The Israelis had no contingency plans for a surprise attack. They relied solely on the competence of their early warning apparatus. All force mobilizations were based on the success of their intelligence organizations. Israeli defense forces’ mobilization plans were based on having 48-hour warning, not the 10 hours that occurred during this war.¹³

When B. Lidell Hart visited Israel in March 1960, he stressed to Israeli officers that the Israeli Defense Force’s greatest danger lay in its success; victorious armies become overconfident.¹⁴ Hart’s prophetic warning became reality 13 years later. **MR**

NOTES

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MR Review Essay

The Yom-Kippur War: Memoirs of Egyptian Generals

Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

During the last decade, Egyptian generals have written prolifically about the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Many articles and books have appeared explaining the strategic and tactical aspects of these wars with particular interest in how Egypt, rising from the ashes of the defeat of the 1967 Six-Day War, was able to accomplish the total surprise of crossing the Suez Canal. Mohammed Al-Jawadi's book, *Al-Nasr-al-Waheed, Muzakiraat Al-Qaada Al-Askariya Al-Masriyah Alf wa Tisooomeah Thalathah wa Sabeen* [The Only Victory, Memoirs of Senior Egyptian Army Commanders in 1973] (Cairo: Dar-al-Khiyal Press, 2000), features the collective memoirs of five flag officers in the Egyptian army who participated in the strategic planning or tactical execution of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The book offers valuable insight into Egyptian military planning, strategic thought, and perceptions of military strengths and weaknesses.

The book represents a purely Egyptian perspective of the 1973 war. To many Egyptians the war was a political and military victory even though the reality was that Israeli units surrounded the Egyptian 3d Army and that Israeli units crossed to the western side of the Suez Canal. For a much broader study, read Chaim Herzog's *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (London: Lionel Leventhal, 1982) and Michael Oren, *The Six-Day War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Field Marshal Abd-Al-Ghani Al-Gamassy

Former Field Marshal Abd-Al-Ghani Al-Gamassy, who graduated from the Egyptian military academy

in 1939 and remained on active duty until 1978, is considered to be a military hero by most Egyptians. He was director of operations for all forces participating in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The book focuses on the key posts that prepared Gamassy for command. In 1961, he was assigned as an armored brigade commander. In 1966, he assumed the post of chief of operations for Egypt's land forces. During 1967 he attempted to conduct a land campaign with General Ismail Ali, who became war minister in 1973. Gamassy was deputy director of military intelligence until 1970 when he became chief of operations for the combined Arab forces during the War of Attrition. In 1971, he assumed the additional duty of head of military training, and by 1972, he was chief of operations of the Egyptian General Staff.

Gamassy's memoir opens with his opinions about civil-military authority: "I know very well that war is a continuation of politics by another means. I also believe that politics have their leaders and thinkers who can explain Egypt's political situation between 1967 and 1973 better than I can. That is why my memoirs focus on the military aspects of the campaign and how policymakers utilized the military option as part of a grand design to achieve Egypt's national interest."

Gamassy wishes to set the record straight about the selection of 6 October 1973 as the start date for the war. Many feel that this date was chosen because it fell during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. He states that there were multiple factors regarding the selection of D-Day and that the Egyptian General Staff contemplated several possible dates dur-

ing September and October 1973. The Jewish holiday was a factor, but not the single driving issue that decided the date of attack.

The General Staff looked for a date when hydrological and meteorological conditions and the amount of moonlight offered the best environmental factors for the initial attack. With these conditions in mind, Gamassy, using pencil, pen, and paper to ensure maximum secrecy, formulated several dates for D-Day. He delivered his handwritten report to War Minister Ismail Ali, who discussed the matter with President Anwar Sadat at his Burg-al-Arab Retreat in Alexandria in the first week of April 1973. Gamassy credits his operations staff with formulating the best month for attack and does not take the entire credit for the proposal to attack on 6 October.

Gamassy's report was shared with Syria's President Hafez-al-Asad, who was in Cairo for secret talks with Sadat about the pending war plans. The possible start dates occurred during May through August or September through October 1973. The Syrians pushed for an October through November attack, agreeing that the joint attack would not occur until the Syrian and Egyptian chiefs of staff met in August 1973 to put the finishing touches on the war plan and to agree on a precise day of attack.

The 1967 Six-Day War had shaken the foundations of Egyptian society and its armed forces, in particular, which almost immediately began a critical self-examination of military and political failures. Candid discussions about the failures that led to that debacle could only be discussed within the armed forces. The discussions led the Egyptian General Staff

Operations Center to establish a cell to address specifically the issue of national military preparedness. Representatives from key ministries were asked to make proposals of what their plans would be should war break out between Egypt and Israel.

One benefit to this brainstorming was a key understanding of the Foreign Affairs Ministry position. Gamassy points out that the planning that occurred with the Ministry of Petroleum was invaluable. They were able to assess what petroleum reserves were needed to feed Egypt's war machine in case of attack should Israel succeed in targeting key installations. The Ministry of Infrastructure educated the armed forces on what was needed to protect key dams and other locations that led to a complete defensive plan of the Aswan High Dam. The cell resolved many issues, including the operation of civil aviation during the opening of hostilities and protecting electrical power to cities.

On 13 December 1972, the Council of Ministers, coordinating with the Defense establishment, created an Emergency Coordination Committee under the direction of General Abdullah Abd-al-Fatah, Deputy Minister of War. The committee was to address issues of how to operate the government and supply the population with energy and food while the army was engaged in war. The organization would make decisions within the civil sector to balance military and civilian needs during the war.

What also helped Egyptian military planners was that many high-level commanders, such as Gamassy, Admiral Fuad Abu Zikry (Head of Egyptian Naval Forces), and Ismail Ali (War Minister), had been students together in the 1965 Nasser Higher Military Academy class. They knew one another's strategic thinking, had participated in group wargaming, and had shared the humiliation of the 1967 war.

Gamassy assumed the role of chief liaison to the Syrian Armed Forces in 1970 and retained this responsibility while changing billets even during his assignment as Director for Operations during the 1973 war. Aside from his operations staff, he created a

separate cell of officers who helped coordinate militarily with the Syrians. For 3 years, the group arranged exchanges and meetings with the focus of understanding respective chains of command and military doctrines as well as assessing each other's command and control abilities. Gamassy also required honest assessments of each other's strengths and weaknesses to plan the military campaign. What the Egyptians did not want was the typical military cooperation that was mainly for political show but did not have any military value or substance.

Among the most sensitive issues Gamassy talks about is U.S. military aid to Israel during the 1973 war. Because Israel's air fleet was not sufficient to resupply Israel with warfighting materiel, it needed help from the United States to make up for horrendous losses incurred during the opening days of the battle. Gamassy lays the blame for Egypt's inability or failure to regain the Sinai squarely on U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Gamassy believed Kissinger made a deal with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. According to Gamassy, the airlift lasted 33 days (from 13 October to 14 November) and transported a total of 22,497 tons of military materiel, with an estimated 5,500 tons being transported by Israeli civil aviation.

Gamassy also discusses the sealift of military equipment to Israel after the war, but his memoir does not address the greater Cold War issues of Soviet support to Syria and Egypt and U.S. support to Israel. The focus is on U.S. intervention that denied victory to Egypt and her Syrian ally.

One of the most controversial issues of the 1973 war involved a dispute between General Saad-Al-Deen Al-Shaazli and Sadat. The dispute revolved around Shaazli's wanting to withdraw four brigades from the Sinai to reinforce positions that Israeli forces were attacking on the western side of the Suez Canal.

On the evening of 19 October, Sadat arrived at the operations center to receive his regular briefings from the war minister and members of his staff, which included Ibrahim Fuad Nassar, director of military intelligence; Gamassy as director of

operations and head of artillery, air force, and navy; and Shaazli, the army chief of staff. During a 1-hour conversation with the war minister, Ismail Ali was told of Shaazli's decision to withdraw four mechanized infantry divisions from the Sinai back to the western side of the Suez Canal. Sadat, noting the difference in opinion between Shaazli and Ismail Ali, decided to convene a round-table meeting and be briefed by each flag officer.

Ibrahim Fuad Nassar, director of intelligence, explained that the battle with the Israeli Army had spilled onto the western side of the Suez Canal with battles in the Egyptian cities of Suez and Ismailiah. Gamassy explained that Egyptian forces were well entrenched in the Sinai and that withdrawing any divisions from there would give the impression of a retreat, which would have a dreadful psychological effect on Egyptian forces. When Shaazli's turn came to speak, he remained silent. From this, Sadat concluded that no units were to be withdrawn from the Sinai. Although not mentioned in Gamassy's memoir, Western accounts of the events reveal that Shaazli's brooding over the matter caused him to suffer a nervous breakdown and subsequent removal from command.

Gamassy includes in the book a discussion of the strategic directive Sadat issued to his war minister, post-dated 5 October 1973, which articulates his intentions down the military chain of command. The document details that, based on political-military guidance issued on 1 October 1973 and the strategic-political situation, Sadat decided to task the armed forces with accomplishing the following strategic objectives:

- Change the military stalemate by breaking the UN-brokered cease-fire.
- Overwhelm enemy defenses and inflict the maximum amount of military casualties.
- Liberate occupied territory in stages, based on the armed forces' capability and the campaign's development.

Egyptian armed forces were to accomplish these objectives alone or in collaboration with Syrian armed forces. Ismail Ali insisted that Sadat produce these objectives in writing

to clearly demonstrate that this was a political decision by Egypt's president. The document also would demonstrate that Sadat's intention was not to liberate the entire Sinai but to change events on the ground that would lead to an eventual favorable settlement regarding Egyptian territory that Israel occupied.

A key question that plagues Egyptian military thinkers who assess this campaign is, "Why did the Egyptian Army not press the attack beyond the Suez Canal and into the Gidi and Mitla Passes until 14 October?" Gamassy explains that overwhelming the Bar-Lev Line, securing the Suez Canal, and pressing the attack east toward the passes were all part of the military plan that he, Shaazli, Ismail Ali, and Sadat formulated and agreed to. Securing the passes would be crucial to denying Israeli ground units the ability to easily reinforce or regain the Bar-Lev Line.

Gamassy outlines three major obstacles in preparing Egyptian forces for combat that preoccupied Egyptian military planners. One was switching the mentality of the entire armed forces from the defensive to the offensive. This particular obstacle included expunging political intrigue from the army so senior leaders could concentrate on tactical planning for the liberation of occupied Egyptian territory. Political intrigue was not to be tolerated. This housecleaning was to begin at the general staff level and trickle down to unit commanders. The second obstacle was to plan the war using weapons and capabilities in the Egyptian inventory, not with those promised by the Soviets. This would serve the Egyptians well in their deception campaign, as the Israelis refused to believe an attack was imminent unless the Egyptians acquired state-of-the-art Soviet fighter-bombers. The third and final obstacle was the need to coordinate with Syrian armed forces over a period of stages from the political (Sadat-Asad) level to senior military commanders.

Gamassy's book continues with his observations on how the Egyptians for the first time truly studied Israel's mobilization, command structure, and the former Arab-Israeli Wars, paying particular attention to

the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1956 Suez Crisis. Their victory during the 1973 Yom Kippur War showed that the Egyptians had learned from past mistakes.

General Saad-Al-Din-Al-Shaazli

General Saad-Al-Din-Al-Shaazli, who graduated from Egypt's Military Academy in 1940, witnessed events at El-Alamein first hand as a junior officer accompanying King Farouk to the front. Through the association with a senior mentor, Shaazli joined the paratroopers and eventually commanded a paratroop unit before the 1967 Six-Day War. In the Yemen War (1962-1967), he led special forces units against guerrilla tribesmen loyal to the Yemeni monarchy. Shaazli's unit was recalled to Egypt during the 1967 Six-Day War, but it arrived too late to participate in any engagements. Sadat named Shaazli Army Chief of Staff in 1971.

Shaazli is one of the more controversial figures in modern Egyptian military history. After disagreeing vehemently with Sadat and members of the general staff over the relocation of forces to help repel Israeli incursions into the western side of the Suez Canal, he was relieved of command and sent into political exile. He remained an outspoken critic of Sadat and eventually took refuge in Libya, even dabbling in the Islamist movement.

In formulating the overall objectives for the 1973 war, Shaazli wanted to only focus on capturing the Suez Canal and go no more than 15 kilometers (km) east of the canal. This offered protection for Egyptian forces under the umbrella of its extensive network of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Ismail Ali pressed Shaazli to plan for an attack beyond that range to convince the Syrians to enter the war simultaneously with Egypt. According to Shaazli, he was not directed to develop plans to secure the passes in central Sinai until April 1973, and the entire plan was drawn up hastily for the sole purpose of keeping the Syrians on the Egyptian timetable of attacking on 6 October. Shaazli remarks, "We prepared a new plan based on an old one labeled Operation Granite which was

developed to address how to proceed beyond the canal and secure the passes; we labeled this one Granite 2 after making minor revisions. This plan was then added to Operation Badr (the crossing of the Suez Canal), and it was presented to the Syrians as one plan. The Egyptian High Command, however, understood Operation Badr to have two phases with the second phase (Granite 2) to be executed based on the military and political developments of the campaign."

Shaazli wanted to withdraw four brigades from the Sinai to relocate them on the western side of the Suez Canal to help repel Israeli units attacking the cities of Suez and Ismailiah and to help prevent Israeli units from crossing to the western side of the Suez Canal. Shaazli admits that he did not speak out during the evening conference with Sadat and the General Staff. He felt that Sadat had already made up his mind (backed by Ismail Ali and Gamassy) not to withdraw a single soldier from the Sinai. Shaazli says, "I was not aware until that second of the political game, and I thought that Ismail Ali's reluctance to withdraw forces was merely tactical stubbornness and not part of the wider political game. So I decided to take the case directly to President Sadat." In another instance, during a discussion with Ismail Ali about withdrawing the 25th Mechanized Brigade, Shaazli recounts, "It became apparent to me that the War Minister had been directly given instructions from Sadat, that their decision had already been made and that further opening or mentioning this issue would incur his displeasure."

On the night of 19 October, as they waited for Sadat to arrive, Shaazli again beseeched Ismail Ali to be forthright about the issue of counter- ing Israeli forces entering the African side of Egypt. According to Shaazli, Ismail Ali said that he did not want to bring up these issues, became agitated, and threatened immediate court martial if Shaazli continued to highlight these problems. Shaazli felt that this decision was Ismail Ali's, not Sadat's. Ismail Ali did not want to reveal Egyptian weaknesses to Sadat.

Egyptian military officers continue to debate this situation, and it has been featured in several Arabic books on the war. Some writers are critical of Shaaзли, others consider Sadat's and Ismail Ali's decision a tactical blunder.

Unlike other generals, who focus on tactics, and unlike Gamassy, who looks into the campaign's strategic aspects, Shaaзли's account contains many statistics about the men, materiel, and equipment used for each phase of the war. Crossing the Suez Canal and breaching the Bar-Lev Line on 6 October 1973 are considered brilliant feats of combat engineering and tactical surprise. The breach occurred in 18 hours with the loss of 5 combat aircraft, 20 tanks, and 280 men. In that time, three mechanized and one infantry brigade crossed the canal into the Sinai. Of over 100,000 troops who crossed the canal—

- ▢ 32,000 crossed on rubber boats.
- ▢ 5,500 crossed inside tanks, armored vehicles, trucks, amphibious vehicles, and Jeeps on floating platforms and were ferried across the Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah.
- ▢ 1,500 crossed using light pontoon bridges.
- ▢ 61,000 crossed using heavy pontoon bridges.

Another item that occupied Shaaзли after the initial success of overwhelming the Israelis on the Bar-Lev Line was the quality of tanks. He explains that the Israeli tank was superior to the mix of Egyptian tanks that crossed into the Sinai. The Israelis had 960 tanks in the Sinai. Egypt had over 1,000 tanks, but they were a mix of T-62s, 54s, and 55s. Only 200 Egyptian tanks were T-62s, equal in range and quality to Israeli tanks equipped with 105-millimeter (mm) guns as well as excellent range-finding equipment. Egyptian military planners wanted to counter the Israeli advantage by not employing their weaker tanks in open desert where range dictated the outcome of a tank battle. Instead, they hoped to combine antitank SAGGER missiles with their inferior tank force to equalize the battlefield. Egyptian planners understood that Israeli doctrine called for tank-on-tank battles

with no reliance on infantry. Egyptian strength was the reverse, and Egypt planned accordingly.

Shaaзли's memoir details the equipping of Egyptian forces by the Soviet Union and the disagreements over tactics and strategy. Gamassy and Shaaзли offer a complete account of the military strategic perspective of the 1973 war from the Egyptian viewpoint and no doubt serve as required reading for Egyptian senior officers attending the Nasser Academy for Higher Military Studies.

General Abd-Al-Minaam Khaleel

General Abd-Al-Minaam Khaleel was of the same generation as Gamassy and Shaaзли, having graduated from the Military Academy in 1941. He assumed command of the Egyptian 2d Army during the 1973 war. His memoir details the study of the 1956 Suez Crisis as a template for infantry tactical planning for the 1973 war. He says, "Among the battles carefully analyzed was the one at Abu Ageila in which I read Moshe Dayan's account that this battle was the most difficult for Israeli Infantry Divisions on their way to the Suez Canal." Khaleel's careful analysis of Israeli performance during the 1956 Suez War was used to develop the initial tactics of using antitank weapons to strengthen Egyptian infantry. Khaleel was first to delineate between the successful victory of the initial assault then to admit that the Israelis seized the initiative after 14 October when his forces were beyond SAM protection.

Beginning in May 1971, Shaaзли gathered the senior commanders of the Egyptian 2d and 3d Armies along with Gamassy and their respective staffs to create an offensive plan to regain the Suez Canal and, potentially, portions of the Sinai. Breaching the Bar-Lev Line, dealing with mines, logistics, and the mechanics of the actual crossing were discussed with each member, who were given 4 weeks to solve tactical problems and propose new ones for the next meeting.

In dealing with breaching Israeli mines, the Egyptian combat engineers borrowed heavily from tactics

learned during the 1962 Yemen War, where they had to contend with guerrilla ambushes and where they developed systems whereby a tank was equipped with de-mining equipment. Their efforts were put in writing in a classified document known simply as Official Circular Number 41. This document also detailed how the Egyptians could not advance 8 to 10 km beyond the eastern side of the Suez Canal forces because they would not be protected from Israeli air assaults.

Khaleel discusses the debates among the General Staff on issues such as the need to advance to the passes immediately after securing the Suez Canal because any delay would result in Israeli reserves being called up to reinforce the region. Egyptian tanks would only encounter Israeli tanks, because the Israeli air force would be occupied with Syria, dealing with the classic tactical problem of defense in depth.

General Yousef Afifi

General Yousef Afifi's memoir offers more of a ground view of the 1973 war. He commanded the 19th Infantry Brigade, one of five that crossed the Suez Canal into the Sinai on 6 October 1973. His particular unit crossed from the city of Suez into the Sinai. He lists the officers who had commanded each of the five brigades and discusses the military challenges he faced in scaling the Bar-Lev Line. He outlines methods by which infantry units trained as they would fight and discusses the endless exercises that involved scaling a 22-meter (m)-tall model of the Bar-Lev Line while carrying gear and weapons. The soldiers also practiced setting up water cannons and penetrating replicas of sand barriers.

During operations, Afifi's 19th Infantry Brigade scaled the Bar-Lev Line and remained in the Sinai for 26 hours before the bulk of tanks and armored vehicles crossed the Suez Canal. Afifi's brigade used antitank and light weapons to keep the Israelis suppressed in their reinforced bunkers. Egyptian artillery also kept up an unending barrage during the crossing of Egyptian forces into the Sinai.

Many of Afifi's men scaled the Bar-Lev Line at the same time the engineers were using high-pressure hoses to penetrate the sand barrier. He recounts how the water made going up the barrier extremely difficult. Some soldiers abandoned their portable ladders and climbed on each other, forming a human ladder on the side of the fortification.

Afifi also recounts how his unit undertook night operations while knowing that the Israelis had perfected this type of warfare. This was the first time Egyptian forces had conducted night combat operations. Infantry units reached as far as the Mitla Pass, one of three main passes in the center of the Sinai connecting Egypt and Israel. Afifi's detailed daily account of his unit's fight in the Sinai outlines the difficulties of command and control during infantry engagements between Israeli and Egyptian forces.

Colonel Bgen Adel Yussri

Colonel Bgen Adel Yussri and his 7th Infantry Battalion represent the concept of valor to many Egyptian army personnel. His unit endured fierce fighting as they pushed 19 km

past the Suez Canal into the Sinai. Yussri lost a leg, and many of his soldiers were posthumously and personally decorated for valor. His unit helped capture of the 190th Israeli Tank Brigade and its commander Colonel Asef Yagouri.

Yussri's unit received orders on 14 October to proceed toward the Gidi and Mitla passes. Their mission was to relieve pressure on the Syrian front, to destroy Israeli logistics bases in the Sinai, and to advance from 10 to 40 km inland. They were to keep Israeli armored units from entering the passes and to begin a counteroffensive against Egyptian forces in the western Sinai.

Yussri and his force witnessed a punishing Israeli air offensive on 15 October. On the night of 15-16 October, Israeli forces began a counteroffensive, which ended with an Israeli penetration between the Egyptian 2d and 3d Armies and the envelopment of the 3d Army. Yussri also admits the effectiveness of the Israeli Air Force in destroying Egyptian SAM sites. Israeli fighters eventually dominated the sky.

Yussri treats readers to his strategic opinion of why the Israelis did

not press their attack and dislodge Egyptian forces from the Sinai. The Egyptian 3d Army would eventually be decimated by starvation if not resupplied. Yussri explains that the Israelis also had problems. They had a 300-km-long logistic trail; they suffered massive losses in tanks and materiel; and they expended the majority of Israeli reserves on the Syrian front. So a tenuous stalemate ensued in which Gamassy negotiated humanitarian relief of the Egyptian 3d Army and the eventual cease-fire with the Israelis.

Conclusion

While this article gives only a glimpse of the actors and actions of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, many other untapped Arabian sources of information await military historians. The Syrians, who are the most enigmatic combatants of this war, have yet to produce any major literature about their participation. My hope is that more analyses and translations of works from Arabic to English will occur to enrich the understanding of combat tactics and military strategy from the Arab perspective.

The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom

Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

With rumblings about possibly ejecting U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia, it is important to dust off some old books regarding the Desert Kingdom to understand where America's relationship with Saudi Arabia has been and where it is going. Journalist Sandra Mackey's 1987 book *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom* (Penguin Books, New York) is one such old book. From 1978 to 1980 and again from 1982 to 1984, Mackey lived in Saudi Arabia with her husband, who worked as a dermatologist at King Faisal Specialist Hospital.

During her sojourn, Mackey wrote an anonymous column for the *New York Times* in which she described Saudi society and politics. Mackey also landed a job at the Saudi Min-

istry of Planning and was privy to that nation's 5-year plans to modernize the infrastructure and to deal with the problems that were impeding industrialization.

When writing on Saudi Arabia one cannot rely on open-source information. To penetrate the inner circle of princes, tribesmen, and religious scholars, a journalist must be armed with a sharp memory and an unassuming manner. Although Mackey's book is not what I would call scholarly, it does point out major problems of Saudi society in a kind of tell-all narrative.

The book begins by humorously describing Saudi customs and Draconian methods of implementing moral views on an unsuspecting group of travelers arriving in the

Kingdom. Mackey insightfully points out the lack of education, the need to dominate, and finally the efforts to keep impurities such as pork, alcohol, Christian bibles, and crosses out of the country. The book is filled with anecdotes about foreigners roughing it in Saudi Arabia, but once the reader wades through those, he will find important nuggets of information to help him understand the Kingdom's customs.

Mackey delves into the history of Saudi Arabia's founding, a truly remarkable story of how Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud left exile in Kuwait to lead several dozen warriors to liberate his ancestral home of Riyadh. By 1932, through tribal alliances, war, and marriage, he had unified Saudi Arabia into its present form.

The Al-Saud family had to make two alliances with radical Islam. One alliance occurred in the 18th century with Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahab, a revivalist Muslim scholar who wanted to purge Arabia of pagan practices and the influence of Islamic mysticism (Sufism). The rulers of central Arabia saw in this the potential of winning political and religious tribal support through religious legitimacy. The second alliance was made in the 20th century when Abdul-Aziz was trying to unify the country. Abdul-Aziz used the Ikhwan, a group of militant Islamic warriors living in Northern Arabia, as a lightning strike force in his campaigns. However, by 1929, they were challenging his authority and religious beliefs. This led to a serious revolt in which Abdul-Aziz subdued the rebels with machine guns.

The tie between the Al-Sauds and Abdul-Wahab can be seen today in marriages and connections between the Royal Family and the family known as Al-Ashaykh, who are descendants of Abdul-Wahab, from which the word Wahabism comes. What Mackey does not discuss is that calling a Saudi a Wahabi is not polite. Saudis usually refer to themselves as Muwahidun (those who preach unity with God) or simply Muslims. The Muwahiduns are considered one of the most conservative sects of Sunni Islam, and elements of Arabian tribal tradition has found its way into their religious laws. Only with a thorough understanding of the Shariah (Islamic Law) can a person distinguish between tradition and law.

Mackey lists the many princes and princelings of the Royal Family and shows how the line of power directly relates to the person's relationship to Abdul-Aziz and to the person's competence, age, and matrilineal line. Mackey illustrates her point by discussing the ascent of Fahd to Crown Prince and of his full brothers' occupation of key positions in the Saudi government. Nicknamed the Sudairi Seven, the brothers are the major decisionmakers in Saudi Arabia. Among their numbers are Naif, the interior minister; Sultan,

the defense minister; and Salman, the governor of Riyadh and deputy governor of Mecca. The current regent, Abdullah, is not a Sudairi, and cracks in the royal family can be seen in the resentment family members feel in not sharing the Sudairis' wealth, prestige, and power.

Mackey was privileged to attend a royal wedding. She describes the princesses' range of tastes and education, from the elite, well-dressed, and well-educated Al-Faisal line, from which Foreign Minister Saud-Al-Faisal comes, to the gaudier members of the family.

One of the titles the Saudi king has assumed is Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina. This authority was challenged in November 1979, when Juhaiman Al-Utaibi and 200 followers seized control of the Grand Mosque of Mecca and held hostages for a week during which a microphone blared about the corruption of the Al-Sauds. One week of serious hand-to-hand fighting occurred before this crisis was resolved. Mackey capably describes the events as well as the mood of the Saudi Arabian people during and after the incident.

After the crisis, many Egyptians, Yemenis, and Sudanese nationals were executed or implicated in aiding Juhaiman and his followers. A statement made by Abdul-Aziz El-Tuweijery, Deputy Commander of the National Guard, is revealing. He stated that the weapons Juhaiman used came from a National Guard arsenal. This is significant because Juhaiman served in the National Guard, and this military unit, recruited exclusively from the Najd (Central Arabian) tribes, is considered by the Royal Family to be the most loyal fighters. Although not covered in the book, the National Guard is charged with overseeing any dissension within the Regular Army and is controlled by Prince Abdullah.

Mackey tells interesting stories about life as an expatriate, including ways she got around conservative Saudi laws. One permanent fixture of life in Saudi Arabia is the Mutawain (religious police) who roam the streets in search of those who

might offend their version of morality. Typically, the Mutawas are young males, who derive pleasure and empowerment from physically harassing people, such as shopkeepers who do not close promptly during prayers or women who are not properly veiled. Mackey describes an incident in which she was assaulted by Mutawa for showing too much of her bare arms. [As a child, a Mutawa confiscated my roller skates because they offended his sensibilities.] Many foreigners get around alcohol prohibitions by brewing their own beverages, including moonshine called Siddequi (my friend).

Mackey ably highlights the business elite, including the Al-Rajhi, Al-Kaki Bin Mahfouz, and Bin Laden families, who built empires in trade, construction, and banking, respectively. The "Bin" in front of the last name denotes families from Yemen. They possess shrewd business skills, which are combined with sharing profits with the Royal Family to gain concessions and to further their fortunes in Arabia.

Mackey ends the book with a discussion about the Al-Saud quest for turning money into security through its multibillion-dollar investment in King Khalid Military City. The project, which began in 1976, is designed to house 70,000 troops. Many U.S. defense and construction companies, such as Bechtel Steel, benefited from this element of the Saudi's third 5-year plan. By the time Iraq leader Saddam Hussein threatened Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military had a city that was compatible with U.S. equipment. Many Saudi Muslim radicals see this investment as another way in which the United States has encouraged the squandering of Saudi petroleum wealth.

Although Mackey's book is important, I recommend Robert Lacey's *The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud* (New York: Harcourt, 1982), which is one of the best histories of modern Saudi Arabia. Unlike Mackey's book, *The Kingdom* is more scholarly in its approach and dispenses with the cute anecdotes of expatriate life in Arabia.

Robert E. Lee: Three Views

Major James Gates, U.S. Army

One of the pleasant problems with studying history is that few things are black and white. Many historians have examined, and disagreed on, the South's attempt to preserve its "peculiar institution" and to achieve independence.¹

One of history's never-ending, never-to-be-solved controversies concerns Confederate strategy during the American Civil War, about which accusations and counteraccusations began flying soon after the war ended. Three recent investigations by Robert G. Tanner; Pia S. Seagrave and Edward H. Bonekemper III; and Michael A. Palmer take radically different views on Confederate General Robert E. Lee and Southern strategy.

Tanner's *Retreat to Victory: Confederate Strategy Reconsidered* sets out not to reconsider Confederate strategy but to defend it to the hilt.² Although in places Tanner presents a detailed, cogently argued case, sloppy scholarship, bias, and exaggeration detract from his work.

In the 12-page introduction Tanner constructs a straw man, outlining critics' three points. First, the Confederacy should have employed guerrilla tactics. Second, the South should have adopted a Fabian strategy. Finally, Southern military leaders should have adopted a strategy of deep retreat, fighting only when necessary. While historians have agreed on each point to greater or lesser extent, Tanner quotes out of context and overstates his case. Three examples should suffice.

To illustrate the guerrilla warfare camp, Tanner quotes Professor Reid Mitchell, "I doubt that the Union could have won the war if the Confederacy had decided to wage it as a guerrilla war."³ Here is Mitchell in context: "It is idle to speculate, but I doubt that the Union could have won the war if the Confederacy had decided to wage it as a guerrilla war. The Union certainly did not succeed

in putting down what might be called the postwar guerrilla activity that took place during Reconstruction. But in 1861 the Confederacy did not choose to fight a guerrilla war—because, in large part, it did not seem possible to fight a guerrilla war and keep slavery intact."⁴ Mitchell was not advocating guerrilla war but explaining why the South could not adopt guerrilla warfare.

On defensive war, Tanner quotes Alan T. Nolan, "[T]he South's true grand strategy of the defensive could have kept its armies in the field long enough to wear down the North's willingness to carry on the war."⁵ Tanner ignores Nolan's concession that limited offensives for political or morale purposes were necessary.

Tanner asserts that revisionist British general and historian J.F.C. Fuller argued for a Fabian strategy. Fuller actually argued that the South should have located the capital in Atlanta, fallen back to its natural frontiers, and conducted an offensive-defensive war.⁶

All the aforementioned are unfortunate because Tanner makes some salient points. Specifically, by 1863, the Confederates had retreated as far as they could. Behind them lay the heartland, agriculture, industry, and slaves. Tanner argues that the Confederacy had to hold Richmond—its industrial and symbolic heart. Further, the Confederacy had to defend the remaining agricultural lands so it could feed itself. And finally, Federal advances accelerated slave desertions. The South simply could not afford to lose both its industrial and its human property.

Tanner uses Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* as a yardstick with which to measure Confederate strategic effectiveness.⁷ The South fought to achieve independence and to protect slavery. All moral considerations aside, Clausewitz would have approved. Measured against this standard, Tanner argues, the South em-

ployed the correct strategy. Few, if any, Civil War-era leaders had heard of Clausewitz, let alone read *On War*. Instead, nearly all West Point graduates were well versed in Antoine Jomini's *The Art of War*.⁸ Perhaps this would have been a better yardstick against which to measure effectiveness.

Ironically, one could argue that Clausewitz proves the opposite of Tanner's thesis; that is, adopting a defensive-Fabian-guerrilla strategy was not in the South's interest. Tanner quotes Clausewitz: "The level of violence required to satisfy disparate political objectives differs with the objectives, something the commander must keep in mind as he expends force in furtherance of government policy."⁹ Since the South sought to preserve slavery and achieve independence, were Lee's invasions and the associated 41,787 casualties consistent with the "level of violence required to satisfy disparate political objectives?"¹⁰

Seagrave and Bonekemper's *How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War* takes the opposite view.¹¹ They believe the South would have won the war had it not been for Lee. Although many of their arguments parrot Nolan's *Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History*, they go into greater detail by arguing that the South would have won the war if it had husbanded its manpower, but Lee wasted his men in needless offensives.¹² The most important theater of the war was not Virginia or even in the South. Indeed, the most important theater was the morale of the loyal states. Seagrave and Bonekemper's indictment is that the South's best hope to win was to defeat Abraham Lincoln at the ballot box. Lee's aggressive tactics slowly destroyed that hope.¹³

Interestingly, Lee understood this, but being aggressive by nature, he fought a war of annihilation. To win

militarily, he needed victories that would result in casualty ratios of at least three to one or victories that would completely destroy the Army of the Potomac. Only his victory at Cold Harbor approached this ratio. Fredericksburg was Lee's one and only chance to crush a Union army, but he hesitated, allowing it to escape. During his first 14 months in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee lost 80,000 men while inflicting only 73,000 casualties on the Federals—hardly a ratio designed for victory.¹⁴ To put it in different terms, before August 1863, when Lee was predominately on the offensive, he lost approximately 5,700 men per month. After Gettysburg, when he was usually on the defensive, he lost only 2,000 men per month. Later, in 1864, he was able to inflict horrendous casualties on Union General Ulysses S. Grant's army only because Lee had bled his army white and had to fight from entrenchments. One can only speculate on the outcome of the 1864 election had the Army of Northern Virginia totaled 110,000 men instead of the 64,000 who faced Grant and General George Meade's 125,000 men.

Sandwiched between these two views lies Michael A. Palmer's *Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive*.¹⁵ Palmer, the only professionally trained historian among the trio, is a professor at East Carolina University and takes a more even-handed approach, admitting that Lee was a brilliant soldier, but only when on the defensive. When Lee went over to the strategic offensive, his faults surfaced.

After a brilliant, costly campaign against Union Generals George McClellan and John Pope, the Confederates in August 1862 stood just a few miles from Washington. In a matter of weeks, Lee had reversed the Confederate fortunes of war. Then, Lee embarked on what Palmer terms "probably the worst decision he ever made as a general"—invading Maryland.¹⁶ Holding his enemy in contempt, Lee divided his army; against a competent opponent, he would have been destroyed. Besides

risking his army, he destroyed any chance of European aid. In a cogently argued essay, Palmer outlines Lee's mistakes, from his assumption that the people of Maryland would welcome his troops as liberators to the assumption that McClellan would fight on ground favorable to Lee.

When Lee returned to Virginia, he again became a brilliant tactician in the defense of Virginia. After his triumphs at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, though, he launched an ill-conceived and risky raid into Pennsylvania looking for that elusive battle of annihilation. Once again the Federals surprised him. Against a more capable foe Lee might have found his battle of annihilation . . . in reverse.

Palmer's conclusion discusses an old topic: could the South have won, and if so, what was the best strategy to win? As many historians have noted previously, the Confederacy did not have to defeat the North to obtain its aims; it simply had to survive. Palmer believes that if the South had been truly waging a war of liberation, it should have adopted a defensive strategy. This was Confederate President Jefferson Davis' policy. Unfortunately for the South, Lee pursued a strategy inconsistent with that policy.

Lee wanted to "strike a blow" at the enemy, and repeatedly, the Federals frustrated him by escaping destruction. Palmer says, "Lee's twin penchants for the offensive and for secrecy contorted the outlines of the Confederate national strategy between 1862 and 1863 and led to his own failures as a commander."¹⁷

Lee understood Davis' penchant for a defensive war, but he also understood the Union's strength. To achieve independence, Lee opted for a strategy of annihilation but had to keep this hidden from his superiors. This meant keeping his plans hidden from his lieutenants lest Richmond discover his plans and rein in his efforts. Such secrecy prevented proper staffing and planning and often confused his lieutenants. One need only look at Lee's orders to Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart be-

fore Gettysburg to understand this. Lee expected Stuart to screen the Army's movements, to forage, and to scout. The first mission placed Stuart in Lee's rear while the second required him to be in the van. Stuart, after screening the Army of Northern Virginia, could not ride down the Shenandoah Valley on roads clogged with infantry, artillery, and supply trains. Thus, he detached his command and rode around Meade. Proper staffing might have prevented this confusion and led to a better distribution of the cavalry. Conversely, when on the defensive, Lee did not have to worry about logistics, and his objectives were always clear: march here, find the enemy's flank, attack, drive them back.

Palmer contends that Lee, rather than being Davis' top military adviser and executor of policy, actually usurped Davis' authority as commander in chief when he launched his offensives without conducting the proper staff work and the proper communication with his superiors. This is a radical view indeed and needs more study.

The reader is left with the pleasant problem of deciding who is right concerning Lee and Confederate strategy. Those convinced of Lee's genius will follow Tanner, convinced that the Confederacy only succumbed to overwhelming numbers and that in a "fair" fight a Lee victory would have permitted men to own men. Those convinced that Lee was a liability will agree with Seagrave and Bonekemper that political but not military victory was possible. Those who struggle with Lee's brilliance while in Virginia but his blunders north of the Potomac will likely agree with Palmer.

Ultimately, Tanner's work is less convincing because it misrepresents sources and fails to address why the South adopted an aggressive strategy. However, Tanner does provide a cogent argument for why the South had to adopt a forward defense after 1862. Did Lee adopt excessively aggressive tactics? Probably, because Civil War weapons generally precluded battles of annihilation. Yet,

Lee came close to achieving a political victory by outlasting the North's will to win. Military professionals should read all three books because all provide interesting insight into the problems of Civil War history. **MR**

NOTES

1. Confederates E. Porter Alexander and James Longstreet criticized the aggressive Southern strategy, particularly Robert E. Lee's. In fact, it is almost impossible to segregate Lee from Southern strategy. Historian Thomas Connelly, who examines Lee's strategy in *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), concludes that Lee was a localist at heart and concentrated on Virginia to the detriment of the other theaters of war. Attorney Alan T. Nolan in *Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991) challenges all the standard perceptions of Lee, from his position on slavery to his resignation from the Army to his generalship.
2. Robert G. Tanner, *Retreat to Victory: Confederate strategy Reconsidered* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2001).

3. Reid Mitchell, quoted in Tanner, xii.
4. Mitchell, "The Perseverance of the Soldiers," in Gabor S. Boritt and James M. McPherson, eds., *Why the Confederacy Lost* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 124-25.
5. Nolan, quoted in Tanner, xvi.
6. J.F.C. Fuller, *Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 32, 40. Tanner's view that anyone who criticizes Southern strategy is a revisionist is curious, especially when applied to Fuller. First, revisionism is not necessarily bad. Without revisionism, African-American contributions to the Nation would have been largely unknown. Second, the reader must ask what Fuller was revising. Writing in the early 1930s, Fuller was perhaps the first to challenge the mythic Lee created by the decidedly mediocre Confederate General Jubal Early. That Early and his compatriots deliberately twisted the historical record to place Lee in the best light is now widely known.
7. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Knopf, 1993).
8. Antoine Jomini, *The Art of War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992).
9. Clausewitz, quoted in Tanner, 80.
10. Casualties vary depending on the source. This total comes from Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War* (Bloomington: University of Illinois Press, 1991), as quoted in Pia S. Seagrave and Edward H. Bonekemper III, *How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War* (Spotsylvania, PA: Sergeant Kirkland's Press, 1999), 218-19.

11. Seagrave and Bonekemper.
12. Nolan.
13. Seagrave and Bonekemper, 11-13.
14. *Ibid.*, 134.
15. Michael A. Palmer, *Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive, From Antietam to Gettysburg to Bristoe Station* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996).
16. *Ibid.*, 22.
17. *Ibid.*, 134.

Major James Gates, U.S. Army, is Executive Officer, Directorate of Budget Investment, at the Pentagon. He received a B.S. from Kansas State University, an M.A. from Ohio State University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College. He is a prolific writer whose articles have appeared in the Journal of Military History, Aerospace Chronicle, and Aerospace Power Journal, among others.

U.S. Army War College Strategic Landpower Essay Contest 2003

The United States Army War College and the United States Army War College Foundation are pleased to announce the fifth annual STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest.

The topic of the essay must relate to "The advancement of professional knowledge on the strategic role of LANDPOWER in joint and multinational operations."

Anyone is eligible to enter and win, except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation will award a prize of \$1,000 to the author of the best essay and a prize of \$500 to the runner-up.

For more information or for a copy of the essay contest rules, contact Dr. Jerome J. Comello, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242, commercial telephone (717) 245-3498, DSN 242-3498.

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest Rules:

1. Essays must be original, not to exceed 5,000 words and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to Dr. Jerome J. Comello, USAWC Strategic Landpower Essay Contest, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242, commercial telephone (717) 245-3498, DSN 242-39498.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 1 June 2003.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay so that the identity of the essayist will not be known by the selection committee. Instead, each author will use a personally selected codename. This codename shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay in lieu of the author's name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope must contain a typed sheet giving the essayist's name, rank/title, branch of service (if applicable), biographical sketch, social security number, address, office and home phone numbers (if available), the essay's title, and the essayist's codename. This envelope will not be opened until after the final selections are made.
5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8½" by 11". Submit two complete copies. If prepared on a computer, please also submit the entry on an IBM-compatible disk, indicating specific word-processing software.
6. The award winners will be notified in early Fall 2003. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by mid-October.
7. The author of the best essay will receive \$1,000 from the U.S. Army War College Foundation. A separate prize of \$500 will be awarded to the author of the second best essay.



EXPANDED

Book Reviews

COMMAND LEGACY: A Tactical Primer for Junior Leaders of Combat Units, Raymond A. Millen, Brassey's, Dulles, VA, 2002, 368 pages, \$24.95.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen has, without a doubt, constructed what many doctrinal writers and commanders in the field have struggled to develop for dozens of years. *Command Legacy: A Tactical Primer for Junior Leaders of Combat Units* is an epiphany of sorts. Millen, a U.S. Army infantry officer, provides a one-stop shop for small-unit leaders of what the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the Infantry Company Career Course should provide every student. The book illuminates clearly, in a smartly compartmentalized form, all of the facets of small-unit command a leader will use to execute any mission. The book could become the tactical reference for all junior leaders in the Army.

Command Legacy is the synthesis of dozens of doctrinal manuals; accepted standard operating procedures; well-known tactics, techniques, and procedures; and Millen's own talented ability to organize military thought. The book provides small-unit leaders with easy-to-use templates, tables, and steps for conducting everything from assembly area occupation to link-up operations to developing sector sketches to conducting military operations in urban terrain. Not only does this well-written book provide an in-depth look at mission sets, it also functionally dissects, in simple terms, salient factors involved in conducting foot marches; planning land navigation; and most notably, controlling the "soldier's load." Millen writes, "[E]veryone talks about the soldier's load but does nothing about it." Millen provides a solution—plain and simple—a task that would make the World War II historian, S.L.A. Marshall, proud.

As a leader and staff officer in various outfits, including mecha-

nized, airborne, air assault, and Ranger infantry units, I feel confident in saying that Millen's *Command Legacy* is one of the most important soldier's manuals developed in modern Army times. I sincerely hope that its marketing strategy is sound. The Army needs this book, and more important, our soldiers deserve it.

LTC Dominic J. Caraccilo,
USA, Vicenza, Italy

THE FIGHTING RABBIS: Jewish Military Chaplains and American History, Albert Isaac Slomovitz, New York University Press, 2001, 171 pages, \$14.95.

The Fighting Rabbis: Jewish Military Chaplains and American History is a groundbreaking history by Albert Isaac Slomovitz, a recently retired U.S. Navy chaplain. The book clearly and economically records the triumphs and travails of Jewish military chaplains throughout U.S. history.

Given the long history of Jewish soldiers in America, beginning with their participation in the Revolutionary Army, it is startling to realize that this study is the first of its kind. Perhaps the topic's neglect can be attributed to stereotypes—enforced by anti-Semites—that Jews lacked the proper "character" to serve as soldiers. Indeed, a 1915 U.S. Army textbook author claims that the Jew did not know what patriotism means and, therefore, the Jew would not have the qualities to be a good soldier.

In righting the historic record about Jews in the U.S. Armed Forces in general and the chaplaincy in particular, Slomovitz underscores the persistent theme of interfaith cooperation. Throughout the 20th century, Christian chaplains, for the most part, empathetically supported the activities of their Jewish counterparts.

In his opening chapter, Slomovitz offers a well-written overview of the

origin of military chaplains in Europe and how that role altered in America, its focus becoming as ecumenical as possible. He also excels in revealing the multidimensionality of the chaplain's role. More than simply spiritual counselors, they are "fighting Rabbis," and like all chaplains, they are medics, therapists, and educators. Their stories make this book compelling reading for anyone interested in military-centered pastoral care.

Norman Weinstein, U.S. Army
Research Institute, Boise, Idaho

WARRIOR POLITICS: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, Robert D. Kaplan, Random House, NY, 2002, 198 pages, \$22.95.

The insightful observations Robert D. Kaplan reveals in his many books are of benefit to any military officer or political leader with international responsibilities. His journalistic background contributes a style both lively and engaging. His conclusions are a needed caution against the idealism of those who would change the world but who have little understanding of it. There is much wisdom in *Warrior Politics*; nonetheless, I consider Kaplan's realist approach to international relations inadequate.

Kaplan offers a timely warning against easy answers to difficult questions. He reminds us that Utopian visions have too often led to monstrous government. He encourages us to study how previous leaders have confronted problems so we can deal better with our own, but he warns that not every problem has a solution.

Kaplan says his book is about how to think, not what to think. Yet, while I found his critique of idealism convincing, I did not find his argument for realism equally so. The contemporary challenges he examines are more amenable to application of the Just War tradition he considers irrelevant than they are to his realism.

Naïve or pessimistic realism is not our only option.

Kaplan's argument is convincing only if we accept his pessimistic premises. However, many of these are historically, philosophically, or theologically flawed. Kaplan's reading list ignores such influential philosophers as St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Locke.

One of Kaplan's key premises is that morality is a human construct. From that notion, Kaplan develops a consequentialist ethic. Kaplan and I disagree completely; it is far from universally agreed that morality is a human product. If morality is merely a human construct, then the moral becomes what is most convenient to us. Kaplan's morality reduces to self-interest, but self-interest is too flimsy a foundation on which to construct an ethic.

The important thing in consequentialism is achieving the proper outcome. Kaplan is too sophisticated to propose that the end justifies the means. He says, "Statesmanship demands a morality of consequence." Consider the morality of your actions, but the bottom line is the outcome. The weaknesses of this construct are that we cannot know all the consequences of our actions, and consequences can justify what most would call intrinsically wrongful acts.

Kaplan commends President Franklin D. Roosevelt for "steadily and stealthily" moving the United States closer to war with Adolf Hitler while denying he was doing so because of congressional opposition. I doubt Kaplan would applaud Roosevelt's suppression of intelligence about a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor because of his belief that an attack would unite the nation against the Axis powers. Consequentialism would allow both because of the greater good of defeating the Nazis.

In recommending pagan over Christian virtues, Kaplan misunderstands Christian ethical thinking. He writes as if pagan and Judeo-Christian virtues were mutually exclusive. He also ignores the ethical distinction between how an individual Christian should behave in personal matters and how the same person

should behave as a government official. Kaplan rightly says deception is commendable in war but not in civil government. He wrongly thinks Christian ethics condemns all deception. Yet the Bible contains accounts of spy missions and the use of ruses to defeat Israel's enemies. Not all is fair in war, but spying and deception are.

Kaplan believes asymmetrical conflict is America's future. I agree. In such an environment, Kaplan claims the Just War tradition is irrelevant. I think he is wrong. The stress and frustration that asymmetrical conflicts place on soldiers and their leaders make the Just War tradition more important than ever. The new threats created by asymmetrical conflict call for new strategy and new tactics, but they do not require a new morality or the return to an ancient pagan one.

Warrior Politics is a must for anyone concerned about morality and international conflict, but read it cautiously. Do not let it be the only book you read on the subject.

**CH (COL) Doug McCready,
USAR, Roslyn, Pennsylvania**

FIRES OF HATRED: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe, Norman M. Naimark, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, 248 pages, \$24.95.

Since its entry into the vocabulary in 1992, the term "ethnic cleansing" has dominated the collective conscience. In *Fires of Hatred*, distinguished historian Norman M. Naimark takes a journey into the darker side of humanity—into the depths of the primordial hatred and enmity that characterize conflict in 20th-century Europe.

Naimark's analysis begins and ends with a clear delineation between ethnic cleansing and genocide, two often-misunderstood terms that frequent contemporary debate. The difference, argues Naimark, is in intent: "Genocide is the intentional killing off of part or all of an ethnic, religious, or national group." With ethnic cleansing, however, the intent is to remove a particular group, often any trace of them, from a "concrete territory." With Naimark's analytical framework, the intent of genocide is

clearly murderous, while ethnic cleansing does not necessarily share the same horrific purpose.

In reality, ethnic cleansing inevitably evolves into a form of genocide. As Naimark notes, a people will not often willingly abandon a territory to which it shares ties. Violence, often perpetrated against women, children, and the infirm, remains the proven method. The resulting flood of refugees has become characteristic of the international crises of the past decade.

Fires of Hatred is an exceptional primer for those seeking a broader, conceptual approach to the horror that plagues much of our modern existence. Focusing on 20th-century development in Europe, Naimark offers an exhaustive historical analysis of ethnic cleansing that is remarkably compelling. This book should be a welcome addition to any professional reading list; no other writer treats the subject with quite the same level of depth and understanding.

**MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AT WAR AT SEA, Ronald H. Spector, Penguin Books, NY, 2001, 463 pages, \$29.95.

Ronald H. Spector's *At War at Sea* tackles the broad topic of naval warfare in the 20th century. Such a venture runs the risk of being too general, too redundant, or both. Happily, Spector's work suffers no such misfortune.

At War at Sea covers naval warfare chronologically from the critical Battle of Tsushima in 1905 to the actions in the Falklands in 1982 and the Airbus shoot down by the U.S.S. *Vincennes* in the Arabian Gulf in 1988. Spector's major theme is the interaction of humans with the advanced technology inherent in 20th-century naval warfare.

The battles Spector describe include most of those in the must category—Tsushima, Jutland, and the submarine and carrier battles of World War II. He also includes several eclectic choices that demonstrate the increasing complexity and sophistication of war at sea. These include the World War I destruction of a British torpedo boat squadron by German aircraft, the fierce naval

versus air battles around Crete, and the naval versus air combat in the seas around the Falklands.

The ongoing battle between ships and aircraft for command of the sea is a major theme of the book. Where Spector really scores, though, is in the realm of his treatment of naval cultures. He captures the essential cultural context to set the stage for his choice of battles. Indeed, after reading Spector's cultural descriptions of the Royal Navy, that institution's decline as the dominant sea power becomes more comprehensible.

Spector pleases scholars and general readers alike with his clear prose and meticulous research. I highly recommend this book.

CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE CAT FROM HUE: A Vietnam War Story, John Laurence, Public Affairs, NY, 2002, 864 pages, \$30.00.

The cat from Hue was a filthy, forlorn, shell-shocked kitten that TV war correspondent John Laurence rescued during the savage battle for Hue in February 1968 and shipped home to the United States. In a sense, Laurence sees the cat as a metaphor for himself—a survivor despite the chaos of war.

The cat story is a major part of *The Cat from Hue*, but Laurence's main objective is to relate his experiences during three tours covering the war for CBS. Laurence evolves from being an idealistic, naïve reporter when he first went to Southeast Asia into a hardened journalist determined to reveal what he saw as the real face of war. Little by little, he begins to question the methods and objectives of those in command. In the process, he becomes a thorn in the government's side.

Laurence was present at such pivotal events as the early battles with the People's Army of Vietnam in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, the siege of Khe Sanh, the fight for Hue in 1968, and the U.S. incursion into Cambodia in 1970. His descriptions of battle are vivid and filled with detail. For example, he describes the action at Hue as an "urban brawl between two armed and largely adolescent tribes, a street fight of fast

action and merciless bloodletting."

Spicing his account with direct quotes gleaned from the audio and videotapes Laurence made during the fighting, he shows how the war affected soldiers and what they thought about their place in it. He describes those who fought the war as decent individuals caught up in extraordinary circumstances. Laurence is relatively evenhanded in showing their heroism and their brutality in times of great stress and danger. However, he is less objective in his assessment of those in power. He lays blame on President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, General William Westmoreland, and other U.S. leaders for their "blind plunge into a maelstrom of anguish."

This book's strength lies in Laurence's detailed portrayal of how TV war correspondents covered combat in Vietnam. The reader learns much about how news footage was put together, often during the heat of battle and often at great risk to correspondents and the TV crews. Laurence discusses how he covered the war and provides wartime portraits of many other Vietnam war correspondents and photographers, including Peter Arnett, Morley Safer, Gloria Emerson, and Joe Galloway.

This book took Laurence 20 years to complete, and it appears that he was determined to include virtually everything he had seen and done during his years in Vietnam. Consequently, at 850 pages, the book is almost too detailed; at various points during the narrative, it drags. For example, the story of the cat is interesting, but by the end of the book, it almost seems superfluous to Laurence's main objective for writing the book and does little more than make the book longer. That being said, I recommend the book for two reasons. First, Laurence's portrayal of combat and those who did the fighting is authentic and vivid. Second, the book is a must for those interested in how the war was covered and how an extremely contentious relationship developed between the military and the media during the Vietnam war.

LTC James H. Willbanks, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas

WAR AND REVOLUTION: The United States & Russia, 1914-1921, Norman E. Saul, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 483 pages, \$45.00.

Norman E. Saul's *War and Revolution* contains extensive, useful details on relations between the United States and Russia from 1914 to 1921 and is definitely a book most appropriate for specialists of this topic. The greatest strength of Saul's work is to show the non-governmental connections between Russia and the United States.

The book is more narrative than argument, and there is limited material that would interest soldiers and military historians. But, Saul contributes solid research to a field that has too often focused on official governmental actions.

MAJ Curtis S. King, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas

JEFFERSON DAVIS IN BLUE: The Life Of Sherman's Relentless Warrior, Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., and Gordon D. Whitney, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2002, 475 pages, \$49.95.

In *Jefferson Davis in Blue*, Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes and Gordon D. Whitney provide the first biography of Union General Jefferson Davis, best known for sharing the same name as the more famous president of the Confederate States. Other than that, history remembers Davis as being a hothead who murdered his former commanding officer and who was allegedly a racist accused of abandoning hundreds of black refugees to the mercies of the Confederate cavalry during Sherman's March to the Sea. Hughes and Whitney reappraise Davis, not from a revisionist or apologist viewpoint, but from a complete and analytical perspective. Their findings are enlightening, well written, and thorough.

Davis lived a full military career, serving as an enlisted man during the Mexican War, as a lieutenant at Fort Sumter at the start of the Civil War, and as a commander playing important roles at Pea Ridge, Rome, Bentonville, and elsewhere. After the Civil War, Davis commanded the Military District of Alaska, dealt with myriad problems associated with transitioning the new land from Russian control, and became an accom-

plished Indian fighter. Hughes and Whitney chronicle Davis's adventures and provide thoughtful, objective analyses of Davis's conduct after each important event in his career.

Davis was an excellent battlefield commander. He was aggressive, hard charging, and offensive-minded. He was the kind of subordinate a commander loves to turn to to get a tough combat job done. But, Davis was certainly rough around the edges, which limited his advancement. Nonetheless, he is an extremely interesting personality, and *Jefferson Davis in Blue* is definitely worth reading.

**LTC Kevin Dougherty, USA,
Hattiesburg, Mississippi**

MAJOR MCKINLEY: William McKinley & the Civil War, William H. Armstrong, Kent State University Press, Ohio, 2000, 191 pages, \$18.00.

Iron Majors rejoice! There is hope for all. William H. Armstrong's Civil War biography, *Major McKinley*, about President William McKinley's military career during the Civil War, is easy and interesting to read. McKinley, unlike other presidential veterans, came from the ranks and served in unheralded staff positions. Despite this, he served well and used the experience he gained in his Presidency.

McKinley enlisted as a private in the 23d Ohio Volunteer Infantry under future Major (later Major General and President) Rutherford B. Hayes. McKinley's relationship with Hayes is a well-known aspect of his own subsequent rise to the presidency.

Hayes noted McKinley's sharp appearance and attention to detail and assigned him as a clerk in the brigade quartermaster's office. McKinley's skills as a clerk earned him the respect of his superiors, and he was soon appointed regimental commissary sergeant. As a brigade quartermaster he understood logistic requirements and support. As an adjutant, he assisted his generals with moving and directing formations. Hayes said McKinley "had unusual character for the mere business of war . . . unsurpassed capacity, especially for a boy of his age."

McKinley was not a famous commander and never held a leadership

position. He served as a staff officer for most of the war, and his performance was exemplary. Armstrong uses McKinley's wartime diary and other primary and secondary sources to show this was the formative period of McKinley's life. McKinley's experiences working in key positions for various generals prepared him for his later success as a statesman, becoming a "hands-on" commander-in-chief during the Spanish-American War.

In his climb to the presidency, McKinley unashamedly used his connection to the soldiers with whom he had served. This solid book gives hope to generations of staff officers toiling away in undistinguished positions while hoping for their opportunity to contribute.

**MAJ Michael E. Lynch, USA,
HQ, USAREUR, Germany**

AIR POWER: Promise and Reality, ed., Mark K. Wells, Imprint Publications, Inc., Chicago, IL, 2000, 339 pages, \$39.95.

In *Air Power: Promise and Reality*, Colonel Mark K. Wells builds on previously published from 1978 symposium proceedings from the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado. Wells drops some background from that publication, adds five new essays, and presents an up-to-date historical overview of the development of military air power in its technical and theoretical aspects.

The essays skillfully trace the development of the machines, organizations, and theoretical underpinnings of the world's great air forces. Each essay is sufficiently focused, dealing in topics such as "French Military Aeronautics before and during the Great War," "Soviet Air Power in World War II," and "Air Power in the Gulf War: Plans, Execution, and Results." Each essay is also well researched and documented. While the source material might not be the most modern, it has stood the test of time, and no factual errors are noticeable; the presentations are informative and pertinent. The discussion of the *Luftwaffe's* shortcomings during World War II acts as a cautionary tale for modern air forces.

The most pleasing aspect of this edition is the balance of views pre-

sented. I expected the book to be a steady drumbeat that air power can win any war. This view does appear, but only in one article, and other essays balance it. For example, Thomas Kearny and Max Clodfelter provide honest assessments of the promise and reality of the air war in the Persian Gulf, acknowledging the critical role the Air Force played, while noting that the Gulf was an almost ideal setting for air war victory.

Wells notes that the majority of essays in this edition are drawn from *Air Power and Warfare*. I found that the most interesting essays were from that previous volume, so I recommend those owners reread that book rather than spend money on the new one. For the rest of us, I recommend having this book on our bookshelves.

**MAJ Richard K. Guffey, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

A HISTORY OF TERRORISM, Walter Laqueur, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2001, 277 pages, \$24.95.

Walter Laqueur, professor emeritus of Georgetown University, is chairman of the International Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is a leading academic expert on terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and political violence. *A History of Terrorism* was originally published in 1977 and, with the exception of a new introduction, the text remains the same. Paradoxically, this is the book's strength and weakness; it is a strength because Laqueur's purpose in writing the work was not to rush out a book to capitalize on the events of 11 September 2001. His survey of the history of terrorism as a strategy of political violence provides a much-needed historical context to ongoing events.

Much of what Laqueur writes seems eerily prescient, considering the book is over two decades old. On the other hand, most readers will be lost as Laqueur fights 25-year-old academic battles, and they will be frustrated when the history ends abruptly in the 1970s. In the end, most readers will be better served by Laqueur's *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (Oxford University Press,

New York, 2000).

Yet, this is an excellent work, and Laqueur is an engaging writer who guides the reader expertly from the days of 11th-century assassins to the actions of the Red Army faction of the 1970s. The book provides a welcome historical perspective, arming the reader with the ability to discern patterns of continuity and change in terrorist organizations, their ideologies, and their methodologies.

A History of Terrorism is ideal for readers who want to thoroughly explore the subject; however, it will probably frustrate readers who simply want to better understand terrorism as it exists today. For these readers, Laqueur's more recent works will be of more value.

**MAJ Anthony W. Vassalo, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

STRATEGIC ASIA: Power and Purpose, 2001-02, eds., Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, WA, 2001, 378 pages, \$19.95.

Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose, consists of an annually published report and a "Strategic Asia" database. Both contain current economic, military, and political data for all countries in what has been labeled by the project as Strategic Asia which encompasses countries located within the Asia-Pacific regions plus Canada and the United States.

The 2001-02 report, the first of the program series, focuses on framing issues for the project. The report also provides definitions and contextual framing of the Strategic Asia categorization. The report presents the stage setting of each of the countries included in the Strategic Asia realm, including their placement, power, and purpose within the region and the interrelationships with other states within the region. The report also assesses significant trends across the region and provides current expert analyses of the critical subregions of strategic Asia—China, Japan, Korea, Russia, South Asia, and Southwest Asia. The country study chapters, collectively, provide a detailed outline of the current strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific. Each chapter analyzes that strategic envi-

ronment from a particular country perspective, providing a valuable assessment and prediction for what Strategic Asia might look like in the next five years.

The most prominent Asian scholars and practitioners have contributed to this first report, presenting fresh, firsthand empirical data gained from interviews with key actors of subject countries. The regional analysis is conducted in light of current threats to peace and stability, including new asymmetries in threat assessment posed by weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Innovative forecasting approaches underpin the report. The strategic estimates transcend more traditional forecasting methodologies that tend to focus only on military balances by incorporating economic, political, and demographic data. With this innovative approach, *Strategic Asia* provides civilian decisionmakers, scholars, and military practitioners with an up-to-date, comprehensive review and assessment of the strategic perceptions and realities facing the United States in Strategic Asia during the first decade of the 21st century.

**MAJ I. Wilson, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A Theoretical Analysis, Kenneth N. Waltz, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, 263 pages, \$19.50.

As military professionals, we might frequently investigate the causes of any particular conflict, but rarely do we delve into the overall reasons for the occurrence of war in general. That is precisely what Kenneth N. Waltz attempts to do in his international-relations classic *Man, the State and War*. The question "What causes war?" is paramount in the study of world politics because if we can determine the causes of war, then by mitigating those causes can increase the possibility of a world environment dominated by peace rather than conflict.

Because the study of conflict is too complicated to allow focus on only one dimension of politics, Waltz divides his investigation into three levels of analysis: the nature of man,

the nature of the state, and the nature of the international political structure. A correct understanding of the causes of conflict requires study of all three levels of analysis in concert. To ignore any level will result in a distorted view of the causes (and prevention) of war. While the natures of man and the state are important, their relevance is trumped by the nature of the international political system. Since man and his creations (the state) are imperfect, corrections to them will not be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of war in an anarchical system of international relations in which states are left to fend for themselves against aggressive foes.

Waltz supports this thesis by examining each of the levels of analysis, supporting each main point by presenting arguments from classical and modern theoreticians. He cites the philosophers St. Augustine, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Baruch Spinoza in his analysis of the nature of man. In discussions of the nature of the state, he relies on more familiar philosophers—Thomas Hobbs, Immanuel Kant, and Thomas Paine. Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thucydides share space with Alexander Hamilton when Waltz addresses the effects of the international system on war and peace.

Waltz admirably breaks down the colossal investigation of what makes men and states take up arms. He uses historical examples of attempts to produce peace through the correction of faults in the represented systems and proves that the psychological and behavioral approach to war has little effect because of man's inherent faults. At the state level, Waltz demonstrates that attempts to create peaceful states within a dangerous framework of international politics will just as assuredly fail. When considering the international system, he concedes that there is a solution, but that the cure of war (world government) might be just as deadly as the disease.

Waltz originally wrote *Man, the State and War* in 1954. Since then, many developments in the world political environment have occurred that challenge his premises. For example, the European Union has recently

countered his warning that no number of states could ever agree to join their interests permanently.

Despite the changes in the world, the text stands as a classic effort to explain why men and nations fight. The book's timelessness recommends it to military professionals who desire to understand more about international politics.

MAJ Gregory R. Ebner, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PHANTOM SOLDIER: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower, H. John Poole, Posterity Press, Emerald Isle, NC, 2001, 338 pages, \$14.95.

H. John Poole's book, *Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower*, is an interesting summary of how Asian forces, particularly Chinese forces, are organized and how they fight battles. Poole's thesis is that Asians' radically different form of warfare would defeat clumsy, slow-moving, firepower-heavy U.S. forces. Although he places great emphasis on Asian successes, particularly in Vietnam, he does not argue away U.S. successes, such as General Matthew Ridgway's initiatives in early 1951.

While it is always important to understand potential enemies and appreciate their style of making war, to radically change the method of organizing and deploying the U.S. military based on a perceived threat in the Far East is foolhardy. The success of U.S. forces in Afghanistan shows that force capability across the continuum, from massive air power to Special Forces, is and will remain the key to military success.

COL James Dunphy, USAR,
Fairfax, Virginia

AN UNSETTLED CONQUEST: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Arcadia, Geoffrey Plank, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2001, 239 pages, \$29.95.

A well-researched book is always a pleasure to read. *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the People of Arcadia* is no exception.

During the years before 1763, the English were trying to define what being a British subject meant. They were also trying to develop policy on

how to treat people who got in the way of their empire-building. Author Geoffrey Plank tells the story of the growth of Halifax; shifting power; aggressive leadership; the deportation of Arcadians to mainland colonies; the buying of men's, women's, and children's scalps; and the problems caused by differing languages and various religions among the French, Arcadians, Mi'kmaq, and Germans. Such a tale is always tragic.

I highly recommend this book for the lessons we can learn about what happens to everyday people caught up in the clash of great powers jousting for domination.

LTC Lynn L. Sims, USAR, Retired,
Ph.D., University of Richmond, Virginia

AFTER CLAUSEWITZ: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War, Antulio J. Echevarria II, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 360 pages, \$39.95.

Carl von Clausewitz's magnum opus, *On War* (Knopf, New York, 1993), has long been hailed as the preeminent theoretical treatise on military affairs. In addressing the complexities of warfare in so thoroughly comprehensive a manner, Clausewitz established a standard that dwarfs the writings of any other theorist. However, in *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War*, Antulio J. Echevarria II supports the efforts of other, less prominent theorists.

Echevarria, the director of national security studies at the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, contends that men such as German Field Marshals Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Schlieffen recognized the changing nature of warfare and struggled to find a solution that would restore the offensive to primacy. Their efforts, often obscured by the collapse of Germany during World War I, were significant in the evolution of modern operational art.

Echevarria recounts Moltke's, Schlieffen's, and others' labors to resolve the strategic dilemma that accompanied industrial-age advancements. Modern warfare necessitated a new balance between the classic arms of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.

Echevarria's provocative study on

the role of theory in warfare is as valuable and applicable today as it was when it was written. I recommend it highly.

Major Steven Leonard,
Fort Campbell, Kentucky

WAR AND OUR WORLD: The Reith Lectures for the BBC, John Keegan, Vintage Books, New York, 2001, 112 pages, \$10.00.

John Keegan, a respected military historian and author of several books on military history and war, was for many years the senior lecturer in military history at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England. In *War and Our World*, he explores, in broad overview, the aspects of war and its effect on human society and history. He examines the evolution of war from its most primitive beginnings between nomadic early humans to the complex spectrum of current conflicts.

Keegan reflects on several topics, asking, "Is humankind naturally predisposed to warfare?" "Where did war originate in human history?" "Is there a dependence on war in a modern nation-state?" "Can humankind end war, which, as the single most devastating scourge on earth, is far more destructive than disease and famine?"

I recommend this book to all thinkers interested in the answers or attempts at answering such questions. The book is truly thought-provoking.

Richard L. Milligan,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SPECIAL FORCES: A Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces, Tom Clancy with John Gresham, Berkley Books, New York, 2001, 366 pages, \$16.00.

In *Special Forces: A Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces*, Tom Clancy continues his examination of the U.S. military machine, explaining the elements, equipment, and organization of the Special Operations Command. Clancy focuses on U.S. Special Forces (SF), also known as Green Berets, but he explains the differences in Special Forces, Rangers, and other special operations organizations. While he profiles the average SF trooper, his training, and operations, Clancy cannot resist dwelling on high-tech toys. Exotic,

specialized equipment makes today's Special Forces more effective, although admittedly some of it must be left behind when working with less generously supplied organizations.

The book has some defects. For example, Clancy places the early antiterrorist team "Blue Light" in Europe, but most readers will remember this as being a project of the 5th SF Group at Fort Bragg, which was used as a close-quarter combat training center after the antiterrorist mission went to Delta Force. Clancy wastes time by dwelling on a former Special Operations Command commander's conventional experience that was not related to Special Forces. He wastes more time on a mini-novel about a fictional SF operation that fails to illustrate SF operations, principles, issues, capabilities, or to humanize its players. The space and effort would have been better used to create an index or a detailed table of contents.

Despite its faults, the book is of value to writers on special operations. A researcher or reporter will not find in any other source the inclusion of diagrams of the Special Operations Command and SF organization; the purpose of various special operations elements, including Air Force and Navy units; the structure and purpose of SF teams; and details of SF missions. Of considerable value are Clancy's personal observations of SF training exercises and missions with foreign counterparts. The book is heartily endorsed as an explanation of Special Forces by Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough, which should be reviewed enough.

Kevin L. Jamison, Attorney at Law,
Gladstone, Missouri

RACE AND REUNION: The Civil War in American Memory, David W. Blight, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, 512 pages, \$29.95.

In *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory*, David W. Blight tells a passionate tale of the battle over the meaning of the Civil War. Blight's thesis is that when white Northerners and white Southerners reconciled, they buried the hatchet in the back of the black man. According to Blight, after the war the meaning of the conflict hung between two mutually exclusive in-

terpretations: the reconciliationist legacy and the emancipationist legacy. During Reconstruction, while Radical Republicans were ascendant and bitter war memories strong, the emancipationist legacy won the day. Starting in 1868, and gathering strength over time, Americans came to emphasize sectional reconciliation and to de-emphasize the rebirth of freedom, especially black freedom, brought about by the war. By 1913, black veterans were invisible during commemorations of the Battle of Gettysburg.

While admitting that his work is anecdotal, Blight documents quite well the evolution of sectional reconciliation and postwar racism. There are, however, some flaws in how he presents his case. First, there is the problem of balance. For example, Blight takes cheap shots at John Singleton Mosby for hanging Union prisoners during the war without explaining that this was a one-time retaliation for Union General Phil Sheridan's hanging of seven of Mosby's men. Blight only tells half the story, which makes the reader wonder what other pertinent facts might have been omitted.

Blight spends considerable en-

ergy on Southern racist policies and treats racism as a uniquely Southern problem. He largely ignores Northern racism, such as the refusal of most Northern states to enfranchise African-Americans until forced to by the 14th Amendment. Thus, the reader does not see the evolution of American racism in its national context. This makes Blight's story half-blind, which leads to the most significant flaw—causation.

While it seems undeniable that sectional reconciliation and racial discrimination grew over the 50 years following the war, Blight does not adequately connect the two. How a defeated South convinced a presumably heretofore nonracist North to embrace racist ideology and policy is unclear. Blight suggests that Northern statesmen adopted racist ideology in their efforts to further economic and political rapprochement with Southerners after the war. I disagree. Sectional reconciliation did not necessarily mean the nationwide adoption of racist ideology and public policy. That such occurred is a tragedy.

The book should be particularly relevant to officers in the fields of information operations and psycho-

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logical operations because it is a great case study of how to influence behavior. To those who design policy for posthostilities operations, the book shows that justice and peace sometimes cannot coexist. Indeed, in some cases they might be mutually exclusive. While there is no doubting Blight's passion for his subject, his passion brings into question his objectivity.

I recommend reading *Race and Reunion* as an eloquent, adept work of advocacy of one side of an emotional but still-relevant issue. Bear in mind, however, that it is only one side of the story.

LTC D. Jon White, USA, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

ALLEGIANCE: Fort Sumter, Charleston, and the Beginning of the Civil War, David Detzer, Harcourt, Inc., New York, 2001, 384 pages, \$27.00.

I highly recommend *Allegiance: Fort Sumter, Charleston, and the Beginning of the Civil War*, by David Detzer, for its fresh insight into an event that led to the open hostilities that became known as the American Civil War. Not since the publication of *First Blood: Story of Fort Sumter*, by W.A. Swanberg (Marboro Books, A Division of Barnes & Noble, New York, 1990), has there been such a scholarly examination of the events surrounding the struggle at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, in 1861.

Unlike Swanberg's account, Detzer's focus is on the fort's commander, Major Robert Anderson; the indecision in Washington, which only increased Anderson's anxiety; and the significance of the actions at Fort Sumter on the people of Charleston. Anderson, the tragic figure as well as the hero of the story, was a West Point graduate, a professional soldier, and a participant in three wars, which had instilled in him a deep dislike for war and a hatred for politicians. Despite that hatred, he had an intense sense of duty to represent the U.S. Government in the impending crisis. As Detzer points out, for Anderson to perform that duty, he needed specific guidance from his superiors in Washington. His greatest fear was that his actions would precipitate a war that could have been avoided.

Unfortunately for Anderson, neither Presidents James Buchanan nor Abraham Lincoln would provide the directives he so desperately desired. Much of the indecision was caused by both presidents having cabinet members from the South, plus the realization that the United States was too weak militarily to do much about the situation anyway. An example of the absurdity of the irresolution in Washington is the order to Anderson to return to the Charleston arsenal the muskets he had taken to help in the defense of U.S. property.

Particularly intriguing is Detzer's analysis of events leading to Anderson's move from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. While militarily reasonable, politically the move created a diplomatic furor. Although South Carolina Governor Francis Pickens demanded that Anderson evacuate the fort, Buchanan finally stiffened his spine and directed Anderson to remain.

Military and diplomatic maneuverings were at the heart of the crisis over Fort Sumter, but Detzer does not ignore the effects of events on the citizens of Charleston and the occupants of Fort Sumter. He uses narratives of Civil War Charleston found in Mary Chestnut's diary that give remarkable accounts of the mood and actions of city inhabitants. Reminiscences by Captain Abner Doubleday and Assistant Surgeon Samuel Crawford provide details of the uncertainties, the danger, and the frustrations of a garrison essentially held hostage by a foreign power. Also given their due are the slaves who worked on the fortifications, and he particularly mentions the three slaves who rowed Confederate politician Louis Wigfall across to the fort during the actual bombardment.

I highly recommend this book for its fresh insight into the event that precipitated the Civil War.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas

THE MYTH OF THE GREAT WAR: A New Military History of World War I, John Mosier, HarperCollins, New York, 2001, 381 pages, \$30.00.

In both title and introduction, John Mosier's *The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War*

I promises a significant revision to the accepted view of World War I. In making such a promise, Mosier exhibits considerable temerity; he is a literary historian and film critic, not a school-trained military historian. Giving him the benefit of the doubt, one concedes that there are no historical issues that would not benefit from a fresh approach. Perhaps Mosier's background will lead him toward an important new interpretation of the events of 1914-1918. Alternatively, one fears such a book will end up as an amateur's unhappy exercise in hubris, which is my conclusion.

The myth the title alludes to is actually two myths: that France and Great Britain "won" the war and that the United States had a secondary role in achieving the Allied victory. Mosier believes contemporary and postwar British accounts have deceived students of World War I and that French accounts have intentionally obscured the fact that the Germans consistently outperformed the Allied armies on the battlefield. Only the intervention of the Americans saved the Allied armies, which were spent by mid-1918.

Mosier offers these points as a new revelation but, in fact, he is one or two revisions behind the current historiography. The "butchers and bunglers" school of World War I research has pilloried Allied ineptness since the 1960s. See, for example, *The Donkeys* by Alan Clark (Award Books, New York, 1965) or Leon Wolff's *In Flanders Fields: Passchendaele, 1917*, Penguin, New York, 2001). More recently, Bruce Gudmundsson, Timothy Lupfer, Martin Samuels, and David Zabecki have explored German tactical expertise during World War I and shown that the Kaiser's army held the clear edge through most of the war.

The latest trend has been to rehabilitate the Allied armies, as in, for example, *Amiens to Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign, 8 August-11 November 1918*, by J.P. Harris and Niall Barr (Brassey's, Inc., Dulles, Virginia, 1999), and *How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918*, by Tim Travers (Routledge, New York, 1992), by emphasizing the

technical and tactical innovations made late in the war.

Mosier dismisses this recent scholarship as "enormous, repetitive, and largely without merit." In this instance and others, his use of sources is sometimes curious and often irritating. He suggests, for example, that the relatively low casualties incurred by the American Expeditionary Force were the result of the enlightened training the doughboys received from the *chasseurs alpins*, a conclusion unsupported by any U.S. accounts of the war. In another example, Mosier asserts that the British Expeditionary Force was finished as an offensive force after Passchendaele. His claim overlooks the key victories won by British General Douglas Haig's army between August and November of 1918. Mosier also argues that the German army was not beaten at the end of the war, ignoring the disastrous decline in German morale and front-line fighting strength during the last 3 months of the war.

What can be said in defense of the book? Mosier's book makes greater use of French sources than virtually any other recent general history of the Western Front. In doing so, he highlights the major French offensives of 1914 and 1915, which are almost ignored by Anglo-American authors. Mosier also possesses a lively writing style, which is entertaining even when his substance is annoying. Despite these things, the book is a disappointment.

Along with intemperate and unbalanced interpretations, *The Myth of the Great War* features editing that would embarrass a minor publishing house and is inexcusable for a major firm like HarperCollins. The book can only be recommended to those who have read widely on World War I and who enjoy dissecting a poorly conceived argument.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Retired,
Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas

PEARL HARBOR BETRAYED: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack, Michael Gannon, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2001, 282 pages, \$27.50.

For 60 years, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has been an endless source of debate, and the questions

the attack raises are compelling. How could it have happened? What more could have been done to prevent it? Who was principally to blame? How much did the U.S. Government know? Was there a conspiracy to bring the country into World War II? These questions have of course been addressed considerably in the past 6 decades, and one might ask what more needs to be said? In *Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack*, Michael Gannon once more explores, dissects, and effectively answers these questions.

Gannon, the author of several other books on military and history topics, has raised the bar with this book. During his extensive research, which took over 6 years, he delved into the National Archives for written military orders. The result is a comprehensive account of what is known about Pearl Harbor and differentiates it from the hearsay and myths that have appeared since 1941.

Gannon devotes much of his attention to two senior commanders—Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short—who commanded U.S. Navy and U.S. Army forces, respectively, in Hawaii before the attack. They have historically carried the blame for unpreparedness. While not acquitting the commanders of responsibility, Gannon adroitly identifies and supports the idea that the blame should be rightly shared all the way up the chain of command. He stops short of including President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which might surprise some conspiracy theorists, but again, he successfully defends his position with what was known and could be prudently proven at the time. Gannon never overextends an argument, but he presses the limit of logical agreement. He leaves what cannot be proven to history or future discoveries.

The effort to shed a more favorable light on the senior commanders proves to be the book's central organizing theme, from which all other questions are presented, argued, and answered. This is an effective way to present information that might be described by some as simply dry research material.

The book is also about more than just Pearl Harbor. I recommend it to those interested in the conditions inside of the Japanese military in 1941 and those interested in code breaking, espionage, and politics inside the U.S. military and government.

MAJ Ted J. Behncke, Sr., USA, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas

EYEWITNESS IN THE CRIMEA: The Crimean War Letters of Lieutenant Colonel George Frederick Dallas, Michael Hargreave Mawson, ed., Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2001, 320 pages, \$39.95.

During the Crimean War, which lasted from 1853 to 1856, opposing forces included the British, French, Turks, and Sardinians against the Russians, who were ultimately overcome. The main utility of *Eyewitness in the Crimea: The War Letters of Lieutenant Colonel George Frederick Dallas* is to gain understanding of the quality of life of soldiers in the field.

Dallas began his military career as a subaltern (a British lieutenant) and eventually worked his way up to a general staff position, but his letters reflect his dissatisfaction with his profession; it is easy to understand why. Communications were slow, logistics were difficult to deal with, and promotions seemed based more on family ties than merit.

This book is easy to read and moves at a fair pace. There might be terminology with which Americans are unfamiliar, so it might be worthwhile to do a little research to understand how the British honorary orders and rank system of that time worked. The book's purpose is not to be a comprehensive account of the Crimean War, and as a supplement it is excellent.

CPL David J. Schepp, USA,
Fort Benning, Georgia

NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT (International Security Readers), Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, 491 pages, \$27.95.

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict is a collection of reprints of articles published by the Center for International Security and Cooperation. Al-

though half the material is new, the world situation is unchanged; internal and interregional conflicts, such as those in Rwanda and Bosnia, continue to threaten international security. The collection contains three sections: "The Sources of Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict," "Options for international Action," and "Political Challenges."

The first section, which defines terms and problems, contains one of the more thought-provoking articles, which argues that unregulated free speech might not always be the best arrangement for a newly established nation. Another article addresses the roles of special interests, grudges, and pettiness in manipulating ethnic outbreaks and the possibility that, perhaps, ethnic conflict is sometimes a rational choice. In an essay from 1996, David Lake and Donald Rothchild explain that because intergroup relations are imperfect, fear might be a major driver of ethnic conflict. An ethnic group that loses its confidence in the system becomes vulnerable to the rabble-rouser, so it is imperative to maintain intergroup trust. Each essay includes recommendations for at least reducing the problem, but overall emphasis is more on defining than solving the problem of ethnic friction.

The second section deals with tools. Those who would call for military action should read the three essays that discuss military options. Barry Posen demonstrates that, in almost all circumstances, solving refugee-generating problems requires the use of force; the nature of war cautions against entering into it lightly. Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman's article on the air war in Kosovo takes the position that the debates on air power have not even asked the right questions, much less answered them.

Part three focuses on what to do once conflict has begun—how to develop a workable peace, how to defuse those who have a stake in prolongation of the conflict, how to work around international rules. This section is really depressing. Nothing works consistently. Maybe, suggests Chaim Kaufmann, the only solution is to create homogenous ethnic homelands for everyone.

This is a good book. As with any good collection, it includes a section on additional reading. However, there is no bibliography, and the footnoted material might or might not be mentioned as additional reading. Styles of writing vary, of course, and some are more readable than others, but all are acceptably written. The editors might have updated some of the older articles, but the dated references matter only to quibblers; the new articles keep the collection fresh and pertinent. More important, the book is a good reminder that in ethnic conflict, as in life, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity are more common than clear-cut answers.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

MARTIN FROBISHER: Elizabeth-an Privateer, James McDermott, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2001, 509 pages, \$35.00.

Sir Martin Frobisher (1535-1594) was a vice admiral in the Royal Navy and a pirate. The dichotomy of the two positions works as a good introduction to a man who spent much of his career searching for the fabled Northwest Passage, but who also, in 1588, played a significant role in thwarting the Spanish Armada, an action that earned him a knighthood. Yet, Frobisher never achieved the historical stature of contemporaries Sir Francis Drake or Sir Walter Raleigh.

James McDermott traces Frobisher's life from his boyhood in Yorkshire to expeditions in Africa, North America, and the Caribbean. Frobisher's three unsuccessful voyages in search of a northwest passage to Asia were the impetus for his piracy against the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean. The respectability of his later undertakings for Queen Elizabeth does not negate his unsavory early activities or his personal ruthlessness.

McDermott, an independent scholar and a leading authority on Frobisher and the Northwest Passage, spent almost 30 years researching his topic. The end result is the life story of an unlikable individual who climbed the social ladder despite the cost to those around him. McDermott bases his story on

available archives, printed primary sources, and many secondary sources. I recommend this book to those interested in naval history or the Elizabethan era.

Alexander Bielakowski, Ph.D.,
Findlay, Ohio

HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism, Reza Afshari, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2001, 376 pages, \$49.95.

Reza Afshari teaches human rights and history at New York's Pace University. *Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism* is an excellent book on the mechanics, twisted legal justifications, and organizations that propagate human rights abuses in Iran.

The book is organized into five main areas of violations as defined by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR). When UNHCR measures a nation's internal security apparatus, the five violations it looks for include the following:

- ▣ The right to life.
- ▣ Freedom from torture.
- ▣ The right to liberty and security of person as well as freedom from arbitrary arrest.
- ▣ The right to fair trial.
- ▣ The right to freedom of conscience, thought, and religion.

What makes this book a great find is Afshari's ability to use Persian concepts and Shiite interpretations of Islamic law to make his points. He relies heavily on prison accounts and the work of UN inspectors such as Galindo Pohl.

Afshari lays out the political framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran and delineates between the hierarchies of Shiite Muslim clergy, which begins with *Talabah* (student). The initiate next attains the rank of *Mojtahid* (cleric), during which he strives to perfect certain aspects of theology. From there he completes a thesis on Islamic affairs and attains the rank of *Hojjat-ul-Islam* (learned cleric) and finally *Ayatollah* (supreme guide). Understanding this hierarchy, which is only found in Shiite Islam, is important because it is crucial to appreciating the differences and significance among various *mullahs* (clerics) who operate the theocracy in Iran.

One concept of Islamic law that Ashfari discusses is *mofsed fel ard*, meaning "one who sows corruption on earth." In Arabia this concept was used to develop laws against smuggling and drug peddling. In Iran the concept has taken on new meanings, including the undermining of national security. Another word favored by Islamic jurists in Iran is *mohareb* (warring against God); that is, engaging in armed robbery or violent crimes, for which the maximum punishment is meted out. This concept has also been used to declare someone an apostate whose only crime is his political conscience. Ashfari discusses how Islamic judges in Iran use these Arabic terms, largely unintelligible to a Persian-speaking populace, to establish legitimacy and to frighten the accused.

Another cruel perversion of Islamic law that Ashfari discusses is *najes* (being unclean), which deals primarily with the state of cleanliness preserved for prayers. Shiites running Iranian prisons took this concept a step farther to declare non-Muslim captives spiritually unclean and to begin the systematic dehumanization of such prisoners.

Finally, there is the term *tawaban* (the repentant prisoners). The concept of *tawba* is used as a compact between God and the repentant over a matter that requires forgiveness. *Tawba* is personal, and occasionally others are allowed to witness it so as to keep the Muslim from straying. Iranian jailers, using tapes and forced confessions, have developed an informant system using the *tawba* concept.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard conducts interrogations, and according to prison memoirs, veterans of the Iran-Iraq War are the meanest interrogators. They typically blame subversives for prolonging the war and are more physically abusive to political prisoners. *Qapan* is a technique in which the extended arms are handcuffed and slightly elevated to deliver pain to the joints, nerves, and wrists. *Dastgah* is a wooden version of the medieval iron lady without the spikes—a prisoner might remain lying in a coffin-like apparatus for days until he confesses. These accounts also show that as religious and po-

litical objectors are callously tortured, such inhumanity spreads to even religious clerics arguing for a change in policies.

On a brighter note, the book contains highlights about the political soul-searching Iran is undergoing. Over 60 percent of the population are under 25 years old and do not remember the 1979 Revolution. This has led to open questioning of the wisdom of the clergy, who have no expertise in running engineering, transportation, and other complex systems. Many people question the need for the post of supreme leader (currently the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), a person not elected by the populace and who serves to undermine current president Mohammed Khatami.

The book contains many accounts that take readers into the notorious Evin Prison in Teheran and offers insight into the types of dissent that incur the wrath of the religious clergy in Iran. Afshari's work is highly recommended for Middle East specialists and those who want to understand events in Iran in particular. Readers might want to consult Elaine Sciolino's *Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran* (Free Press, New York, 2000), which gives a broader sociopolitical perspective of the Islamic Republic, before tackling Afshari's book.

LT Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN,
Gaithersburg, Maryland

UNDER ARMY ORDERS: The Army National Guard during the Korean War, William M. Donnelly, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2001, 271 pages, \$34.95.

Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War sheds light on the age-old problem of how to successfully integrate citizen-soldiers into the regular army during times of crisis. Even though William M. Donnelly focuses on the period during the Korean war, the problems of mobilization, training, and readiness could apply now as well as they applied during the limited call-up during the Persian Gulf war. Donnelly brings up valid arguments and differences in conceptual deployment philosophy. Many of the shortcomings of the U.S. Army Na-

tional Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) brought to light remain relevant. Whether these shortcomings are actual or perceived is irrelevant since once perceived the issues need to be analyzed and solutions developed.

Reading about the major issues during the Korean war call-up of ARNG units and USAR soldiers allows us to see that Army leaders continue to refine this process to fit the evolving environment of modern warfare. Two issues Donnelly explores are the integration into the force of units that have proper operational readiness and the training of battalion and brigade staffs in the functions of a warfighting staff. Two concepts that directly address warfighting readiness are the development of ARNG enhanced brigades and the incorporation of the Battle Command Training Program, which helps train ARNG brigade and battalion staffs.

Donnelly offers great insight from both perspectives of the struggle to integrate the components into the regular army during times of crisis. Overcoming the political implications and human aspects remain the same, however. The components' senior leaders recognize the issues and continue to work toward solutions with which to serve the Nation.

LTC Billy J. Hadfield, USA,
Beaver Creek, Ohio

THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Oxford University Press, NY, 2002, 222 pages, \$26.00.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., was dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and assistant secretary of defense during President Bill Clinton's administration. With *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Nye adds to the list of books on the future of U.S. foreign policy as perceived after the events of 11 September 2001.

In the wake of the 11 September assault, many pundits have advocated a go-it-alone solution to eradicating the immediate and long-term threats of global terrorism. Thus far, military efforts in Afghanistan have

validated this approach, as U.S. forces have conducted the majority of operations with smaller contributions from Britain, Canada, and Australia. Nye would agree that, in the short term, this is a plausible and correct approach, but to succeed in this war on terrorism and remain a superpower well into the 21st century and beyond, America must work closely with the world community.

Nye's paradox is that despite America's superpower status, with its capability to project conventional and nuclear forces worldwide, it still cannot absolutely influence world events. Nye calls this kind of power "hard power," which rests at the top of a "three-dimensional chess game" of global power.

Clearly, the United States is the leader in the military realm, with a convincing ability to act in a uni-polar fashion, but in the next layer, the economic realm, it is operating in a multi-polar field. Thus the United States, despite unprecedented economic strength, must give and take with the rest of the world, especially Europe, since downturns in European markets can have serious repercussions on the U.S. economy. The United States cannot afford the luxury of a go-it-alone attitude.

But it is in the base layer, what Nye calls "the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control," that America needs to devote its fullest effort—or risk further attacks. This is "soft power," where American values, traditions, and social mores provide the kind of world influence that is the most cost-effective and, ultimately, the most lasting in a world setting. Soft power is also how America balances diplomatic and informational power as a global player.

Globalization and the information revolution have dramatically enhanced America's hard and soft power while allowing other actors a global voice. What occurs in the arena of foreign affairs is quite important.

Nye advocates a middle ground between unilateralism and multilateralism, because what America stands for is equally important, indeed at times more important. Nye

cautions that U.S. leaders must respect and fully understand soft power because its consequences and benefits transcend immediate global concerns. In the long term, it will be impossible to win the war on terrorism by acting alone. The rest of the world cannot see America as a ruthless hegemony. Yes, there are times to act unilaterally, but for the most part, America will benefit from being a global player.

Nye's critics will most certainly point out that it was during the Clinton administration, in which Nye was a significant player, that Osama bin-Laden and the al-Qaeda network developed fully. These critics thus will argue that soft power is not enough and that the United States should have been flexing more and stronger hard power, as evidenced by the failure of the cruise-missile strikes following the 1998 American Embassy bombings. In hindsight, Nye would agree with this, but the seeds of world discontent were sown long before Clinton took office, and a military reaction to all such discontent is both unsuitable and unsustainable.

The United States must travel a middle ground between hard and soft power, which is a lesson the U.S. military learned quite well, given America's global commitments in the 1990s. America most certainly should carry President Theodore Roosevelt's "Big Stick," but in operations other than war, speaking softly and respectfully can provide far greater returns, especially when lives are at risk.

Short yet pithy, Nye's book will most certainly benefit the military professional by providing a clear framework for how military power can most successfully interplay with the other tools of power in best securing U.S. national interests.

MAJ James J. Bruha, USA,
Williamsburg, Virginia

NONE SO BLIND: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam, George W. Allen, Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, Chicago, IL, 2001, 300 pages, \$27.50.

George W. Allen retired from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in

1979. From 1949 to 1968, his intelligence career focused on Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. He served in Saigon for two years as a member of the CIA element and made repeated assessment trips there. His career includes service in Washington, D.C., at CIA headquarters, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Army intelligence.

The initial draft of Allen's book was completed in 1980, immediately after his retirement. In the book, he seeks to document, through his personal accounts and direct contact with many major decisionmakers, the fundamental flaw in U.S. decision-making that led to the escalation in military involvement and ultimate defeat in Vietnam. His theme is that U.S. decisionmakers would not or could not integrate into their deliberations intelligence findings that did not fit their preconceived or desired notions of what the events, facts, figures, and potential outcomes should be.

The seeds for the flaw were evident in the overly optimistic U.S. policy decisions of the 1950s in support of French forces in Indochina, despite evidence that the Vietminh's overwhelmingly strong will made them capable of defeating any opposition. Neglecting intelligence estimates that did not fit into the group-think approach of U.S. policy deliberations denied U.S. decisionmakers the evidence of enemy capabilities. Witnessing the reactions of principal civilian-military leaders to contrary intelligence estimates through Allen's eyes is a sobering experience that makes reading this book a wise use of one's time.

COL James D. Blundell, USA,
Retired, Alexandria, Virginia

IN CONFIDENCE: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, Anatoly Dobrynin, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2001, 672 pages, \$27.50.

Former ambassador and politburo member Anatoly Dobrynin presents a unique perspective on Soviet-American relations from 1962 through the demise of Gorbachev's regime. Dobrynin's well-written memoir offers keen insight into the inner workings of the upper reaches of

both governments during periods of cooperation and confrontation.

The leader of each nation had to reconcile sharp internal differences between military and diplomatic establishments. Each also had to rely on high-level, back-channel, personal communications to defuse potentially explosive situations. In the wake of the current acts of terror, Dobrynin's experience might prove relevant if the U.S. must confront an aggressive nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare-capable global alliance that has sharply different political and social systems.

**COL John W. Messer, USAR,
Retired, Ludington, Michigan**

**DUTY, HONOR, PRIVILEGE:
New York's Silk Stocking Regiment
and the Breaking of the Hindenburg
Line,** Stephen L. Harris, Brassey's, Inc.,
Dulles, VA, 2001, 374 pages, \$27.95.

Stephen L. Harris' *Duty, Honor, Privilege: New York's Silk Stocking Regiment and the Breaking of the Hindenburg Line* is first-rate social and military history. The 107th Regiment, a component of the 27th Division, was composed entirely of New York National Guard troops from two great New York Infantry Regiments—the 7th “Silk Stocking” Regiment from downtown New York City and the 1st New York “Apple Knockers” from upstate New York near Newburgh. The regiment fought gallantly and at great cost as part of the British Army's last great offensive of World War I.

To Harris the story is personal. He is a descendant of Raeburn van Buren, magazine illustrator, cartoonist, and member of the social and intellectual elite of New York City. The 7th New York Infantry's Armory on Park Avenue between East 66th and East 68th reflected Van Buren's neighborhood. The Armory housed soldiers who were, for the most part, well heeled. The 7th was mostly old money and had been so from the outset of the regiment's history in the early 19th century. In 1917, when the United States joined the fighting in Europe, soldiers in the regiment bore the names of the leading families of New York—Vanderbilt, Van Rensselaer, Gracie, and Roosevelt, to name

a few.

Harris notes that, in addition to wealthy old New York families, the regiment included the newly wealthy, including the son of a Tammany Hall magnate; New York City's intellectual elite, including poet Joyce Kilmer, who became the regiment's most famous casualty; a band of New York journalists from major papers and periodicals; and graduates of Yale and Harvard. The 7th was rightfully proud of who they were and took pride in their military history. During the Civil War, for example, one of theirs earned the first Medal of Honor. The regiment also took pride in the fact that they provided more officers for the Union Army “than any other organization including the USMA.”

Harris's account is richly laced with first-person narratives, and he is at his best when capturing the social context of life in and around the Silk Stocking soldiers. He is also effective in relating the riveting tale of the wrenching amalgamation of the quite different regiments. Early 20th century New York life was far more class conscious than we are now, but the new regiment came together because officers were sensitive to the need to get it done right.

Harris's account of the fighting to break the Hindenburg Line is first rate, although focused obviously on the effects of combat on individuals rather than on pure military history. The regiment suffered in that offensive, losing 349 killed on 29 September 1918 for the highest casualty rate for a U.S. regiment in a single day. Nearly 900 more were wounded, but the 107th fought bravely, earning four Medals of Honor—a record for the U.S. Army in that war.

Harris sees the regiment through the end of the war and occupation and ends the story with its welcome parade in March 1919. Harris leaves the reader at just the right balance between promise for the future and sorrow for those lost. Altogether, this is a book well worth reading and recalls an era when the Army and the country were much more closely woven together than they are now.

**COL Gregory Fontenot, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

**FORT ROBINSON AND THE
AMERICAN CENTURY,** Thomas R. Buecker, Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, 2002, 242 pages, \$40.00.

My lifelong interest in horses and riding led me to review *Fort Robinson and the American Century* by Thomas R. Buecker. Younger soldiers today might find it hard to comprehend that the Army did not disband its final two horse-mounted divisions until 1943. My father's class at West Point was the last to receive equestrian lessons as cadets, and they were the last to ride horses into combat, the last horse cavalry charge being made by the 26th Cavalry Regiment in the Philippines in March 1942.

Horses were integral components of the early U.S. Army, and Fort Robinson, Nebraska, was synonymous with Army horses; it was the Army's premiere remount station during the years between World War I and World War II. Buecker's superlative book documents the Fort's history, and it complements his first book, *Fort Robinson and the American West, 1874-1899* (Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, 1999). Fort Robinson eventually garnered a reputation for being one of the finest posts in the Army and earned the title “country club of the Army.” It was home to the 1st, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 13th Cavalry Regiments, with the 10th having spent the longest service at the fort.

The Army had no real standardized means of acquiring good horses until Fort Robinson's remount service began after World War I. Before then, regimental officers had to purchase horses from private ranchers and breeders, but this system was not reliable. What was required was a standard breed of horse suitable for Army use. World War II might have heralded the end of the mounted services, but Fort Robinson kept providing outstanding horses, later mules, for the U.S. Army and for British Commonwealth forces.

Mobilization for war also meant diversified uses of the fort. The Army War Dog program was stationed at Fort Robinson, where thousands of sentry and scout dogs were assessed and trained. Thousands of Afrika Korps enemy prisoners of war

also spent time at the fort.

At the end of the war, Fort Robinson was high on the list of excess forts. The Germans were sent home, the dogs were no longer needed, the frontier was closing, and the horses were relegated to Olympic teams. Fort Robinson's use to the Army was over. The fort was turned over to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which quickly converted it to a cattle experimentation station, much to the dismay of horse ranchers who believed horse-breeding operations would continue. When the USDA's cattle operation became a point of contention too great to be ignored, the State of Nebraska took possession of the fort and converted it into a state park. Fort Robinson is now a recreational area and boasts a number of activities, including horseback riding. Old officer quarters have been converted to guesthouses, and the old stables now house rental horses.

Having taught the Sioux Wars staff ride as an elective at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, I found this book to be a great addition to my reference library. I will certainly take it with me when I accompany groups to Sioux Wars sites on future tours.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

CHINA MARINE, E.B. Sledge, The University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 2002, 224 pages, \$29.95.

China Marine is E.B. Sledge's follow-on to his critically acclaimed memoir *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1996). In *China Marine*, Sledge recalls his experiences as a young private in the 5th Marines Regiment, 1st Marine Division, while stationed on occupation duty in North China following the end of World War II. Sledge recounts his combat experiences in Peleliu and Okinawa and how bonds of friendship formed in combat were never broken. These bonds proved invaluable as the Marines of the 1st Marine Division found themselves in the middle of a power struggle for control of all China. While Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung, and various warlords fought for control of

war-torn China, U.S. Marines fought and died while attempting to provide stability to the region.

Sledge relates how he transitioned mentally from a life focused on battle and the camaraderie among soldiers; to duty in China, where he formed new and lasting friendships among the Chinese; and finally, as a professor in a small southern university. Sledge superbly describes his adventures. His narrative is easily read, and anyone who has been in a kill-or-be-killed situation can readily relate.

COL C.E. Hatch, USMC,
Retired, Foster, Oklahoma

EAST ASIA AT THE CENTER: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World, Warren I. Cohen, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, 528 pages, \$35.00.

Warren I. Cohen's relatively short book, *East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World*, presents unfamiliar material in a readily understandable way. The last half of the book, which talks about East Asian international relations since 1600, emphasizes the relatively recent past. Cutting across traditional chronologies, Cohen takes a broad view of diplomacy and considers continuities and disruptions—wars and revolutions and cultural, religious, and commercial exchanges—as well as evolving relations between the region's various states and nations. Cohen's conclusion is that China, like all great powers, will behave in the present as it did in the past—aggressive when strong, defensive when weak.

This brief summary does not do justice to this book's narrative sweep or its conclusions. I recommend that all who are curious about or who have a professional interest in East Asia read this book.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Senior Historian, Huntsville, Alabama

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO, L. Douglas Keeney and Stephen Schwartz, MBI Publishing Company, St. Paul, MN, 2002, 126 pages, \$19.95.

In *Doomsday Scenario*, L. Douglas Keeney and Stephen Schwartz present two of the three sections from the U.S. *Emergency Plans Book (EPB)* that until 1998 remained clas-

sified. The *EPB*, prepared in 1958 for senior military and civilian leaders, outlines how the United States would ensure continuity of government after a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Keeney and Schwartz discuss the *EPB's* current relevance and application in light of the events of 11 September 2001.

The 1958 version of the *EPB*, which provided guidance for defense mobilization planning in the event of a direct attack on the United States, contained three sections: "Capability Assumptions," "Weapons Effects," and "Situation Assumptions." The second section remains classified, but the format and wording of the *EPB* is unchanged.

The *EPB* contains a scenario of a Soviet strategic forces nuclear attack to illustrate the expected damage to the United States. In "Capability Assumptions," Keeney and Schwartz outline the impact, expected levels of damage on critical infrastructure, and casualty predictions. The *EPB* states that the Soviets will use atomic weapons anywhere in the United States and deliver them by aircraft, submarine, mines, or clandestine means. Unfortunately, Keeney and Swartz incorrectly distinguish between atomic and nuclear bombs, stating that an atomic bomb is smaller in yield than a nuclear bomb and that an atomic bomb is a fission-only bomb while a nuclear bomb is a fusion bomb. The words atomic and nuclear are synonymous, and if one desires to talk about nuclear weapons that incorporate fusion for increased yield, the correct term should be thermonuclear weapon.

A second item worth noting is that the *EPB* assumes that a strike will be a counterforce strike rather than a countervalue strike. In a review of historical bombing campaigns and a comparison of the 11 September 2002 terrorist attacks, Keeney reinforces this targeting method and its underlying assumptions. In almost every recorded bombing campaign, the use of countervalue targeting hardens the resolve of the receivers and fails to achieve the intended objective of the aggressor.

In "Situation Assumptions," the authors discuss results, focusing on

the consequence management efforts of the government and the military. This section also contains pre- and postattack actions still valid today.

The *EBP* identifies clandestine means as a delivery option for a surprise nuclear attack. Most U.S. borders are unguarded and port nuclear-detector capabilities are nonexistent. A determined enemy or terrorist could easily place a small nuclear weapon anywhere in the United States and detonate it at will. Keeney brings this issue out and raises the question of why this critical issue remains unresolved after more than 40 years.

The *EBP* assumed a nuclear attack would paralyze the economic and other critical systems within the country, and the shape of the economy would reflect the effects for years. The government would rely on local and regional governments to carry out national-level policies and to make the best use of remaining resources to provide necessary services while encouraging survivors to conduct normal consumer functions. Keeney and Swartz link this section of the *EBP* directly to the effects from the 11 September attacks and the economic results when Wall Street finally re-opened. Although they do not directly state this conclusion, I believe they felt that the government could have done more to prepare for this type of attack and clearly could have handled post-attack actions and civilian confidence differently.

I recommend this book to anyone who has an interest in the history of U.S. nuclear doctrine or U.S. consequence-management efforts.

MAJ Richard A. Schueneman,
USAF, Offutt AFB, Nebraska

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, Pave Podvig, ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, 192 pages, \$45.00.

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces is a compendium on the evolution of such forces and provides information on most of the central issues concerning Russian strategic weapons. Written in 2001, the book covers the conception of the Soviet nuclear weapons development program in

the 1940s to the situation of strategic forces in Russia up to 1998. The book begins with a short history, structure, and organization of Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, then examines nuclear weapons production, nuclear tests, the strategic rocket forces, naval strategic nuclear forces, strategic aviation, and strategic defense. A short afterword deals with more recent attempts at reform. The authors draw the uncontroversial conclusion that Russia will most likely continue to draw down the number of weapons it currently possesses and that the major source of tension will remain the U.S. position of creating a national missile defense.

This book is an outstanding source for a detailed overview of technical and institutional information concerning Russian strategic forces. It is also an excellent initial source for students, researchers, or professionals dealing with issues relating to these forces. Of special interest are the sections covering various arms control initiatives.

Although this book is an excellent source on Russian nuclear forces and specific weapons systems, it does not include an analysis of political factors that influenced the development and current posture of Russian nuclear policy. Also, there is little information on the effect of various nonproliferation programs that have played major roles in destroying excess systems and improving security since the Soviet Union's demise.

MAJ Ralph T. Blackburn, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE EMERGENCE OF PEER COMPETITORS: A Framework for Analysis, Thomas. S. Szayna, Daniel L. Byman, Steven C. Bankes, Derek Eaton, Seth G. Jones, Robert E. Mullins, Ian O. Lesser, and William Rosenau, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 171 pages, \$18.00.

This succinct work constructs a framework that strategists, soldiers, intelligence specialists, scholars, and statesman can use when assessing what should be the long-term future national security strategy of the United States in response to the rise of a peer competitor. The authors'

thesis is that identifying the rise of a peer competitor early is the most important long-term planning challenge for the Department of Defense.

The study begins with an explication of the term "proto-peer competitor." The authors define the term as follows:

- It is a state that has certain characteristics.

- It must have the means (defined as multiple elements of national power at its disposal) and a desire to upset the current international status quo.

- It must be able to challenge the current hegemon (the United States), and the outcome of the challenge must be uncertain, even if the hegemon uses all its assets in the fight.

The study outlines four strategies a state could use to aggregate power so it can compete with the United States either regionally or globally. A proto-peer can reform itself, undergo revolution, form alliances, or seek hegemony through conquest. A future proto-peer might use one, a combination, or all of the above in its drive for power.

The study also provides four possible strategic options the United States can use in attempts to counteract the power aggregation desires of a proto-peer competitor. The United States might adopt a conciliatory stance, attempt to co-opt the rising power to accept the status quo, constrain the proto-peer, or directly compete with the proto-peer to retain its hegemony.

The framework is an easily implemented and understood tool to conduct an initial assessment of potential competitors. The proposed framework has three advantages. First, it defines what a nation-state needs to be classified as a proto-peer (ability and intent). This is crucial because domestic political concerns often create inaccurate impressions of other nation-states, leaving the strategist to look elsewhere for information with which to build a strategy. Second, the framework provides an objective, structured methodology with which to assess potential risks and gains for a given strategy that the United States might adopt. Third, the framework provides the strategist a basis

from which to assess second- and third-order effects a particular strategy might create. This ability is absolutely crucial for developing a long-term strategy that affects U.S. national security policy.

This study is a valuable resource for military professionals. It outlines possible strategic options for future competitors against United States hegemony and provides realistic options for the United States in combating the rise of such a competitor. Worldwide operations demonstrate that the most seemingly insignificant tactical events can and do have operational and strategic repercussions. This work provides in an analytical model with which to solve future national security problems and crises with respect to the United States and its future competitors. With the levels of war so merged as to be nearly indistinguishable, it is important for military professionals to read books such as this.

The only detractor to the study is that some sections are rather technical as the parameters for the game logic are explained in detail. The chapters on game modeling and decision rules are best skipped unless one is knowledgeable about those topics.

MAJ Daniel S. Hurlbut, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DEFENSE BY OTHER MEANS: The Politics of US-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation, Jason D. Ellis, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2001, 221 pages, \$67.95.

In *Defense By Other Means: The Politics of US-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation*, Jason D. Ellis provides the background, evolution, and future forecasts for the Nunn-Lugar program. The program was a bipartisan initiative that sought to provide the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU) assistance in denuclearizing their countries.

Ellis presents a detailed account of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, or Nunn-Lugar, since its initiation in 1991. He provides background information detailing the need for the program and the hurdles that stood in the program's way. He

also outlines the problems of trying to execute such a complex program with countries that only a few years before had their nuclear weapons aimed at the United States. Ellis's descriptions of the ways various federal agencies conduct daily business regarding complex and proprietary issues provide insights applicable to any number of federal programs. The clearly depicted data supports all of Ellis's facts and suppositions.

For the novice to the subject of arms control, this book provides an excellent base on which to build a further understanding of U.S. policy on future threat-reduction programs and legislation. Ellis presents the information in such a manner that even without a thorough knowledge of arms control or nuclear disarmament the book is enjoyable and easy to understand. The fact that Ellis provides repeated definitions or important facts and figures in several chapters allows the reader to refer to pertinent information without having to constantly search through the entire book.

Military personnel working in arms control, strategic planning, or military-to-military programs relating to NIS from the FSU will find this book a good reference.

MAJ Donald R. Baker, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, Henry A. Kissinger, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2001, 318 pages, \$30.00.

"Yes" is the answer to the question in the title of Henry A. Kissinger's foreign policy treatise. Ironically, the book's thesis would have been quite different if the title pressed for a "new" American foreign policy, as opposed to a foreign policy at all.

Kissinger's title bolsters his view that for the past decade (during President Bill Clinton's administration) the United States has not had a coherent foreign policy. This lack of strategic vision came at a time of unprecedented uncertainty in the world, a period when many longed for, and others grew resentful of, U.S. leadership. The book proposes that for the United States to excel in its new position of global preeminence, it must

adapt its foreign policy to the new realities of the international order, asserting U.S. power and protecting U.S. interests by building consensus in a more humble manner.

Kissinger supports his thesis by balancing the scales of a "strange mixture"—U.S. global preeminence versus the potential of becoming irrelevant. On the one hand, U.S. power engenders respect and submission; on the other hand, long-term objectives (or lack thereof) arouse feelings of exasperation and confusion. Kissinger balances these two extremes in chapters devoted to each of the major world regions as well as the politics of globalization, peace (with respect to humanitarian intervention), and justice (in the sense of universal jurisdiction). In short, Kissinger is for constructive engagement with Russia and China; is anti-intervention; and definitely against any type of international criminal court. In addition to outlining potential pitfalls if the United States stays the current unilateralist path, Kissinger particularly emphasizes the facts around the growing tensions between the United States and transatlantic partners in Europe.

Overall, Kissinger's recommendations are carefully nuanced, and he does not pose any radical shifts from policies being pursued today by President George W. Bush. I laud the call for more humility and less post-Cold War gloating in U.S. foreign policy. There is a clear warning against the current trend toward America's unilateralist approach to the world, one that Kissinger cautions could erode the benefits of U.S. leadership. After all, Kissinger is the consummate diplomat and rarely bypasses an opportunity to engage other countries for their support of U.S. policies. To do so would be diplomatic suicide.

For the military professional, regardless of specialty, it is essential to engage in debate about America's role in world affairs. This is especially true in an era of increased combined operations and coalition building. To know and to understand how the world perceives the United States and to be aware of the limits of U.S. power is critical. Kissinger's astute

combination of history and prescriptions for a better foreign policy are valuable. His book is rife with appropriate historical references that might have relevance for tomorrow's global landscape. Military professionals can gain a much better understanding of second- and third-order effects of strategy and plans by stepping inside Kissinger's strategic thinking. While the mechanics of political and military maneuvering might be different, the thought processes to arrive at such strategic decisions are strikingly similar.

MAJ Daniel R. Green, USA,
North East, Maryland

QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security, Michele A. Flournoy, ed., National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 2001, 388 pages, \$30.00.

QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security is the result of 15 months of effort by a group from the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chartered the group in 1999 to conduct an intellectual review of the issues involving defense policy and to serve as a starting point for developing defense strategy, policies, and programs.

The review was conducted with the recognition that an estimated annual imbalance of \$30 to \$50 billion dollars exists between defense resources and strategy. Editor Michele A. Flournoy compares the situation to an analogy of an "iron triangle." The three sides of the triangle represent the U.S. Department of Defense's requirements: to spend more (to receive an overall budget increase); to cut costs (to determine internal efficiencies and redistribute the savings to accomplish goals); or to do less. Flournoy acknowledges that political reality might make it impossible to increase defense spending to meet defense requirements.

Thirteen additional chapters examine other critical issues that must be addressed to determine defense policy and to provide recommendations for further consideration in developing an integrated national defense strategy. This book is an excel-

lent resource for anyone interested in exploring this complex issue. Although the book is lengthy, the stand-alone chapters facilitate quick analysis of several critical issues.

The study group's effort predates the final QDR by over 9 months and the events of 11 September 2001. The 79-page QDR is available online at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>.

LTC Gregory L. Cantwell, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? Terrorism and the New War, James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose, eds., Foreign Affairs, New York, 2001, 324 pages, \$14.00.

How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War is a superb, thought-provoking book. The combined talents of 24 civilian and military Middle East experts, such as General (Retired) Wesley Clark, William Perry, Samuel Berger, Fouad Ajami, and others of high caliber and recognition, make this must reading for the military community.

Neither complacency nor hysteria, obviously, are good ways of approaching U.S. national security. More appropriate is measured determination grounded in facts and sound judgments about the challenges facing the country and the alternative responses available. Many have questioned why the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks occurred and who the people were who were responsible. This book is an excellent analysis of what happened, although some conclusions are speculative, and it offers insight into possible ways to combat future problems.

Each writer tells a compelling story or narrative about what he sees as the driving force behind why planes were launched against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Several major points underscore the thesis. For example, in "American Society Responds to the New War," Alan Wolfe proposes that the main reasons for attacking America stem from how the attackers perceive Western culture and religion.

In "Somebody Else's Civil War," Michael Duran argues that Osama bin-Laden wanted to cast the United States and its allies as demons and

instruments of Satan. Bin-Laden wanted to incite the Arab and Muslim communities to drive America from the face of the earth. Such acts would satisfy the Umma or the universal Islamic community and restore harmony and balance: "The ensuing outrage will open a chasm between state and society . . . , and the governments allied with the West . . . will find themselves adrift."

Karen Armstrong's narrative, "Was It Inevitable?" examines Americans' attitudes toward Islam. The truth is that most of us believe that all people of Muslim and Islamic faiths are fanatical terrorists and the "enemies of decent civilization" (an extremely narrow and dangerous view). This is an excellent book. I recommend it to everyone.

MAJ Rene Brown, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER MILITARY LEADERS IN NEWLY DEMOCRATIC NATIONS: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea, Terence Roehrig, McFarland and Company, Jefferson, NC, 2002, 211 pages, \$35.00.

Can a nation that has been under military rule successfully transition to a democratic government and reassert civilian control over the military? Can the new government hold the former military regime accountable for previous human-rights abuses in a manner that does not provoke the military to seize power again? Terence Roehrig addresses these pertinent questions in *The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea*. Roehrig's thesis is that "the military can be prosecuted for past atrocities while not provoking a rebellion, if the civilian government embarks on a careful yet firm path to impose justice in a way that does not threaten the military as an institution." He provides in-depth analyses of how new governments in each country dealt with the military, cogently explaining why Argentina's approach resulted in military rebellion while Greece and South Korea's handling of military leaders resulted in acquiescence from their armed forces.

To organize his analysis, Roehrig uses Alfred Stepan's military prerogatives as the basis for his argument. Stepan's prerogatives are defined as "areas where the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise internal control over its internal governance. . . ." They are the privileges of political power that military regimes enjoyed during their reigns. Roehrig argues that during a transition to democracy, a civilian government must negotiate with the military over the retention of these prerogatives. The agreement reached by the military and the incoming government over the containment of these prerogatives is crucial to a successful transition to democracy. In Argentina's case, the government appeared to be tearing away at the prerogatives to the point where military leaders felt that the military, as an institution, was being attacked, along with attacks against individuals responsible for abuse of power.

Roehrig highlights the importance of civilian control over the military, one of the most valued cornerstones of the U.S. Constitution. He calls for some degree of soul-searching within the Washington establishment, urging it to consider that the United States has a history of supporting military regimes, such as that of South Korea, and that it cannot ignore the sobering possibility that there might have been complicity on the part of the United States in the transgressions of these military regimes.

The book is well written and well organized. Roehrig breaks down each case in a straightforward, structured style that makes his logic easy to follow. He masterfully applies specific examples and tables throughout the book to strengthen his argument and to illuminate his main points.

The book's only shortcoming is that it does not adequately examine the effect public sentiment had on the governments' resolve and ability to bring military leaders to trial. Roehrig does mention, in passing, the public's desire to bring military leaders to justice, but he does not sufficiently address the influence the public has in such countries. This

minor shortcoming certainly does not detract from Roehrig's brilliant work.

MAJ Ernest C. Lee, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS FOR WAR: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, Gary R. Hess, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2001, 262 pages, \$49.95.

The decision to commit U.S. forces to combat is perhaps the most difficult and agonizing that any U.S. president might face. When exercising wartime leadership, a president must simultaneously contemplate myriad formal and informal powers at his disposal. Indeed, President George W. Bush currently faces the serious challenges of balancing these powers while executing the war on terrorism.

In *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf*, Gary R. Hess adeptly analyzes the factors influencing a president in his wartime decisions. Hess's approach to the study of presidential decisionmaking is similar to that of Richard E. Neustadt in his seminal work *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (The Free Press, New York, 1991). Unlike Neustadt, who focuses on a president's formal and informal powers, Hess focuses specifically on the complex decisions of three presidents as applied to the limited wars each faced: Harry S. Truman in Korea, Lyndon B. Johnson in Vietnam, and George H.W. Bush in the Persian Gulf. According to Hess, the effectiveness of presidential leadership in limited wars is mainly based on the following factors:

- The ability to clearly define political and military objectives.
- The ability to rely on sound counsel from presidential advisers.
- The ability to gain the support of Congress and the American people.
- The ability to win the backing of the international community.

Hess analyzes the factors influencing each president in deciding to commit troops, and then he focuses on variables influencing the effectiveness of each president's leadership throughout the conflict. He highlights how Truman's decision to extend

forces across the 38th parallel resulted in lost congressional, public, and international support. He explains the effect of Johnson's inability to articulate clear goals and to effectively deal with Congress and the American public. Finally, Hess shows that even when a president effectively balances the many competing factors, as Bush did in the Persian Gulf, in the end, the public might still want more.

By analyzing the factors influencing presidential wartime leadership across all four instruments of power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational), Hess gives military professionals a valuable look into the broader context of when, why, and how presidents decide to commit and use forces and the subsequent pressures they face. Hess's methodology is useful beyond his three case studies. His insight is timely and constructive in the 21st century's complex, changing strategic environment. Indeed, President George W. Bush's ability to effectively balance these factors might ultimately determine the success of the current war on terrorism.

MAJ Troy D. Perry, USA,
Belfast, Maine

BREAKTHROUGH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, Michael Watkins and Susan Rosegrant, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 2001, 346 pages, \$40.00.

How did Richard Holbrooke get Bosnia's antagonists to sit down at the same table? What was Robert Gallucci's strategy to present President Bill Clinton's response to North Korea's development of nuclear technology? How does one build a successful coalition for war? What steps did Terje Larsen take to push Middle East discussions to a different level? Are successful negotiators made or born? Is there a set of tenets, which can be applied to any negotiating scenario? *Breakthrough International Negotiation* by Michael Watkins and Susan Rosegrant attempts to address these questions in this interesting, insightful book.

Watkins and Rosegrant's study of four complex cases in which breakthroughs were attained in situations that had been considered deadlocked,

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highlights seven principles that capture how negotiators operate. A definition of breakthrough negotiators is that they "shape the structure of their situations, organize to learn, are masters of process design, foster agreement when possible but employ force when necessary, anticipate and manage conflict, build momentum toward agreement, and lead from the middle." The way negotiators apply the seven principles varies with each circumstance, but they are present in every breakthrough negotiation. Some principles are further broken down to capture the many facets involved—some more applicable than others, depending on the situation's complexity. The principles ensure every question is asked and every possibility considered. In other words, a negotiator's attention to detail, with a mix of flexibility, charisma, and drive, will produce results.

MAJ Melinda Mate, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SPIRIT, BLOOD, AND TREASURE: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century, Donald Vandergriff, ed., Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2001, 424 pages, \$34.95.

Discussion of the future transformation of the U.S. military, although somewhat muted since the events of 11 September 2001, has begun to re-emerge as a contentious issue, particularly since President George W. Bush unveiled his new military budget request. *Spirit, Blood, and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century* attempts to identify some of the innovative changes necessary for improving U.S. military capability. The emphasis is on improving the ability to react faster than can potential enemies and to reform the defense establishment to be able to adapt to rapidly changing future circumstances.

According to this collection of articles, 21st-century conflict is evolving into a pattern where opposing forces can attack the political will of adversaries while avoiding direct confrontation with conventional military forces. This type of conflict is known as fourth-generation warfare. This book argues that the military-industrial-congressional complex (MICC) has been unable to adapt to

the changing external environment and to prepare the military to efficiently achieve its objectives in fourth-generation warfare scenarios.

Editor Donald Vandergriff, an active-duty U.S. Army major, organizes the anthology into three major sections: people, ideas, and hardware/budgets. Civilian and military authors, representing all services, contribute to the various topics but the "people" and "hardware" sections have a decidedly Army flavor. The section on "ideas" constitutes almost half of the book and provides the most stimulating thoughts. Several articles focus on means for enhancing the development of maneuver warfare doctrine along with techniques for increasing the speed of the military unit decision cycle (observe, orient, decide, act [OODA]). All services are well represented with innovative ideas on how to transform their respective services, but the collection focuses mainly on Army institutions.

This anthology provides many points for discussion of the future of the U.S. military and would be useful to anyone interested in the transformation debate.

LCDR Joseph G. Klein, USN,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR,

Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offley, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2001, 296 pages, \$16.95.

In *Lifting the Fog of War*, Admiral Bill Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states that fewer Americans, including fewer policymakers, have personal experience with the all-volunteer military. Thus, when watching CNN news reports of the apparently easy military successes in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, Americans might think that the military is sufficiently strong to dominate all conflicts for the foreseeable future. When discussions of the defense budget arise, many will ask, "If the military ain't broke, why spend all those billions to fix it?" Owens devotes his book to showing that, while appearing formidable, the U.S. military is, in fact, running on empty. Because of force reductions, more deployments, and aging combat sys-

tems fast approaching obsolescence, the U.S. military is in danger of imploding.

Owens offers a relatively inexpensive fix. He argues that by integrating advanced information technology into redesigned force structures and by developing innovative doctrine, tactics, and training to govern their use, the United States can conduct a revolution in the way it wages war. In so doing, Owens claims the U.S. can transform its military into a smaller, more flexible, more lethal, and less-expensive force.

Owens illustrates his argument with historical examples of how failing to adapt existing force structure, doctrine, tactics, and training to new technology led to defeat for France in the Franco-Prussian War, for the Confederacy at Gettysburg, and for NATO during the air war over Kosovo and Yugoslavia. To Owens, the largest obstacle to this revolution is not the U.S. public or U.S. policymakers; it is the services themselves. What is most needed, Owens argues, is a transformation in the zero-sum mindset of U.S. military leaders.

True military transformation might mean the loss or realignment of the services' traditional roles and missions, resulting in fewer budget dollars for the losing service. Military leaders, primarily concerned with organizational survival in a fiscally constrained environment, impede Transformation from becoming a truly joint force that could best, and least expensively, leverage the nation's information-technology advantage in the pursuit of national objectives.

MAJ Robert P. Mooney, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION AGE WARFARE,

David S. Alberts, eds., CCRP Publications, Vienna, VA, 2001, 312 pages, price unknown.

The main thesis of *Understanding Information Age Warfare* is the importance of providing understanding of the characteristics of information superiority and information-age warfare. The essays describe a spiral-development process required to transform the current military platform-centric infostructure into a network-centric one: "The main purpose of this book is to contribute to our

ability to move to the next spiral by providing a more detailed articulation of Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfare.”

Platform-centric warfare is oriented around individual nodes (AWACS, JSTARS, individual operation centers, and so on). Network-centric warfare is oriented around an information “infostructure” required to provide maximum information sharing and collaboration. The essayists define the parameters of information (richness, reach, quality, and so on) and note the challenges of measuring the performance and effectiveness of spiral development.

The writers base their discussions on three information domains: physical, information, and cognitive. “The physical domain is the place where the situation the military seeks to influence exists (ground truth). The information domain is where information lives (might or might not be ground truth). The cognitive domain is in the minds of the participants (individual cognition).” The ability to share information creates a common operating environment (COE) giving all participants a common situational awareness. The authors believe this will lead to more effective collaboration and change how we approach command and control (C2) in the information age.

The new mental model will allow greater integration that, in turn, will allow more autonomous operations and will further decentralize the decisionmaking process. This allows for more responsive operations. The premise is based, of course, on a common understanding of commander’s intent.

This book’s importance to a military professional is obvious. A better understanding of information superiority and network-centric warfare is the foundation of knowledge required for implementing Joint Vision 2020. The focus now needs to be on the civilian sector. As we fight the war on terrorism, understanding the need for a COE and decentralized C2 and maximizing information-sharing and collaboration will be critical to success. To win the war on terrorism, military professionals will need to lead the way in crafting a

strategy to bring together unlike agencies and departments at all levels of government.

MAJ Joe Friers, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DEFENSE PLANNING IN A DECADE OF CHANGE: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review, Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, Kristin Leuschner, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 156 pages, \$20.00.

This document is a study that summarizes and compares three major military force-structure reviews that occurred during the 1990s: the 1989–1990 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR), and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Key comparisons include assumptions about the threats, strategy, and budget as well as decisions and implementation of these decisions. The purpose of the comparison was to provide a historical context for future defense reviews, including the already released, 2001 QDR. The research study was requested by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) as part of a larger study to determine where the USAF would stand after each of the major defense reviews during the 1990s.

The research team came to several conclusions regarding strategy, force structure, and budgets. They suggest that strategy changes from one time to another, have important ramifications on resulting force structures and budgets, and are often ignored during defense reviews. If strategy was better linked to force structure and budget, changes in strategy could be effectively measured in terms of resources.

The study also concludes that during the 1990 reviews, more concern was placed on current-day threats and current-day force-readiness issues and that this hampered the force-reshaping effort required for long-term needs. The major argument that supports this conclusion includes force-structure numbers. Force structure and manpower do decrease without undergoing a major force restructuring or transformation, despite changes in strategy.

The authors believe there is a failure between the executive and legis-

lative branches to acknowledge true costs of a strategy. Debates over strategy and policies rarely take place with regard to costs, and this has impeded disclosure and consideration of cost problems. How to spend is based on year-to-year revisions and emergency supplementals to the budget. This has led to an inability to recognize the gap between force structure, budget, and strategy.

Although there is nothing earth shattering about these conclusions, the authors present a strong case, using sound methodology. Their methods include determining the state of world at the time of each force-structure review; determining the military posture before the review; collecting the assumptions, conclusions, and implementation of the review; determining the results of the implementation; and assessing the lessons after each implementation. Those who work in the programming world realize that budget defense levels are not determined from pursuit of strategy, nor is strategy considered when levels are decided. The authors recommend that executive and legislative members work closer to develop a better planning approach.

This report is probably most useful as a historical review of the programming and force-structure decisions made during the last decade, with a USAF emphasis. The review was written in preparation for the 2001 QDR, and it meets this need as a historical context. It is an excellent summary of force structure and budget reviews during the 1990s.

MAJ Catherine A. Poston, USA,
Hyattsville, Maryland

RUSSIA’S CHECHEN WARS 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, Olga Oliker, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 102 pages, \$15.00.

More than a century and a half ago, the Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov remarked of Chechens: “Their god is freedom, their law is war.” It is questionable whether, in the intervening years, the Russians have taken Lermontov’s admonition to heart. Only recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his 2002

State of the Nation address, declared that the military phase of the conflict in Chechnya might be considered closed. Almost concurrently ambushes in Grozny and elsewhere killed more than two dozen servicemen and police; thereby placing a sharp question mark after Putin's public assertion.

In *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, Olga Olikier considers exactly what the Russian military learned in Chechnya. Specifically, what did they learn from the first Chechen operation that influenced planning and execution of the second? Olikier examines the differences in approach to fighting that the Russians took in each experience. The disastrous initial battle for Grozny in late 1994 and early 1995 did, in fact, prompt Russian rethinking before the Grozny redux of 1999-2000. Olikier recounts changes in tactics, equipment, and coordination, among other improvements. She credits the Russian military for acknowledging existing failings in their military and compensating for them. Moreover, she gives attention to the importance of information operations, and closer coordination of fire support sharply distinguishes the second Russian adventure from the first.

Olikier correctly identifies the cardinal error of Russian planners between the wars. She maintains that "because the Russian military so feared urban combat and were so determined to avoid it, they were largely unprepared for it when it came." Russian reliance on high-caliber ordnance could not make up for the deficiency of high-caliber troops. Despite experiential learning afforded by the first war, block-by-block urban operations were unavoidable during the second fight. In the end, an entrenched urban insurgency was not soluble exclusively with application of firepower. Seizing the city (and the region) required infantry.

Olikier's work includes an admirable study of the host of primary and secondary sources detailing Russia's experiences in Chechnya.

Paying careful attention to both Western and Russian materials, her greatest contribution might be the coherent summary of widely disparate information. Her analysis is balanced and thorough. This slim book will find an appreciative readership among military and security professionals looking for a trenchant, concise summation of Russian urban operations in Chechnya.

MAJ Martin Ryan, USA,
Plattsburgh, New York

MENDING FENCES: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin, Elizabeth Wishnick, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2001, 320 pages, \$45.00.

In *Mending Fences*, Elizabeth Wishnick carefully details the evolution of Moscow's China policy from 1969 to the present. Soviet policy toward China has come full circle from alliance to containment then back to strategic partnership. Wishnick chronicles the policy's slow evolution and lists the players behind the scenes. She outlines the primary problems the Soviets faced during the Brezhnev period that resulted in the policy of containment. The major factors were border and ideological disputes, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations. These factors culminated in Moscow's hard line against China and détente with the U.S. in an effort to contain China.

After Brezhnev's death, Moscow's policy toward China was in flux because advocates in Moscow and the border regions wanted to improve trade with China. In the middle 1980s, however, Moscow's attitude toward China began to thaw, and change began to speed up. There was a push to improve border trade to spur development in Soviet border regions, and reformers in Moscow were inspired by reforms that were going on in China.

Initially, during the Yeltsin period, there was a move toward the West. However, when market reforms failed to produce success, there was a move toward a partnership with China. The successes with China

were in oil and gas and the defense industry. Russia's renewal of relations with China was a counter to NATO's eastward expansion.

Wishnick's portrayal of the slow evolution of Moscow's China policy gives the military professional a good perspective of how strategic policy was formulated in the Soviet Union, and then in Russia. I highly recommend this book.

MAJ Timothy N. Miller, USA,
Nixa, Missouri

THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, Zalmai Khalilzad, ed., The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 260 pages, \$20.00.

The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, a futures book, vividly analyzes the political environment and how it will affect U.S. national interests. Considering Asia's economic miracles during the last two decades and the stabilizing role the U.S. military provides to the region, the essays in this book suggest that continued U.S. involvement in the region is consistent with current and future national interests. Specifically, they advise that long-term national interests require the United States to directly intervene in Asia to achieve three necessary objectives: the prevention of a regional hegemony, the maintenance of regional stability, and the management of Asia's transformation.

The essays recommend a detailed four-part strategy to help attain the three objectives. First, the United States, where possible, should transform bilateral security alliances into multilateral security alliances. These alliances could then work to strengthen and preserve Asia's security environment. Second, the United States should foster an effective regional balance of power to check future aspirations of regional hegemony by China, India, or Russia. Third, the United States, to preempt any miscalculated assumptions by potential adversaries, should forcefully articulate and manifest its regional interests. Finally, the United

States should advocate the creation of a security forum for the entire Asian region.

Among the authors critical analyses are their assertions that America's enduring ability to continue its policy of forward-deployed military forces in Japan and South Korea is waning. Consequently, based on the technical operating capabilities of current and future U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft, the authors suggest establishing U.S. military airfields in the Philippines and in Vietnam. These locations would permit the United States to better influence foreign policies in Taiwan and the South China Sea area.

This book, both thought-provoking and easily assimilated, would greatly benefit political-military analysts and readers who seek a broad exposure to the security environment of Asia. Without reservation, I strongly recommend this book to all regional policymakers.

MAJ James M. Minnich, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE RISE OF CHINA IN ASIA: Security Implications, Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2001, 308 pages, price unknown.

The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications is a compilation of essays presented at a March 2001 conference attended by members of

the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Duke University's Program in Asian Security Studies. Conference contributors discussed the implications of the rise of China for the international community and, in particular, the United States. The essays that editor Carolyn W. Pumphrey presents examine the current political climate in China, whether or not China is a security threat to the United States, China's effect on other countries in the region, and the implications of the U.S. political landscape.

"Great Power Transitions" addresses the Chinese political process, focusing on issues that occurred during the waning years of the third generation of leaders. The essay lists some of the potential fourth-generation leaders and how their actions affect China's domestic and foreign policy.

In evaluating the threat from China, one essayist determined that China is not a threat to U.S. interests. One author presents an interesting discussion on the dilapidated state of the Chinese military and how, despite their best efforts to modernize their industry, weapons, and technologies, they continue to fall behind the United States and its Western allies.

The book evaluates two scenarios

in which China would be a potential future threat to the United States. One would be the financial collapse of the Chinese economy; the second might occur if China's economy strengthens to the point where it becomes a global economic power. In either case, China's military force would continue to fall behind in technology, and the government would not be friendly to the United States.

The book concludes with a discussion of President George W. Bush's policies toward China. The issues discussed center on international security, economic prosperity, and human rights. Regardless of what policies the United States pursues, the Chinese are going to resist pressure to go in any given direction—a direct effect of the period of Imperialism in China before the 1949 revolution.

Even though academicians wrote this book, it is easy to read. But, because of the high level of discussion, with little historical context to support or explain arguments, it is not a good book for someone to read to learn the historical significance of any given event. Still, to grasp current headlines about China and to get some intellectually stimulating discussion from people who have time to study the area, this information will be helpful.

MAJ Brian Patterson, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MR Letters

Magic

Thank you for the courtesy copy of the review of *Magic: The Untold Story of U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West Coast during World War II* by David D. Lowman (Provo, UT: Athena Press, Inc., 2001), which appeared in the September-October 2002 issue of *Military Review*. I am pleased, of course, that it was good review, but I must tell you of my admiration for your willingness to even

do it considering the political implications. I was an admirer and reader of *Military Review* during my years of active service. I am now even a greater admirer for your integrity and courage. This important part of military scholarship is in good hands with you at the helm. Thanks again for the copy.

Lee Allen, Athena Press, Provo, Utah

Editor's note: Military Review tries to provide a forum for fair, balanced debate.

A Fiasco

I was glad to see that in his article "Equipping the Force" (*Military Review*, May-June 2002) Brian J. Dunn takes a more independent view of Army Transformation than is usually seen in Army journals. An author is always pleased to see his work ("Remaining Relevant," *Armed Forces Journal International* [October 1997]) cited, but unfortunately, Dunn appears to be unaware of my more relevant paper, "The 'Shinseki Trans-

formation Initiative'—is a Fiasco" (publishing citation not given, revised 27 May 2002). The heart of the latter paper is that Army Transformation, at least the vehicle part of it—the modified IAV [interim armored vehicle] (a modified LAV [light armored vehicle] III)—is a multibillion dollar fraud.

In October 1999, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric K. Shinseki said that he had several goals to make the Army more deployable; specifically the following:

1. The Army needs light armored vehicles deployable by C-130 transport aircraft.

2. That he saw buying wheeled armored vehicles as being the best means to meet that goal.

3. That he wanted to buy off-the-shelf vehicles to minimize cost and schedule.

Some have said that the CSA did not propose "exactly" the above goals. That is disingenuous! The military is a "command society," and he made his wishes quite clear. I base my conclusions on the following:

Item 1 is grossly misleading, since the Army already owns, and has owned for 4 decades, approximately 17,000 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) fully capable of being deployed by C-130s. Surely we can expect Shinseki to know that the Army has 17,000 LAVs capable of being deployed on C-130s.

Item 2 is false. The only comparative data available (Army data) show the superiority of tracked armored vehicles over wheeled armored vehicles for combat operations. Wheeled vehicles are essentially roadbound and not able to maneuver freely in combat. Does HQDA believe that we should equip ourselves for combat in a way in which we would be immobilized in a fight where there are no roads, such as in the Philippines or Indonesia, which is a hotbed of Muslim unrest? Does Shinseki's scenario allow for rain?

Item 3 is false in two ways, since according to Army data the vehicle the Army chose is *not* transportable by C-130s, and the LAV III will *not* be bought off the shelf, but will be modified to be deployable in a C-130.

Don Loughlin, Lynden, Washington

Editor's note: The paper Laughlin discusses in this letter was written before 911.

What Defines "Definitive"?

I would be most grateful if you could kindly put me in contact with Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Robert G. Smith, USAR, who wrote a review of my book, *Race for the Reichstag: The 1945 Battle for Berlin* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), in the May-June 2001 issue of *Military Review*, a copy of which I have just received.

As an active lecturer and staff-ride guide on the 1945 Berlin battles, I am most anxious to correct the errors in my book that he refers to and also to discover what he regards as the definitive work on this subject. I might add that Colonel David M. Glantz does not share Smith's views on my work!

**LTC Anthony H. Le Tissier, MBE,
Retired, Somerset, Great Britain**

Editor's note: LTC Robert G. Smith is unavailable for comment.

Command Post "Turf"

Overall, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Burkett's *Military Review* article "Radical C2 Doctrine and Design" (September-October 2002) is insightful, and I applaud Burkett for entering into the command post (CP) dialogue. From 2000 to 2002, I was Chief of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and Battle Command in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Brigade Coordination Cell, where I was involved with the design and implementation of CPs or tactical operations centers (TOCs) in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). I can attest to the fact that developing effective CPs is a challenge that will continue to require a great deal of attention. Universally, the current species of digitally enabled CPs are too large, too immobile, and too complex. They are failing to live up to the dynamic promise of digitization.

Command posts' current unsatisfactory state is not for a want of trying; it is representative of challenges that need to be rectified in the requirements-generation and the materiel-development communities. Burkett points out that assembling appropriate requirements today

normally results in a frustrating collaboration that is a series of compromises. The CP turf war among various TRADOC schoolhouses is not being waged with malice. Rather, each branch believes itself to be important to the fight.

Unfortunately, the mainstream technological solution cannot give the assured communications that will result in a mistake-proof dispersion of information generators, such as intelligence analysts and planners, and information users (operations). As the systems mature, the ability to disperse various elements of the CP with a minimal footprint forward will be realized.

The materiel-development process does not help CP development, integration, or fielding. Unlike a Stryker vehicle, no CP is fielded as a distinct entity. If one were to go to his unit TOE/MTOE to find "Command Post" or "TOC" as a line item, he would not find it. Command posts are not developed and fielded in the classic sense of a system of systems. Rather, they are built. Command posts are composed of a loose, unofficial collection of "stuff" that lacks much of the support, integration, and system new-equipment training that would be received through a more holistic approach.

At Fort Lewis, Washington, CPs were partially built by the TOC project manager (PM). Much of the equipment came from other PMs, and up to eight PMs contributed to the overall CP. We referred to this as "little 't' TOC" versus the more inclusive "big 'T' TOC." The result was a great deal of on-the-ground integration to make things work—integration that included the ever-frustrating patches and workarounds that are sometimes documented and passed on and sometimes not. The process included capability-retarding local compromises by well-meaning people who wanted to get their bit done and move on. It did not include a comprehensive, long-term system support plan and complete digital training plan (including the sequencing of the establishment of the CP, power-up boxes, and so on). It also did not include safety testing and materiel-releasing in the traditional sense.

The Army needs to begin developing CPs as holistic systems of systems that would include integrated electronics, which in turn would include modular, purpose-built shelters and platforms. Currently, the Army is attempting to adapt 1980s shelters and platforms to 21st-century C4ISR that is only just emerging from a generation of stovepipe development. Power will continue to be a major problem so long as the Army remains tied to the current generation of diesel generators.

In the SBCT, the power-distribution system became exceedingly complex, with the initial schematic not only inefficient in terms of load distribution but also in the creation of near-hazardous fumes and noise. The system required extensive, ongoing

redesign and field modification. Technical challenges such as range- and reception-degrading electromagnetic interference will still be treated in an ad hoc, after-the-fact, exploratory manner until we establish some degree of specification.

Burkett says that manning CPs will continue to be a challenge with the need to maintain systems experts. If the Army follows a trend toward using multiprocessor units and integrated C4ISR, it might be able to move away from having subject matter experts "on each box."

The Army needs to move rapidly to develop multifunctional staff members (officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers) who can shift between assets and gather the necessary information. This becomes

even more acute at brigade and battalion levels because the Army wants true battle command on the move (BCOTM). This will require minimal staffing and technical improvements, such as the secure, wireless, local area networks and a manageable satellite on the move.

The energy, innovation, and dedication of the soldiers and civilians working to solve local problems and make their CPs work must impress anyone who has been to Fort Lewis to see the SBCT command posts. However, establishing a new generation of CPs that will support a highly mobile, agile, digital force will necessitate continued development and ingenuity at all levels.

LTC Christopher J. Toomey,
U.S. Army, Engineers

